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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Respondent/ Appellee Debra J. Robinson ("Debra") has determined that she will 
not be appealing any issue on a cross appeal. Accordingly, the only issues on appeal are 
those raised by Petitioner/Appellant Michael S. Robinson ("Michael"). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
U.C.A. Section 38-9-1-4. (Addendum, Ex. Q). 
U.C.A. Section 78B-6-1304. (Addendum, Ex. R). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Since being remitted back to the trial court, this case has resulted in protracted 
litigation caused by Michael's attempts to prevent enforcement by Debra of the terms of a 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement dated November 2, 2007 (the 
"Stipulation") (Addendum, Ex. A) entered into by the parties to settle their divorce 
(j action. The trial court and this Court have previously held that the terms of the 
Stipulation, as incorporated into the Decree of Divorce entered December 31, 2008 (the 
"Decree") (Addendum, Ex. B), were equitable and that Michael was attempting to 
rescind the Stipulation and have the Decree vacated because he believed, in hindsight, 
that the terms of the Stipulation were not equitable. Robinson v. Robinson, 2010 UT App_ 
~ 96, iJ13, 2 11 \s "WSFTA_12c935dd61ea451e820de4b92b0b69b6" \c 3 Robinson v. Robinson, 2010 
UT App 96, iJ13, 232 P.3d 1081 (hereinafter "Robinson I") (Addendum, Ex. C.) 
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Since the decision in Robinson I was issued, Debra has taken steps to collect the 
amounts due her under the terms of the Stipulation and the Decree of Divorce. Michael 
has taken steps to obstruct, delay and frustrate Debra. Over 7 ,_500 pages of motions, 
memoranda, affidavits, declarations, orders and other papers now constitute the record in 
this case. There have been over 15 hearings conducted, culminating in a three-day 
evidentiary hearing in April 2013. Debra has had to request injunctive relief because of 
Michael's interference with the sale of properties. Michael has filed two bankruptcy 
actions, both of which were dismissed. There have been protective order hearings. 
Michael has been held in contempt on three occasions. All of this could have been 
avoided had Michael merely performed his obligations under the terms of the Stipulation 
and the Decree of Divorce. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial 
The Decree was entered by the trial court on December 31, 2008. Michael 
appealed and this Court rendered its decision on April 22, 2010 in Robinson I. Numerous 
motions were filed and hearings conducted between April 2010 and April 2013 relative to 
Debra's efforts to collect amounts due her. On May 29, 2013, the trial court entered 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Addendum, Ex. M) and also a Final Order and 
Judgment. (Addendum, Ex. N) Post-trial motions were filed by both p~ies and denied 
by the trial court on July 11 and 12, 2012. Michael filed his Notice of Appeal on July 19, 
2013, and Debra filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal on August 1, 2013. As stated above, 
Debra has decided to withdraw her notice of cross-appeal. 
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Statement of the Facts 
1. The parties were married on October 4, 1992. (R. 661.) On February 2, 
2007, Michael filed a Petition for Divorce. (R. 1-5.) On November 2, 2007, after months 
@ of negotiations and mediation, during which each party was represented by independent 
counsel, Michael and Debra entered into the Stipulation to resolve all issues of their 
divorce action. (R. 14-28, 114-15, 197.) 
~ 
'" 
2. Over the course of the next year, Michael filed motions in an attempt to 
have the Stipulation set aside. (R. 86-88, 95-97.) The grounds to have the Stipulation set 
aside included, among others, alleged impossibility of performance, mutual mistake, and 
Debra's fraud in inducing Michael to enter into the Stipulation and in providing Michael 
with fraudulent information. (R. 38-85, 98-111.) 
3. On December 31, 2008, the trial court entered the Decree after (i) denying 
Michael's motions to set aside the Stipulation and (ii) finding that Debra had not engaged 
in any fraudulent or deceptive behavior or acted in bad faith. (R. 676-89, 487-92.) The 
Decree awarded the parties certain real and personal property including, among others, 
~ the real properties commonly referred to as the Sandy Retail Center, Phoenix Plaza, Deer 
Valley Condominium, St. George Condominium, and Arizona Parcel. (R. 677-89.) 
Michael was awarded the St. George Condominiwn with its accompanying debt. (R. 677-
78.) Debra was awarded the Arizona Parcel and the Deer Valley Condominium with its 
accompanying debt .. (R. 677-78.) The Sandy Retail Center was to be immediately listed 
~ for sale with Debra being awarded the sales proceeds with a potential adjustment to the 
cash to be-awarded to Debra dependent on the actual sales price. (R. 678-79.) Michael 
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was awarded the Phoenix Plaza and the adjoining parking lot parcel. (R. 679-81.) 
Michael was required to file an application to refinance the Phoenix Plaza mortgage 
within fifteen (15) days from the date the parties signed the Stipulation. (R. 679-80.) The 
loan proceeds were to be used to pay Debra a cash amount of $1,912,696 for her share of 
the marital estate. (R. 679-82.) 
4. On January 23, 2009, Michael filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 692-94.) On 
appeal, Michael argued, among other issues, that the Decree should be vacated based on 
alleged impossibility of performance and mistake. (R. 706.) Although Michael argued 
extensively to the trial court that the Stipulation should be set aside based on Debra's 
alleged fraud, he did not raise or argue the issue of fraud on appeal before this Court. (R. 
705-22.) This Court issued its Opinion affirming the Decree on April 22, 2010. (R. 705-
22.) Michael filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court, which 
~as denied on September 1, 2010. (R. 723-26.) 
5. Having not received any payment from Michael to satisfy his obligation 
under the Stipulation and the Decree, two Orders to Show Cause were issued against 
Michael on October 8, 2010 and November 12, 2010, seeking (i) a judgment against 
Michael for amounts he owed and had not paid to her, (ii) an order requiring Michael to 
sign the listing agreement for the sale of Sandy Retail Center, and (iii) and certification of 
Michael's contempt. (R. 73 7, 779-83.) 
6. On January 13, 2011, Debra's Motiot;i for Order to Show Cause was heard 
by Commissioner Michael S. Evans. (R. 940.) At the hearing, the parties stipulated to (i) 
the immediate listing of the Sandy Retail Center and to the appointment of Michael 
{00636033-1 } 4 
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Carroll as the listing. agent, who had authority to set the initial listing price and (ii) the 
~ 
sale of the Phoenix Plaza with a mutually acceptable agent at a price of $3,000,000. (R. 
940, 1213-22.) On February 25, 2011, the trial court entered a Judgment and Order 
viJ incorporating the stipulations of the parties and also ordering that Debra have sole 
management of the Phoenix Plaza and the Sandy Retail Center. (Addendum, Ex. D) (R. 
940, 1214.) 
7. On or about March 11, 2011, Debra discovered that Michael had already 
listed the Phoenix Plaza for sale with real estate agent Travis Parry for $3,750,000, a fact 
that was not disclosed to Debra by Michael at the hearing on January 13,2011. (R. 1550, 
1557-58, 1561-62.) 
8. Despite the clear direction in the Decree that the Sandy Retail Center was to 
be sold, his own stipulation relative to the sale of the Sandy Retail Center and Phoenix 
Plaza, and the trial court's order, Michael opposed and made attempts to frustrate the sale 
of the Sandy Retail Center as well as the Phoenix Plaza by refusing to sign the listing 
agreements and to otherwise accept or respond to offers received by the parties. (R. 14 78-
xi) 80, 1486-1503, 1550-52, 1580-1639.) Due to his ongoing refusal to accept the various 
offers and his blatant interference with the sale of the Sandy Retail Center and the 
Phoenix Plaza, Debra filed a Verified Motion to Enforce Sale of Sandy Retail Center on 
May 20, 2011, and a Verified Motion to Enforce Sale of Phoenix Plaza on June 7, 2011 
(collectively referred to as "Verified Motions to Enforce Sale of Property"). (R. 1476-
1513, 1548-1639.) 
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9. On June 21, 2011, both Verified Motions to Enforce Sale of Property filed 
by Debra were heard by Commissioner Michael S. Evans and were granted. (R. 1824-
28.) On June 22, 2011, the trial court entered an Order (Addendum, Ex. E) which 
divested Michael of all title in the Sandy Retail Center and granted Debra authority to 
sign all documents necessary to list the Sandy Retail Center and to close its sale. (R. 
1825-26.) The trial court further ordered Michael to sign an addendum accepting a 
pending offer on the Phoenix Plaza, and authorized the court clerk to sign the addendum 
if Michael refused. (R. 1826.) Michael refused to sign the addendum so the court clerk 
signed the addendum. (R. 4247.) 
10. At an evidentiary hearing before Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki on July 26, 2011, 
Michael was found to have breached the terms of the Decree and was found in contempt 
for his failure to abide by and p~rform his obligations under the Stipulation and Decree, 
including his failure to pay property settlement to Debra and his failure to submit an 
application to refinance the Phoenix Plaza mortgage. (R. 1962, 2791-2844, 4360-67.) 
The trial court also ruled that Michael's asserted defenses of impossibility, mistake, and 
fraud were barred by claim preclusion. (R. 2816, 4362, 4371-75.) The Findings, Order, 
and Judgment with respect to the hearing on July 26, 2011, was finally entered by Judge 
Todd M. Shaughnessy on March 1, 2012. (Addendum, Ex. F) (R. 4360-67.) 
11. Having lost another offer on the Sandy Retail Center, Debra filed a Motion 
for Approval of Reduced Listing Price for Sandy Retail Center ("Motion to Reduce 
Listing Price") on August 25, 2011, requesting a reduction of the listing price to 
$599,000 as recommended by Michael Carroll because (a) the property had not sold and 
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(b) Michael continued to thwart the sale of the property by refusing to reduce the listing 
~ 
price. (R. 2178-80.) In support of the Motion to Reduce Listing Price, Debra filed the 
. Affidavit of Mike Carroll ("Affidavit") wherein Mr. Carroll asserted that based on a 
.:,;; listing price of $599,000, the parties should expect to receive offers ranging from 
$575,000 to $599,000. (R. 2181-84.) 
..J 
12. On September 7, 2011, unbeknownst to Debra or her counsel, and despite 
the claim preclusion found by Judge Iwasaki to Michael's fraud claims at the hearing on 
July 26, 2011, Michael filed a prose fraud action in the Third District Court, West Jordan 
Division, against Debra and her children, parents and a friend ("Fraud Action"). (R. 
2894-2912.) Michael's complaint in the Fraud Action did not contain any allegations that 
supplanted the trial court orders in the divorce action. (R. 2894-2912.) 
13. One day later, on September 8, 2011, and just minutes before a scheduled 
hearing in the divorce action, Michael also filed a petition for chapter 11 bankruptcy, 
thereby invoking the automatic stay. (R. 2495-99.) Michael's bankruptcy case was later 
dismissed by order of the bankruptcy court on November 16, 2011. (R. 2725.) 
14. On October 4, 2011, as a result of the delay caused by Michael filing a 
chapter 11 petition for bankruptcy, another offer by a potential buyer of the Phoenix 
Plaza was withdrawn. (R. 2555-56, 2570.) 
15. On October 28, 2011, the parties received an offer from Harris Air, Inc. to 
purchase the Phoenix Plaza for the price of $3,000,000 (the "Harris Air Offer"). (R. 2556, 
2572-78.) On or about November 21, 2011, Debra received an offer to purchase the 
Sandy Plaza for $590,000 from Chicago Holdings, LLC ("Chicago Holdings Offer"). (R. 
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6955, 6971-78.) As required under the Order entered on June 22, 2011, Debra 
immediately provided Michael with a copy of both offers. (R. 6955, 6968.) In response, 
Michael filed a Motion to Compel Respondent to Provide Information Sufficient to 
Obtain Appraisals on Real Property that is Currently Listed for Sale and To Reject Offers 
to Purchase ("Motion to Reject Offers") on November 23, 2011, wherein he requested the 
trial court to reject the Harris Air Offer and the Chicago Holdings Offer. (R. 2521-23.) 
Based on the existing court orders, on November 25, 2011, Debra accepted the Chicago 
Holdings Offer subject to the trial court's approval. (R. 6955-56, 6971-79.) The closing 
date was scheduled for January 15, 2012. (R. 6976.) 
16. On December 6, 2011, Debra filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for An Order Permitting Respondent to Retain Petitioner's Half of Net Rental Income 
From the Phoenix Plaza, Sandy Retail Center, an~ Deer Valley Condominium, wherein 
she informed the trial court that the Sandy Retail Center and Phoenix Plaza were 
currently listed for sale and/or under contract for sale. (R. 2587-91.) On December 13, 
2011, Debra filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Compel Respondent to 
Provide Information Sufficient to Obtain Appraisals on Real Property That is Currently 
Listed for Sale and To Reject Offers to Purchase wherein she once again alerted the trial 
court that the Sandy Retail Center was under contract for sale with a closing scheduled 
for January 2012. (R. 2595-2603.) 
17. At a hearing before Commissioner Evans on December 20, 2011, 
( continued from September 8, 2011 due to Michael's bankruptcy), where fourteen 
motions were scheduled to be heard, testimony was presented regarding the pending 
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offers relative to the Sandy Retail Center and the Phoenix Plaza and their scheduled 
closings on January 16, 2012 and January 20, 2012, respectively. (R. 2604, 2647-52, 
6956, 6984-99.) On January 24, 2012, the trial court entered its Order with respect to the 
\lfij issues dealt with at the hearing on December 20, 2011. (Addendum, Ex. G) (R. 2647-53.) 
Michael acknowledged receiving the Harris Air Offer and the Chicago Holdings Offer. 
(R. 6984-99.) The trial court granted Debra's Motion to Reduce Price and ordered the 
Sandy Retail Center be listed at $599,000, as recommended by Michael Carroll. (R. 
2650.) The trial court also approved the Harris Air Offer and ordered that the closing 
agent deem and treat all net sales proceeds from the sale of the Phoenix Plaza as payable 
to Debra in partial satisfaction of the judgments which Debra had against Michael. (R. 
2649-50.) Due to time constraints and the volume of motions to be heard, the hearing 
was continued until January 6, 2012. (R. 2651.) 
18. On January 6, 2012, the trial court, among other things, denied Michael's 
Motion to Reject Offers. (R. 2620, 2687-93.) Based on the terms of the real estate 
purchase contracts and pursuant to trial court orders, closing on the Sandy Retail Center 
sale had been rescheduled to occur no later than February 6, 2012, and the closing on the 
Phoenix Plaza sale was to occur no later than April 9, 2012. (R. 2706, 2726, 4248.) 
19. Notwithstanding the potential negative financial impacts and contractual 
liabilities the parties would suffer if the pending sales did not timely close, Michael 
improperly recorded four /is pendens on January 27, 2012, against the Sandy Retail 
.,;; Center, Phoenix Plaza, Deer Valley Condominium and Arizona Property. (R. 2726, 2862-
87.) 
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20. Upon receiving notice on January 30, 2012, of the recording of the four /is 
pendens, Debra's counsel alerted Michael's counsel that the /is pendens were wrongfully 
recorded and requested that the lis pendens be immediately removed. (R. 2727, 2892.) 
Michael's counsel was reminded that (i) Debra was the only record title holder of the 
Sandy Retail Center since Michael was divested of title on June 22, 2011, and (ii) by 
filing a lis pendens ~gainst the properties, Michael was violating the trial court's orders. 
(R. 2891.) 
21. On February 1, 2012, Debra was forced to file a Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, Lien Nullification, Damages, and Other 
Relief. R. 2705-8. The trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order relative to the 
Sandy Retail Center on February I, 2012 ("TRO") finding that Michael had violated the 
trial court's orders by filing the lis pendens. (R. 3014-18.) A preliminary injunction 
hearing before the trial court was conducted on February 3, 2012. (R. 2959-62.) Pursuant 
to paragraph 2 of the Findings and Order (Addendum, Ex. H), the trial court found that 
the lis pendens filed against the Sandy Retail Center ''to be a 'wrongful lien' under the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-1 et. seq. and, as necessary, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-
6-1304." (R. 2960.) Accordingly, the lis pendens was declared to be void ab initio. (R. 
2960.) 
22. Notwithstanding the terms ofthe Findings and Order, Michael had another 
/is pendens recorded on the Sandy Retail Center early on the morning of February 6, 
2012 ("Second Lis Pendens''), the morning of the scheduled closing. (R. 2983, 2990-92, 
4389-90.) The TRO was still in effect when Michael recorded the Second Lis Pendens 
{00636033-1 } IO 
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on the Sandy Retail Center. (R. 2983.) On February 7, 2012, Michael had another /is 
pendens recorded on the Phoenix Plaza. (R. 4390.) 
23. On February 7, 2012, after finding out about the Second Lis Pendens 
having been recorded on the Sandy Retail Center, Debra was forced to file a Second 
Motion for Nullification of Second Lis Pendens Filed by Petitioner, Damages, Contempt 
and Other Relief and Motion for Order to Show Cause (Expedited Decision Requested) 
("Second Motion"). (R. 2982-92.) A telephonic hearing on the Second Motion was 
scheduled for February 9, 2012 before Judge Shaughnessy. (R. 2999.) At the telephonic 
hearing, the trial court granted the Second Motion and issued its Second Findings and 
Order and Order to Show Cause (Addendum, Ex. I), which also included a finding that 
"[t]he Lis Pendens is determined to be a 'wrongful lien' under the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann.§ 38-9-1 et seq. and as necessary, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-1304." (R. 3000.) 
24. A preliminary injunction hearing before Judge Shaughnessy was held on 
February 28, 2012, to address, among other issues, all six /is pendens filed by Michael. 
(R. 4384.) The trial court found, among other things, that (i) despite having notice 
through counsel that the /is pendens were wrongfully recorded, Michael refused to 
remove the Lis pendens and continued to refuse to remove them, (ii) the six /is pendens 
were "wrongful liens" as that term is defined under the provisions of Utah Code Ann.§ 
38-9-1 et seq., and as necessary, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-1304, and (iii) that the 
recording of the /is pendens was wrongful and in violation of the orders of the trial court. 
(R. 4368-70, 4388-91.) On March 5, 2012, the trial court entered its Findings and Order 
Granting Preliminary Injunction, Lien Nullification, and Other Relief (Addendum, Ex. L) 
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and enjoined Michael from interfering with the sale of the Phoenix Plaza. (R. 4393.) The 
trial court reserved the issue of damages for the six wrongful liens in violation ofU.C.A. 
§ 38-9-4, for a later date. (R. 4394.) 
25. On March 1, 2012, the trial court entered its Findings, Order, and Judgment 
relative to the hearing conducted on July 26, 2011. (Addendum, Ex. J) (R. 4360-67.) 
Among other relief, the trial court: (i) entered judgment against Michael in the amount of 
$1,912,696 ("$1.9M"); (ii) held Michael in contempt for his failure to pay Debra amounts 
due her and for his failure to refinance the Phoenix Plaza mortgage; and (iii) awarded 
Debra attorney's fees on both a contractual basis and statutory basis. (R. 4365.) 
26. On March 5, 2012, the trial court issued another temporary restraining 
order against Michael, once again enjoining him from interfering with the sale of the 
Phoenix Plaza by making, uttering, recording, or filing any document which would cloud 
title to the Phoenix Plaza or contacting any person associated with the sale including, but 
not limited to, brokers, agents, buyers, and closing agents. (R. 4401.) 
27. Despite Michael's attempts to thwart the closing of the Phoenix Plaza in 
violation of the trial court's orders, the sale of the Phoenix Plaza was fmally closed on or 
about April 25, 2012. (R. 5278.) 
· 28. On May 23, 2012, a telephonic hearing was conducted during which the 
trial court reviewed the history of this action and entered certain rulings. (Addendum, Ex. 
P) (R. 7563: pps 2-24.) 
29. Debra continued her efforts to collect on the judgment against Michael that 
had been entered on July 26, 2011, by filing a writ of execution against the St. George 
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Condominium. (R. 5546-49, 5599-603.) Thereafter, beginning in May 2012, Michael 
stopped making mortgage payments on the St. George Condominium, although the 
property was awarded to him in the Decree. (R. 677, 5885, 5890-99, 5910-14.) Michael 
;;;J was also ordered to pay all associated debt on the St. George Condominium under the 
Decree. (R. 677, 5884-85.) Given that Debra is a co-obligor on the mortgage 
encumbering the St. George Condominium, she began to pay the monthly mortgage 
\j;) 
payments and late fees to protect her credit. (R. 5885.) At a hearing on October 2, 2012 
before Judge Shaughnessy, Michael was ordered to pay in a timely manner all mortgage 
payments, HOA fees, and other liabilities associated with St. George Condominium and 
to reimburse Debra the monthly mortgage payments she had paid to that date, which 
totalled $5,561.82. (R. 6413-6417.) At another hearing on January 22, 2013, Michael 
was again ordered by Judge Shaughnessy to timely pay all future costs associated with 
the St. George Condominium including, but not limited to, the mortgage, HOA fees, 
utilities, and casualty insurance payments, and to provide immediate evidence of such 
payments to Debra's counsel. (R. 6482-86.) 
30. On April 9, 2013, the trial court entered an Order to Show Cause against 
Michael to show cause, why he "should not be held in contempt for violating the terms of 
the Order entered February 13, 2013, relative to the hearing conducted January 22, 2013, 
by failing to reimburse [Debra] $3,402.09 for the insurance premium and mortgage 
payments she previously paid; and by refusing to make the February and March 2013 
mortgage payments." (R. 6627-29.) 
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31. On April 1 7 through 19, 2013, an evidentiary hearing was conducted before 
the trial court to address all remaining issues and at the end of trial a ruling was 
announced by the trial court. (R. 6874, 6863-73.) On May 29, 2013, the trial court 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Findings") (R. 6874-87), which 
among other things, included the trial court: 
(00636033-1 } 
• Affirming all rulings, orders and judgments previously made in the case to 
date with one exception involving an issue not relevant to this appeal. (R. 
6875.) 
• Finding Michael had filed /is pendens on the parties' properties to prevent 
the sales of those properties that had been ordered to be sold by the trial 
court. The trial court found that it had authority to nullify the /is pendens, 
and require the removal of the /is pendens that were recorded relative to the 
Fraud Action; however, because of the legal question, and some doubt as to 
whether Utah's Wrongful Lien Act should apply to a /is pendens, the trial 
court declined to impose any statutory damages. (R. 687 5.) 
• Declining to find Michael in contempt, with respect to the recording of the 
/is pendens, for the same reason it declined to impose statutory damages. 
(R. 6875.) 
• Declining in the interest of justice to impose any further contempt finding 
against Michael or any fjnther sanction with respect to any additional 
contempt issues that were presented. (R. 6878.) 
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32. Along with the Findings, the trial court also entered its Final Order and 
Judgment ("Judgment"). (R. 6888-96.) Paragraph 17 of the Judgment updates the 
amount of the judgment entered against Michael on March 1, 2012, with various offsets 
...J and adjustments as ordered by the trial court. (R. 6892-93.) The updated amount of the 
judgment entered in favor of Debra was $1,128,948.62 together with interest from May 
23, 2012. (R. 3893.) Under paragraph 8 of the Judgment, Debra was awarded attorney's 
fees and costs from January 1, 2008 through May 31, 2012, in the total amount of 
$309,074.72 for actions required to be taken to enforce the terms of the Stipulation and 
the Decree. (R. 6890.) 
33. Both parties filed post-trial motions, which were denied by the trial court 
on July 11, 2013 and July 12, 2013 {Addendum, Ex. 0). (R. 7125-27, 7131-33.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The foundational facts in this case are relatively simple. Pursuant to the terms of 
the Stipulation and Decree, Michael was to pay Debra cash in the amount of $1.9M as 
property settlement. Michael was to also refinance the mortgage encumbering the 
\tJJ Phoenix Plaza and use the loan proceeds to pay Debra the amount owed. In Robinson I, 
this Court determined the terms of the Stipulation and Decree are equitable. Michael did 
not perform these obligations and, accordingly, breached the terms of the Stipulation. 
Michael's failure to perform these obligations resulted in the trial court holding him in 
contempt. Thereafter, Debra took actions to enforce the terms of the Stipulation and the 
Decree and was awarded a judgment. 
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Michael attempts in this appeal to reargue the same defenses of mistake, 
impossibility and fraud that were present or argued relative to Robinson I. In Robinson/, 
this Court found mistake and impossibility were not contractual defenses. Fraud was 
raised in the trial court but not on appeal. Res judicata applies precluding any of these 
defenses from being raised in subsequent actions for any purpose. 
Under the terms of the Stipulation and the Decree, the Sandy Retail Center was to 
be sold. Under the orders of the trial court relative to Debra's requested relief for 
enforcement, the Phoenix Plaza was ultimately ordered to be sold. Michael interfered 
with the sale of these two properties by, among other actions, filing lis pendens that 
clouded title so that the sales could not be closed. The trial court found that the /is 
pendens were "wrongful liens" but declined to award statutory damages due to the issue 
of whether a /is pendens can be a "wrongful lien." 
Finally, the trial court awarded Debra her attorney's fees and costs for the 
enforcement actions she took. Debra has a contractual and statutory basis for the award. 
ARGUMENT 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED A $1.9M JUDGMENT 
AGAINST MICHAEL FOR HIS BREACH OF THE TERMS OF THE 
STIPULATION AND DECREE AND PROPERL y FOUND ms 
CONTEMPT IN FAILING TO EVEN SUBMIT AN APPLICATION TO 
REFINANCE THE MORTGAGE ON THE PHOENIX PLAZA. 
Under the terms of the Stipulation and the Decree, Michael was to pay Debra 
$ l .9M1 as property settlement. Michael was to also refinance the mortgage encumbering 
1 This amount consists of the sum of amounts due under paragraphs 11.B., 12.B. and 15 
of the Decree. 
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the Phoenix Plaza and use the loan proceeds to pay Debra. Michael failed to pay Debra 
the $1.9M owed. Michael also failed to submit an application to refinance the mortgage. 
As this Court stated in Robinson I, Michael's "ability to provide evidence that 
~ performance was impossible or highly impracticable is severely limited where he never 
actually applied for a loan as contemplated, let alone having done so in the time frame set 
forth by the stipulation." Robinson I, n. 4. 
Michael places great weight on the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Goggin 
v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16,299 ~.3d 1079. In Goggin, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
. . . there is no place for contempt sanctions in an equitable 
distribution of marital property. Under the Contempt Statute, 
a court may order a party to pay for the "actual loss or injury" 
he caused. And although a court has considerable discretion 
in determining whether to sanction a party, it does not have 
discretion to impose a sanction beyond the actual injury 
caused by the contemptuous behavior. Moreover, it does not 
have discretion to distribute marital property in a way that is 
designed to punish a party's contemptuous behavior. Id. at 
iJ 52. 
The trial court in Goggin fashioned a property distribution taking Mr. Goggin's 
contempt into account as an element of an "equitable" property distribution. Id. at ifif 59-
61. In the instant case, the equitable distribution had already been fashioned by the 
parties, approved by the trial court and affirmed by this Court before contempt was even 
raised as an issue. In Robinson I, this court stated: 
(00636033-1 } 
Thus, from the district court's decision to enforce the 
stipulation, we assume - - and have no findings that would 
indicate otherwise - - that the court determined that the 
property division was equitable. 
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Id. at 113. Accordingly, in this case, contempt was not a factor in fashioning an equitable 
property division. Contempt was found only after Michael's breach of the terms of the 
Stipulation and Decree had been established. 
The actµal injury to Debra is the loss of the benefit of the terms of the Stipulation 
entered into by the parties. Debra bargained for and agreed to receive $1.9M as her 
equitable share of the division of the marital estate. The trial court and this Court have 
both determined that such was an equitable distribution. Id. 
Accordingly, the $1.9Mjudgment en~ered against Michael for having failed to pay 
Debra her equitable share of the marital estate was proper. Michael's contempt was 
found for his failure to pay Debra that amount and in his failure to submit the loan 
application as a means to pay the $1.9M amount. 
X. MICHAEL AGAIN ARGUES IMPOSSIBILITY WHICH HAS ALREADY 
BEEN DECIDED IN ROBINSON I. 
Michael next argues that he cannot be held in contempt of the terms of the Decree 
entered on December 31, 2008, that required him ''to go back in time" to make a loan 
application by November 17, 2007 (within 15 days of the date of the Stipulation on 
November 2, 2007). This argument is nothing more than Michael's impossibility of 
performance defense made in Robinson I. In Robinson I, this court stated: 
Id. at 112. 
{00636033-1 } 
This defense is wholly inapplicable here because [Michael] 
alleges no unforeseen event occurring after the stipulation 
was signed in November 2007 that altered the possibility of 
performance. . . Thus, without any later-occurring event 
rendering performance impossible or highly impracticable, 
[Michael's] argument of impossibility is unavailing .... 
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In Robinson I, this Court clearly indicated that Michael's obligation to submit a 
loan application commenced November 2, 2007, the date of the Stipulation, not 
December 31, 2008, the date of the Decree. Michael was under a contractual obligation 
pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation to submit an application to refinance the mortgage 
by November 17, 2007. He failed to do so. He breached that term of the Stipulation and 
the Decree. His failure to submit the application constitutes contempt because (i) he 
knew what was required of him and the time frame, (ii) had the ability to comply, but (iii) 
willfully failed to do so. Van Hake v. Thomas, 159 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). 
XI. MICHAEL IS PRECLUDED FROM CLAIMING MISTAKE OR 
IMPOSSIBILITY AS DEFENSES AGAINST THE CONTEMPT CHARGES 
BROUGHT AGAINST HIM. 
Michael argues that the trial court erred in precluding his claim that mistake and 
impossibility are defenses against the contempt charges brought against him. In 
Robinson I, this Court ruled that the contractual defenses of mistake and impossibility are 
not applicable under the facts of this case. Id. at if19-12. 
Relative to the hearing conducted on July 26, 2011, on March 1, 2012, the trial 
court issued its Findings, Order and Judgment. (R. 4360-67.) In paragraphs 12-17, the 
trial court specifically found and held that Michael was in contempt because (i) the 
. .,;J) Decree awarded Debra $1.9M, (ii) Michael was required to submit the loan application to 
refinance the Phoenix Plaza mortgage within 15 days of November 2, 2007; (iii) Michael 
knew and clearly understood he had an obligation to refinance the Phoenix Plaza 
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mortgage as the means to pay Debra, but (iv) Michael failed to submit the application at 
any time after November 2, 2007. 
In Robinson I, as to mistake, this Court stated that if Michael "did not feel that the 
information upon which he relied was sufficient, he should have either insisted on any 
information he felt he needed before he entered into the stipulation or modified the terms 
of the stipulation accordingly." Id. at ,r11. Asking for the deal to be fair "in hindsight" is 
not a defense for contempt. Id. Similarly, Michael's defense of impossibility, whether as 
a contract defense or for civil contempt, and "the ability to provide evidence that 
performance was impossible or highly impracticable is severely limited where he never 
actually applied for a loan as contemplated, let alone having done so in the time frame set 
forth by the stipulation." Id. at n. 4. 
Michael is prohibited from raising mistake or impossibility as a defense to 
contempt because those are now res judicata. When a second defense (in the instant case 
mistake or impossibility as a defense to contempt) is essentially the same as a previously 
raised defense (in the instant case mistake or impossibility as a contractual defense in 
Robinson I) which has gone to final judgment, res judicata means that neither of the 
parties can again litigate that defense or any issue, point or part thereof which was or 
could have been litigated in the former action." Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, 531 
(Utah 1981). Accordingly, Michael is precluded from raising the defenses of mistake and 
impossibility as defenses to contempt. 
Finally, Michael again claims in this appeal that the trial court erred by not 
conducting an evidentiary hearing and thereby excluding evidence from Mr. Gottschall, 
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Mr. Wadley and Michael regarding Michael's inability to refinance the Phoenix Plaza 
mortgage. This issue was decided in Robinson I, when this Court determined that the 
failure of the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing was immaterial to its decision 
vii because there are no disputed facts determinative of whether the contractual defenses 
applied. Id. at ,r 14. 
XII. MICHAEL IS PRECLUDED FROM CLAIMING FRAUD AS A DEFENSE. 
Michael next argues that the trial court erred by precluding Michael's claim of 
Debra's alleged fraud as a defense to his contempt. Resjudicata bars Michael's claimed 
defense. 
The doctrine of res judicata has "two branches: claim preclusion and issue 
preclusion." Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 2012 UT 42, ,r 20, 285 
P.3d 1157. Claim preclusion bars a party from re-litigating a claim for relief that was 
previously litigated on the merits and resulted in a final judgment. Id. at if 21. Issue 
preclusion, commonly called collateral estoppel, presents a party from re-litigating issues 
which have been previously decided on the merits and resulted in a final judgment. Id. at 
~ if23. Claim preclusion has three requirements: (1) the second action must involve the 
same parties, privies, or assigns as the original action; (2) the claim must have been 
brought or have been available in the original action; and (3) the original action must 
..;) 
have led to a final judgment on the merits. Id. at if 21. 
The trial court determined that "[t]here is claim preclusion as to [Michael's] 
...J allegations of fraud against [Debra]. This issue was raised by [Michael] after November 
2, 2007. That issue was not taken up on appeal although [Michael] had an opportunity to 
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raise the issue on appeal. It therefore is not a defense to the contempt charge." (R. 4362.) 
Michael alleged fraud in pleadings he filed after November 2, 2007 on at least four 
occasions. (R. 39, 45-47, 113, 365.). 
With respect to the first requirement of claim preclusion, the parties are identical. 
With respect to the second element of claim preclusion, Michael now argues that 
under Marcis & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000), 
a party is required to include claims in an action f qr res judicata purposes only if those 
claims arose before the filing of the complaint in the earlier action. Michael then argues 
that the allegations of Debra's fraud obviously occurred after this divorce action was 
already filed. But in the instant case, Michael did, in fact, raise the issue of Debra's 
alleged fraud and misrepresentation in the trial court. Those issues were litigated and 
ruled on by the trial court. Therefore, Marcis has no application in the instant case. 
Marcis, at if25. 
With respect to the third requirement of claim preclusion, Michael argues that 
under Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988), there can be no final judgment entered 
in a divorce action on a tort claim of fraud and, hence, the third element of claim 
preclusion is not met. The distinction between claim preclusion and issue preclusion 
resolves the issue. 
Michael raised and litigated the issue of Debra's fraud in the divorce action and 
the trial court found that Debra "didn't engage in any fraudulent or deceptive behavior or 
bad faith." (R. 491.) Michael did not appeal that issue in Robinson I. Under claim 
{00636033-1 } 22 
'-· 
preclusion, Michael is precluded from again raising that issue in the divorce action as a 
defense, including as a defense for contempt. 
In Noble, the issue of husband having intentionally shot wife was litigated in the 
~ divorce action and finally determined. In the separate tort action brought by wife, 
husband was precluded from requiring wife to re-litigate that particular issue under issue 
preclusion. Id. at 1374-75. 
Accordingly, all three elements of claim preclusion have been met and Michael is 
precluded from claiming fraud as a defense to the issue of contempt. 
XIII. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADJUDICATE MICHAEL'S TORT 
CLAIMS BUT IT DID, AS PART OF THE DIVORCE ACTION, 
ADJUDICATE THAT DEBRA DID NOT DEFRAUD MICHAEL AND 
FRAUD WAS NOT A DEFENSE TO THE FINDING OF CONTEMPT. 
In his brief, Michael argues that it was improper for the trial court to state that 
Michael's tort claim of fraud is barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion simply 
-J because he did not raise it in this divorce action. 
This argument is unavailing for several reasons. First, Michael did raise the issue 
of fraud in numerous pleadings filed with the trial court. See, infra IV. Second, the trial 
court found that Debra did not defraud Michael (R. 491.) Third, the trial court found that 
Michael had "no applicable defenses to his contempt and he persists in disobeying Court 
~ orders." (R. 4362.) Finally, the trial court determined that "[t]here is claim preclusion as 
to [Michael's] allegations of fraud against [Debra]. This issue was raised by [Michael] 
after November 2, 2007. That issue was not taken up on appeal although [Michael] had 
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an opportunity to raise the issue on appeal. It therefore is not a defense to the contempt 
charge." (R. 4362.) 
The trial court in this action found that Debra had not defrauded Michael. 
Accordingly, Michael is precluded under claim preclusion from raising Debra's alleged 
fraud as a defense to Michael's contempt. Moss, at ,r 20. 
XIV. -THE TRIAL COURT AND THIS COURT FOUND THAT THE 
DISTIRBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE WAS EQUITABLE UNDER 
THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION. ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
TERMS OF THE STIPULATION, WHICH RESULTED IN A DIFFERENT 
DISTRIBUTION, WERE THE DIRECT RESULT OF MICHAEL'S 
ACTIONS. 
On appeal in Robinson I, Michael argued that the district court erred in failing to 
make a determination that the division of assets described in the Stipulation was fair and 
reasonable. Id. at ,r 13. Michael makes the same argument with respect to the ultimate 
division of the marital estate based on Debra's enforcement of the terms of the 
Stipulation. Michael is the only person responsible for the outcome of the ultimate 
division of the marital estate after Debra's enforcement actions. 
In Robinson I, this Court stated: 
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[Michael] correctly asserts that a stipulation dividing 
p~operty between divorcing parties should be adopted only "if 
the court believes it to be fair and reasonable," Klein v. Klein, 
544 P.2d 472,476 (Utah 1975). But [Michael] provides no 
authority for his resulting assertion that a district court may 
not enforce a stipulation unless the district court makes a 
formal finding that it is fair and reasonable. And the 
presumption seems to be the exact opposite, that is, that a 
stipulation will ordinarily be enforced "unless the court finds 
it to be unfair or unreasonable," Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 
782, 789 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) Thus, from the district court's 
decision to enforce the stipulation, we assume - - and have no 
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findings that would indicate otherwise - - that the court 
determined that the property division was equitable. And 
based on the facts of this case, in particular the sophistication 
of the parties and the facts that they each had the opportunity 
to consult with counsel and other advisors before entering the 
stipulation, we cannot say that the court's admittedly cursory 
finding exceeds the limits of reasonableness. 
Id. at ,I13 ( emphasis in original). 
Michael, in essence, asks this Court for a "redo." The divis_ion of the marital 
property was found to be equitable by this Court in Robinson I. Michael's actions caused 
the protracted litigation that followed when Debra was required to proceed with 
·v;;J enforcement actions. The case of Allen v. Ciokewicz, 2012 UT App 162, ,I 49, 280 P.3d 
425 is not applicable for the reason that the trial court in that case was making an initial 
distribution of property. In the instant case, the initial distribution of property was made 
pursuant to the Stipulation. Debra's enforcement actions caused, as Michael terms it, an 
inequitable distribution of the marital property. There are no exceptional circumstances 
permitting a "redo" given the facts of this case. 
XV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE LIS PENDENS 
WERE WRONGFUL LIENS. 
Michael twice recorded lis pendens on both the Phoenix Plaza and the Sandy Plaza 
relative to the Fraud Action in an attempt to frustrate scheduled closings. The trial court 
~ in the divorce action entered a number of orders, each finding that the /is pendens were 
wrongful liens under Utah Code Ann. § 3 8-9-1, et seq. and, as necessary under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-6-1304. (R. 2960, 3004, 4390.) 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1303 authorizes the filing of a /is pendens in only certain 
narrow circumstances: 
Either party to an action affecting the title to, or the right of 
possession of, real property may file a notice of the pendency 
of the action with the county recorder in the county where the 
property or any portion of the property is located. 
Utah courts have confirmed that a "lis pendens may only be filed in connection with an 
action (1) 'affecting the title' to real property, or (2) 'affecting ... the right to possession 
of [] real property."' Winters v. Schulman, 1999 UT App 119, ,r 21,977 P. 2d 1218 
(quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 78-40-2, the predecessor to§ 78B-6-1303). In Winters, this 
Court concluded that the Us pendens at issue was "invalid because the complaint and 
[divorce] decree failed to address title to or possession of the Utah real property." Id. at ,r 
21. The Winters court further observed that because a post-divorce enforcement 
proceeding sought only monetary damages, it was "unrelated to title or possession of the 
Utah real property," and the fact that the claimant sought to encourage payment of $.e 
damages by requesting a lien on the real property did not change the claim's 
"fundamental character." Id. at ,r 22. 
A Us pendens may be released upon motion if the "court finds that the claimant 
has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real 
property claim that is the subject of the notice." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1304(2)(b). It is 
evident that to the extent an action does not affect title to or possession of real property, it 
cannot be a valid "real property claim," and thus, requires release of the lis pendens. 
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The complaint in the Fraud Action did not make any claim as to title or the right of 
possession as to the Sandy Retail Center or the Phoenix Plaza, but only made claims for 
monetary damages. (R. 2894-2912.) The complaint in the Fraud Action did claim relief 
~ for a constructive trust, but /is pendens are not appropriate in actions claiming 
constructive trust relief. Levinson v. Eight Judicial District Court of Nevada, 857 P .2d 
18, 20 (Nev. 1993). "In determining the validity of a lis pendens, courts have generally 
restricted their review to the face of the complaint." Winters, at ,r 19. 
Winters also made clear that the filing of an invalid /is pendens, in addition to 
subjecting the lis pendens to release pursuant to § 78B-6-1304(2), can form the basis of a 
claim for wrongful lien as defined by :tJtah Code Ann.§ 38-9-1(6). See Winters, 1999 UT 
App 119, ,r 14. The Utah Code defines "wrongful lien," in relevant part, as: 
any document that purports to create a lien, notice of interest, 
or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property 
and at the time it is recorded is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or 
federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of 
a court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
( c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed 
by the owner of the real property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 3 8-9-1 ( 6). Utah Code Ann. § 3 8-9-7 allows the owner of the property 
to petition the court to nullify the wrongful lien. In addition to an order nullifying the 
lien, the court "shall issue an order declaring the wrongful lien void ab initio, releasing 
the property from the lien, and awarding costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the 
petitioner." Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-7(5)(a). 
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Even if the lis pendens are found to not have been wrongful liens, there was a 
second basis for the trial court to nullify the /is pendens. As the trial court stated in its 
Minute Entry dated March 1, 2012, (Addendum, Ex. K) (R. 4369.): 
Whether a lis pendens is a wrongful lien for purposes 
of Utah's wrongful lien statute, and whether this court has the 
authority to order removal of a lis pendens under the lis 
pendens statute, are not dispositive. Where, as here, the 
property in question is a marital asset subject to the 
jurisdiction of this court, and where this court has in the past 
entered orders associated with that property, this court 
respectfully submits that it has the authority to issue orders in 
aid of its jurisdiction or orders that are necessary or 
appropriate to carry out or enforce its prior orders. 
A trial court has authority to issue orders to aid or as may be necessary to enforce its prior 
orders. "Judicial power 'is the authority to hear and determine justiciable controvercies . 
. . [It] includes the authority to enforce any valid judgment, decree or order."' 
Timpanogos Planning and Water Mngt Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy 
District, 690 P.2d 562, 569 (Utah 1984) citing Galloway v. Truesdell, 422 P.2d 237,242 
(Nev. 1967) (emphasis in original). 
Michael also argues that a motion to have the /is pendens nullified must have been 
filed in the Fraud Action. The trial court noted, however, that: 
(R. 4369.) 
{00636033-1 } 
Section 7 8B-6-13 04( 1) states that an affected party "may 
make a motion to the court in which the action is pending." 
The statement is permissive, and the "court in which the 
action is pending" is the Third Judicial District Court. 
However, the court does not rule on the question of whether 
the "court in which the action is pending" means the 
particular judge before whom the case is pending, or that 
district, because it is unnecessary to do so. 
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In summary, the trial court properly found that the lis pendens were wrongful 
liens. Alternatively, the trial court had authority to nullify the lis pendens under its 
inherent judicial authority. 
~ VIII. THE TRIAL COURT'S AW ARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
WERE APPROPRIATE UNDER A CONTRACT CLAIM AND ALSO 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 30-3-3(2). 
Debra made a claim for an award of attorney's fees and costs under a contract 
claim and also Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2) relative to her enforcement of the terms of 
the Stipulation and the Decree. Attorney's fees may be awarded if authorized by statute 
or by contract. Jones v. Riche, 2009 UT App 196, 11,216 P.3d. 357. 
With respect to Debra's contract claim, paragraph 44 of the Decree provides: 
The prevailing party to an action for breach of a term of the 
Agreement shall be entitled to his or her attorney's fees and 
costs. 
(R. 685.) Contractual attorney's fees provisions are enforceable under Utah law. 
Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796 (Utah App. 1992). 
With respect to Debra's statutory claim, Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-3 creates two 
\6) classes of attorney fees - those incurred in establishing court orders and those incurred in 
enforcing court orders. Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ,I 30, 233 P.3d 836. All 
attorney's fees and costs Debra has incurred since shortly after the date the Stipulation 
was signed have been to enforce the terms of the Stipulation. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-3(1) deals with attorney's fees incurred "to establish an 
order of ... division of property in a domestic case .... " (Emphasis added). However, 
Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-3(2) provides: 
{00636033-1 ) 29 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, 
parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of propertY in 
a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees 
upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon 
the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award 
no fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the 
party is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees. (Emphasis added.) 
In Connell, this Court stated: 
Fees awarded under subsection (1) must be based oµ the usual 
factors of need, ability to pay, and reasonableness. See 
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, 176 P.3d 476, ,r 49. By 
contrast, in awarding fees under subsection (2), the court 
"may disregard the financial need of the moving party." 
Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 850 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994); see also Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) ("In an action to enforce the provisions of a 
divorce decree, an award of attorney fees is based solely upon 
the trial court's discretion, regardless of the financial need of 
the moving party."). The guiding factor in fee awards under 
subsection (2) is whether the party seeking an award of fees 
substantially prevailed on the claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 
30-3-3(2). 
Connell, at ,I 28. 
In Connell, this Court also noted that: 
{ 00636033-1 } 
... fee awards under subsection (2) serve no 
equalizing function but allow the moving party to collect fees 
unnecessarily incurred due to the other party's recalcitrance. 
See Finlayson, 874 P.2d at 850-51. In Tribe v. Tribe, 59 Utah 
112, 202 P .213 ( 1921 ), the supreme court discussed the 
rationale for awarding attorney fees when one party "refuses 
to comply with the requirements of [ an order or] decree" such 
that the other party "is compelled to bring proceedings 
against" the offending party to ensure compliance with that 
order. Id. at 216. The court explained that the trial court may 
award reasonable· attorney fees to the moving party so that he 
or she is not forced ''to fritter away in costs and counsel fees" 
the amounts received under the order "by bringing repeated 
30 
actions to enforce payment. ... " Id. The court may in its 
\4fl discretion award no fees or limited fees if it finds the 
offending party impecunious or enters in the record another 
reason for not awarding fees. See Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-
3(2) . 
..;J Connell at iJ 30. 
Debra submitted her claim for attorney's fees and costs in admitted trial exhibits 
61 and 61A. (R. 7569, 779:12.) The trial court only awarded Debra fees and costs for the 
time period between January 1, 2008 and May 31, 2012. (R. 6890-91.) Debra's request 
for an award of fees and costs incurred prior to January 1, 2008 and after May 31, 2012 in 
the total amount of $97,787.05 were denied. (R. 6890-91.) 
In its Minute Entry dated July 12, 2013, dealing with post-trial motions, the trial 
court noted 
(R. 7132.) 
that it did not award [Debra] all of the fees she sought and did 
not award her fees she incurred in connection with matters on 
which she was not successful at the hearing held in April 
2013. The court stands by its attorney fee ruling for the 
reasons stated on the record and as set forth in [Debra's] 
opposition papers. 
Debra substantially prevailed on every issue. That the trial court did not find 
Michael in contempt on numerous obstructionist actions he took during the course of the 
..,iJ proceedings did not change the ultimate outcome of this case or the ultimate judgment 
amount awarded to Debra. The findings in a ruling on post-trial issues, in which the trial 
court awarded additional attorney's fees to Debra, best describes the award in the Final 
Order and Judgment: 
{00636033-1 } 31 
(R. 7530-31.) 
The Court finds that [Debra] substantially prevailed on all of 
the issues brought before the court, and Michael overstates 
the relative degree of his success. More important, as the 
court has previously noted on the record, the need for those 
additional proceedings was brought about entirely by 
Michael's conduct. Throughout these post-judgment 
proceedings [Michael] has intentionally delayed and 
interfered with the orderly disposition of the matters before 
the court. [Debra] has been left with no choice but to proceed 
as she has. Requiring [Michael] to bear the costs occasioned 
by his conduct is the only reasonable result under the 
circumstances. 
Accordingly, the award of attorney's fees and costs by the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Final Order and Judgment should be affirmed in all respects. Debra should be 
awarded her attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this JJ. nl day of August, 2014. 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
J~!~ 
DEAN C. ANDRE~ 
DIANA L. TELFER 
Attorneys for Respondent/ Appellee 
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DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent. 
STIPULATION AND PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Civil No. 074900501 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Comm. Michael S. Evans 
The parties make the following stipulations and agreements for the purpose of 
settlement of this action and respectfully move the Court to adopt the stipulations and 
agreements in the final Decree of Divorce to be entered herein. 
DIVORCE 
1. The parties shall proceed to obtain a Decree of Divorce granting each a 
divorce from the other as provided for by law dissolving the marriage of the parties. 
2. The parties consent that a Decree of Divorce may be entered with terms 
consistent to the terms of this Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement (the 
"Agreement"). 
3. Petitioner is a bona fide -and actual resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, and has been for more than three months prior to the commencement of this action. 
14 
4. Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife, respectively, having been 
married on October 4, 1992. 
5. Disagreements have ensued between the parties concerning their marriage 
and their future together; meaningful communication between the parties has ceased; 
notwithstanding attempts bythe parties to reconcile and resolvetheirdifferences, the same 
have been to no avail and have become irreconcilable making continuation of the marriage 
under the circumstances impossible. 
CHILDREN 
6. The parties have no children born as issue of their marriage and none are 
expected. 
ALIMONY AND RELATED PROVISIONS 
7. Each party irrevocably waives any claim to past, present or future alimony 
under any circumstance or condition. 
8. Each party shall be responsible to maintain his or herown medical and dental 
insurance coverage and each shall be responsible for his or her own uninsured medical 
and dental costs. 
PROPERTY AND DEBT DISTRIBUTION 
9. Prior to and during their marriage, the parties acquired certain real and 
personal property which shall be divided between the parties as described below. Prior to 
and during the marriage, the parties incurred certain debts and obligations which shall be 
allocated between the parties as described below. The party assuming a particular debt 
or obligation shall indemnify and hold the other party harmless therefrom. 
10. Petitioner shall be awarded the Seven Springs residence and shall assume 
and pay any debt encumbering the property. 
2 
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11. Respondent shall be awarded the ten acre parcel in Scenic, Arizona and shall 
assume and pay any debt encumbering the property. 
12. Respondent shall be awarded the Mayan Palace timeshare and shall assume 
and pay any debt encumbering the property. 
13. Petitioner shall be awarded the parties' interest in the condominium in St. 
George, subject to Petitioner assuming and paying any debt encumbering the property. 
Petitioner may continue to own and rent the condominium or, alternatively, sell it but 
Petitioner shall be responsible for all costs of sale. Respondent shall be given a credit as 
described below in the amount of $62,500 for her equity in the condominium calculated as 
one half of the difference between the fair market value of the condominium ($250,000) 
less the current mortgage ($125,000). Rental income from the Phoenix Plaza property 
shall be used to pay all condominium costs and expenses including PITI until such time as 
Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property as described 
·below. 
14. Respondent shall be awarded the parties' interest in the condominium in 
Deer Valley, subject to Respondent assuming and paying any debt encumbering the 
property. Respondent may continue to own and rent the condominium or, alternatively, sell 
it but Respondent shall be responsible for all costs of sale. Petitioner shall be given a 
credit as described below in the amount of $234,000 for his equity in the condominium 
calculated as (i) one half of the difference between the fair market value of the 
condominium ($900,000) less the purchase price ($515,000), plus (ii) $27,870 for the 
down payment paid by Petitioner, plus (iii) $7,500 for the earnest money paid by Petitioner, 
plus (iv) one half of the mortgage pay down in the amount of $6, 130, at the time Petitioner 
has paid Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property. Rental income from 








including PITI until such time as Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in the 
Phoenix Plaza property as described below. Rental income shall be recognized as income 
when earned, not deposited. Cash from rental income when earned shall be equally 
divided until such time as Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix 
Plaza property as described below. . 
15. The disposition of the parties' interest in the retail center,in Sandy shall occur 
as described below. 
A. The retail center shall be immediately listed for sale. The parties shall 
agree to the listing agent, the listing price, any reduction in the listing price, and the 
ultimate terms of sale. In lieu of Petitioner receiving cash from the sale, Petitioner 
shall be given a credit in the amount of $391,000 ($32,188 + $358,812) for his 
interest in the retail center. This credit reflects and assumes estimated net sales 
proceeds in the amountof$749,812 of which Petitioner shall receive $391,000 and 
Respondent shall receive $358,812. If the net sales proceeds are greater than 
$749,812, Respondent shall pay Petitioner one half of the difference between the 
actual net sales proceeds and $749,812. If the net sales proceeds are less than 
$749,812, Petitioner shall pay Respondent one half of the difference between the 
actual net sales proceeds and $749,812. 
B. The parties shall jointly mange the retail center until it is sold. 
Respondent shall provide the bookkeeping and accounting services for the retail 
center and provide Petitioner the regular monthly reports. The 2007 real property 
taxes shall be paid from the joint funds of the parties. Any CAM revenue shall be 
equally divided between the parties. 
C. Until such time as the retail center is sold, the parties may agree to 
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income. At the time the retail center is sold, each party shall be awarded one half 
of any cash from the net rental income. 
D. The parties shall agree as to whether any legal action shall be taken 
in an attempt to collect certain unpaid rents and other bad debt. Each party shall 
pay one half of any costs incurred and shall be awarded one half of any monies 
recovered. 
16. The disposition of the parties' interest in the Phoenix Plaza property shall 
occur as described below. 
A. Petitioner shall be awarded the Phoenix Plaza subject to Petitioner 
taking the following actions. 
B. Petitioner shall re-finance the mortgage encumbering the Phoenix 
Plaza and pay Respondent the amount of $1,784,419 for her equity in the Phoenix 
Plaza property calculated as (i) one half of the difference between the stipulated fair 
market value of the Phoenix Plaza property ($7 .25M) less the purchase price 
($4.5M), plus (ii) $891,803 for the down payment paid by Respondent, plus (iii) 
$12,500 for the earnest money paid by Respondent, plus (iv) one half of the 
mortgage pay down in the amount of $67,616 at the time Petitioner has paid 
Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property, plus (v) $62,500 for the 
St. George condominium credit, less (vi) $234,000 for the Deer Valley condominium 
credit, less (vii) $391,000 for the Sandy retail center credit. If the re-financing does 
not occur within one hundred twenty (120) days of the date the parties sign this 
Agreement, Petitioner shall pay Respondent interest at the rate of eight percent 
(8%) from one hundred and twenty (120) days after the parties sign this Agreement. 
Petitioner shall file the loan refinance application within 15 days of the date of this 
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Agreement. Respondent shall assist Petitioner in preparing and filing the loan 
refinance application. 
C. The parties shall jointly manage the Phoenix Plaza until the time the 
re-financing occurs, Respondent shall provide the bookkeeping and accounting 
services for the Phoenix Plaza and provide Petitioner the regular monthly reports. 
D. Until Respondent is paid her equity in the Phoenix Plaza, (1) the net 
rental income shall be used to pay, as necessary, the operating costs of the 
Phoenix Plaza and the other properties as described above and (2) the parties may 
agree to equally distribute to themselves a portion or all of the cash from the net 
rental income. At the time Respondent is paid her equity in the Phoenix Plaza, each 
party shall be awarded one half of any cash from the net rental income. 
E. Tenants of the Phoenix Plaza owe certain common area maintenance 
fees ("CAM Fees") for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. Any CAM Fees collected 
relative to time periods prior to the time Petitioner re-finances the mortgage on the 
Phoenix Plaza shall be equally divided between the parties. The parties shall agree 
to any collection costs including attorney fees to be incurred in an attempt to collect 
the CAM Fees. 
F. Each party shall pay one half of all costs and expenses including any 
prepayment penalty associated with the payoff of any existing mortgage or encumbrance 
or the origination of any new mortgage or encumbrance relative to the re-financing of the 
Phoenix Plaza debt. 
17. The disposition of the parties' interest in the parking lot parcel next to the 
Phoenix Plaza shall occur as described below. 
A. Petitioner shall be awarded the parking lot property subject to 
Petitioner taking the following actions. 
6 
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8. At the time of and as a part of the re-financing relative to the mortgage 
encumbering the Phoenix Plaza, Petitioner shall pay Respondent the amount of 
$105,777 which is equal to one half of the difference between (1) $425,000 
{representing the stipulated fair market value of the parking lot parcel) less (2) the 
unpaid principal amount of the mortgage in the amount of $213,446 on the parking 
lot parcel at the time of the re-financing of the Phoenix Plaza mortgage. This 
amount may be adjusted as required by each party paying one half of the amount 
to settle or otherwise resolve the disputed claim of Keith Funk for certain asphalt 
services provided relative to the parking lot parcel. In the event the amount 
necessary to resolve the disputed claim of Keith Funk has not been determined by 
the time of the re-financing occurs, such· amount shall not be taken into 
consideration and each party shall thereafter pay one half of the amount necessary 
to resolve the disputed claim. 
18. Petitioner shall be awarded the Ford Excursion vehicle and the BMW 
motorcycle. Petitioner shall assume and pay the debt encumbering the Ford Excursion 
vehicle. There is no debt encumbering the BMW motorcycle. 
19. Respondent shall be awarded the Chevrolet Avalanche and Toyota Matrix 
vehicles. Respondent shall assume and pay the debt encumbering the Chevrolet 
Avalanche vehicle. There is no debt encumbering the Toyota Matrix vehicle. 
20. Petitioner shall be awarded the Cessna 210 airplane. There is no debt 
encumbering the airplane. On the first closing to occur of either the sale of the Sandy retail 
center or the refinancing of the Phoenix Plaza property, Petitioner shall pay Respondent 
$22,500 from his share of the net sales proceeds in consideration of Petitioner being 
awarded the airplane. 
7 
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21. Respondent shall be awarded the aluminum boat and motor. The interest 
of the parties in the sailboat shall be awarded to Matthew Larson. 
22. Petitioner shall be awarded his retirement accounts in the Cardiomed Profit 
Sharing Plan. Petitioner represents that no contributions have been made to his account 
in the Cardiomed Profit Sharing Plan during the term of the marriage. Petitioner shall be 
awarded his I RA accounts. 
23. Respondent shall be awarded her 401 (k) retirement accounts. Respondent 
shall be awarded her I RA accounts. 
24. Each party shall be awarded one half of any Utah Education Savings Plan 
accounts in either parties' name. 
25. Any bank account maintained jointly by the parties for their personal use or 
used in conjunction with a real property shall be equally divided between the parties at the 
time the account is closed, the property is sold, or Respondent is paid out her equity in the 
property. Petitioner shall be awarded the Rawkin Horse bank account and the cash in 
Petitioner's possession. 
26. Each party shall be awarded his or her individual checking and savings 
accounts. 
27. The parties have no life insurance policy that has a cash surrender value. 
28. Each party shall be awarded his or her clothing, jewelry, sporting equipment, 
musical instruments, and personal effects. 
29. Each party shall be awarded as his or her separate property, property 
acquired prior to the marriage, property acquired by gift, devise or inheritance, or as a gift 
from the other party during the marriage 
30. Petitioner shall· be awarded the furniture, furnishings and other personal 
property located in the real properties awarded to him except as described in Exhibit A 
8 
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attached, which items shall be awarded to Respondent. Respondent shall be awarded the 
furniture, furnishings and other personal property located in the real properties awarded 
to her except as described in Exhibit B attached, which items shall be awarded to 
Petitioner. Respondent may store her personal property at the Seven Springs residence 
until thirty days after the date this Agreement is signed by the parties. The parties shall 
clearly identify in a list the property that is being stored. Respondent may store her grand 
piano at the Seven Springs residence for an indefinite period of time provided that 
Respondent shall remove the grand piano within 60 days of demand for such from 
Petitioner. 
31. This paragraph is intentionally deleted from this Agreement. 
32. Each party shall be awarded one half of any marital property not specifically 
p_rovided for in this Agreement. 
33. Each party shall assume and pay one half of any marital debt or obligation 
not specifically provided for in this Agreement. 
34. Each party shall assume and pay his or her debts and obligations incurred 
since the time of the separation of the parties, and indemnify and hold the other party 
harmless therefrom. 
TAX PROVISIONS 
35. In the event any income tax return of the parties filed on a married filing joint 
basis is audited, the parties shall be equally liable for any tax, penalty or interest assessed 
or shall be equally entitled to any refund. The parties shall equally pay one half of the 
excise sales and lodging taxes due to the State of Utah relative to the rental of the Deer 
Valley condominium. 
36. The parties shall file federal and state income tax returns on a married filing 




party shall pay one half of any taxes, penalties or interest due on the 2007 returns w~_th the 
:, 
exception that the incremental taxes owed relative to retirement distributions taken ~y 
Petitioner during 2007 shall be paid sol~ly by Petitioner from his separate funds. Each 
party shall be awarded one half of any alternative minimum tax credit carryforward from the 
2007 federal income tax return. 
37. Petitioner shall be entitled to any tax deduction relative to the Seven Springs 
residence accruing from January 1, 2008. Respondent shall be entitled to any tax 
deduction relative to the Scenic, Arizona property or the Mayan Palace timeshare accruing 
from January 1, 2008. 
38. Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the 
St. George condominium from January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid her equity in the 
Phoenix Plaza property. 
39. Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the 
Deer Valley condominium from January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid her equity in the 
Phoenix Plaza property. 
40. Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the 
Sandy retail center from January 1, 2008 until the time of sale. Respondent shall elect to 
either realize the gain on the sale of the property or enter into a § 1031 exchange 
transaction since Respondent has assumed the tax basis in the property by granting 
Petitioner a credit for his interest. 
41. Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the 
Phoenix Plaza property from January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid her equity in the 
property. 
42. Each party shall be awarded and entitled to claim one half of any quarterly 




the mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property and paying Respondent her equity in the 
property as described above. 
43. Petitioner shall be liable for any income tax or penalty relative to distributions 
he has taken from his retirement during 2007 at the parties' highest marginal tax rate. 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
44. The parties shall execute such documents as may be necessary to transfer 
the property as awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto. 
45. Each party shall pay his or her attorney fees and costs individually incurred 
in this action. 
46. Respondent may have her previous surname of Johnson restored to her if 
she so desires. 
47. A restraining order shall be entered enjoining each party from harassing. 
annoying or bothering the other party or any family member of the other party. 
48. Each party has made a full and fair disclosure to the other of his or her assets, 
financial condition and worth, and each party has had the opportunity to inspectthe other's 
records as they relate to the subject matter hereof and is satisfied by the disclosures of the 
other party and knowingly and willingly waives any further disclosures. 
49. The parties also represent that they have made no assignment, transfer, or 
distribution of any funds or property to any third party except in the course of typical and 
reasonable living and business expenses. 
50. The parties represent that prior to the execution of this Agreement they have 
each reviewed and discussed its terms with their respective counsel, if deemed necessary, 
and that the same represents a fair and equitable distribution of the assets acquired and 
liabilities incurred by the parties. 
11 
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51. In the event of a dispute between the parties as to the interpretation of a term 
of this Agreement, the parties shall mediate the issue before either party may initiate court 
action. Each party shall pay one half of the mediator's fee. 
52. The file in this action shall be classified as private. 
53. The prevailing party to an action for breach of a term of this Agreement shall 
be entitled to his or her attorneys fees and costs. 
54. Each party shall use his or her best efforts to effectuate the refinancing of the 
existing mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property and shall cooperate and provide 
necessary documentation and signatures on a timely basis. 
55. Until the refinancing of the mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property occurs, 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the )nd day of !lfuvlrok 2007 1 personally appeared before me 
MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, being duly sworn under oath says that he is the signer of the 
foregoing instrument. 
NOTARY PlJBLIC 
Residing at: ______ _ 
My Commission Expires: 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the JI)/ day of /U11,mb-,c 2007, personally appeared before me DEBRA 
J. ROBINSON, being duly sworn under oath says that she is the signer of the foregoing 
instrument. 
NO ARYPLic 
Residing at: ______ _ 
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EXHIBIT A 
~ 
ITEMS DEBRA WANTS FROM SANDY RESIDENCE 
1. Tempurpedic Bed 
.) 
to JJ;/,f>~r d,Q..UAL---2-:-- Marl31e Buddha 
3. Washer & Dryer 
4. Stainless Steel Barbeque 
v:;J 5. New Chase Lounges and Umbrella around pool 
6. Flat screen in bed1oom 1i P./-;'h;,,.,,r Jt,R ut/---
Gamer furr~and R_ig in downstairs family room 7. 
,.fi) 8. Treadmill -lb Pt.titi~K~  Uttl---
9. Purchases during travel equally divided 
10. Photographs divided or copied - cost divided equally. 
v:) 11. Equally divide sheet music 
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DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 074900501 
J~dge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Comm. Michael S. Evans 
The above-captioned matter came on regularly for consideration by the Court 
without hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-4. The parties entered into a 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement {the "Agreement") to settle all issues of this 
action. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the parties consented that a Decree of 
Divorce could be entered consistent with the terms of the Agreement. The Court consid-
ered the testimony of Respondent by way of affidavit as to jurisdiction and grounds for this 
divorce. The Court having reviewed the Agreement and other pleadings on file herein, and 
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, does now ORDER, ADJUDGE 
and DECREE as follows: 
DIVORCE 
1. Each party is awarded a divorce from the other. 
if l[f ~iiill 1111111111111111111111111111 
JD27754402 pages: 14 
074900501 ROBINSON,MICHAEL 5 616 
ALIMONY AND RELATED PROVISIONS 
2. Each party irrevocably waives any claim to past, present or future alimony 
under any circumstance or condition. 
3. Each party shall be responsible to maintain his or her own medical and dental 
insurance coverage and each shall be responsible for his or her own uninsured medical 
and dental costs. 
PROPERTY AND DEBT DISTRIBUTION 
4. Prior to and during their marriage, the parties acquired certain real and 
personal property which shall be divided between the parties as described below. Prior to 
and during the marriage, the parties incurred certain debts and obligations which shall be 
allocated between the parties as described below. The party assuming a particular debt 
or obligation shall indemnify and hold the other party harmless therefrom. 
5. Petitioner shall be awarded the Seven Springs residence and shall assume 
and pay any debt encumbering the property. 
6. Respondent shall be awarded the ten acre parcel in Scenic, Arizona and shall 
assume and pay any debt encumbering the property. 
7. Respondent shall be awarded the Mayan Palace timeshare and shall assume 
and pay any debt encumbering the property. 
8. Petitioner shall be awarded the parties' interest in the condominium in St. 
George, subject to Petitioner assuming and paying any debt encumbering the property. 
Petitioner may continue to own and rent the condominium or, alternatively, sell it but 
Petitioner shall be responsible for all costs of sale. Respondent shall be given a credit as 
described below in the amount of $62,500 for her equity in the condominium calculated as 
one half of the difference between the fair market value of the condominium ($250,000) 
less the current mortgage ($125,000). Rental income from the Phoenix Plaza property 
shall be used to pay all condominium costs and expenses including PITI until such time as 
2 
'677 
Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property as described 
below. 
9. Respondent shall be awarded the parties· interest in the condominium in Deer 
Valley, subject to Respondent assuming and paying any debt encumbering the property. 
Respondent may continue to own and rent the condominium or, alternatively, sell it but 
Respondent shall be responsible for all costs of sale. Petitioner shall be given a credit as 
described below in the amount of $234,000 for his equity in the condominium calculated 
as (i) one half of the difference between the fair market value of the condominium 
($900,000) less the purchase price ($515,000), plus (ii) $27,870 for the down payment 
paid by Petitioner, plus (iii) $7,500 for the earnest money paid by Petitioner, plus (iv) one 
half of the mortgage pay down in the amount of $6,130, at the time Petitioner has paid 
Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property. Rental income from the Phoenix 
Plaza property shall be used to pay all condominium costs and expenses including PITI 
until such time as Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza 
property as described below. Rental income shall be recognized as income when earned, 
not deposited. Cash from rental income when earned shall be equally divided until such 
time as Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property as 
described below. 
10. The disposition of the parties' interest in the retail center in Sandy shall occur 
as described below. 
A. The retail center shall be immediately listed for sale. The parties shall 
agree to the listing agent, the listing price, any reduction in the listing price, and the 
ultimate terms of sale. In lieu of Petitioner receiving cash from the sale, Petitioner 
shall be given a credit in the amount of $391,000 ($32,188 + $358,812) for his 
interest in the retail center. This credit reflects and assumes estimated net sales 
proceeds in the amount of $749,812 of which Petitioner shall receive $391,000 and 
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Respondent shall receive $358,812. If the net sales proceeds are greater than 
$749,812, Respondent shall pay Petitioner one half of the difference between the 
actual net sales proceeds and $749,812. If the net sales proceeds are less than 
$749,812, Petitioner shall pay Respondent one half of the difference between the 
actual net sales proceeds and $749,812. 
B. The parties shall jointly mange the retail center until it is sold. 
Respondent shall provide the bookkeeping and accounting services for the retail 
center and provide Petitioner the regular monthly reports. The 2007 real property 
taxes shall be paid from the joint funds of the parties. Any CAM revenue shall be 
equally divided between the parties. 
C. · Until such time as the retail center is sold, the parties may agree to 
equally distribute to themselves a portion or all of the cash from the net rental 
income. At the time the retail center is sold, each party shall be awarded one half 
of any cash from the net rental income. 
D. The parties shall agree as to whether any legal action shall be taken 
in an attempt to collect certain unpaid rents and other bad debt. Each party shall 
pay one half of any costs incurred and shall be awarded one half of any monies 
recovered. 
11. The disposition of the parties' interest in the Phoenix Plaza property shall 
occur as described below. 
A. Petitioner shall be awarded the Phoenix Plaza subject to Petitioner 
taking the following actions. 
B. Petitioner shall re-finance the mortgage encumbering the Phoenix 
Plaza and pay Respondent the amount of $1,784,419 for her equity in the Phoenix 
Plaza property calculated as (i) one half of the difference between the stipulated fair 
market value of the Phoenix Plaza property ($7.25M) less the purchase price 
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($4.5M), plus (ii) $891,803 for the down payment paid by Respondent, plus (iii) 
$12,500 for the earnest money paid by Respondent, plus (iv) one half of the 
mortgage pay down in the amount of $67,616 at the time Petitioner has paid 
Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property, plus (v) $62,500 for the 
St. George condominium credit, less (vi) $234,000 for the Deer Valley condominium 
credit, less (vii) $391,000 for the Sandy retail center credit. If the re-financing does 
not occur within one hundred twenty (120) days of the date the parties signed the 
this Agreement, Petitioner shall pay Respondent interest at the rate of eight percent 
(8%) from one hundred and twenty (120) days after the parties sign this Agreement. 
Petitioner shall file the loan refinance application within 15 days of the date of this 
Agreement. Respondent shall assist Petitioner in preparing and filing the loan 
refinance application. 
C. The parties shall jointly manage the Phoenix Plaza until the time the 
re-financing occurs, Respondent shall provide the bookkeeping and accounting 
services for the Phoenix Plaza and provide Petitioner the regular monthly reports. 
D. Until Respondent is paid her equity in the Phoenix Plaza, (1) the net 
rental income shall be used to pay, as necessary, the operating costs of the Phoenix 
Plaza and the other properties as described above and (2) the parties may agree 
to equally distribute to themselves a portion or all of the cash from the net rental 
income. At the time Respondent is paid her equity in the Phoenix Plaza, each party 
shall be awarded one half of any cash from the net rental income. 
E. Tenants of the Phoenix Plaza owe certain common area maintenance 
fees ("CAM Fees") for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. Any CAM Fees collected 
relative to time periods prior to the time Petitioner re-finances the mortgage on the 
Phoenix Plaza shall be equally divided between the parties. The parties shall agree 
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to any collection costs including attorney fees to be incurred in an attempt to collect 
the CAM Fees. 
F. Each party shall pay one half of all costs and expenses including any 
prepayment penalty associated with the payoff of any existing mortgage or 
encumbrance or the origination of any new mortgage or encumbrance relative to the 
re-financing of the Phoenix Plaza debt. 
12. The disposition of the parties' interest in the parking lot parcel next to the 
Phoenix Plaza shall occur as described below. 
A. Petitioner shall be awarded the parking lot property subject to 
Petitioner taking the following actions. 
B. At the time of and as a part of the re-financing relative to the mortgage 
encumbering the Phoenix Plaza, Petitioner shall pay Respondent the amount of 
$105,777 which is equal to one half of the difference between (1) $425,000 
(representing the stipulated fair market value of the parking lot parcel) less (2) the 
unpaid principal amount of the mortgage in the amount of $213,446 on the parking 
lot parcel at the time of the re-financing of the Phoenix Plaza mortgage. This 
amount may be adjusted as required by each party paying one half of the amount 
to settle or otherwise resolve the disputed claim of Keith Funk for certain asphalt 
services provided relative to the parking lot parcel. In the event the amount 
necessary to resolve the disputed claim of Keith Funk has not been determined by 
the time of the re-financing occurs, such amount shall not be taken into 
consideration and each party shall thereafter pay one half of the amount necessary 
to resolve the disputed claim. 
13. Petitioner shall be awarded the Ford Excursion vehicle and the BMW 
motorcycle. Petitioner shall assume and pay the debt encumbering the Ford Excursion 
vehicle. There is no debt encumbering the BMW motorcycle. 
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14. Respondent shall be awarded the Chevrolet Avalanche and Toyota Matrix 
vehicles. Respondent shall assume and pay the debt encumbering the Chevrolet 
Avalanche vehicle. There is no debt encumbering the Toyota Matrix vehicle. 
15. Petitioner shall be awarded the Cessna 210 airplane. There is no debt 
encumbering the airplane. On the first closing to occur of either the sale of the Sandy retail 
center or the refinancing of the Phoenix Plaza property, Petitioner shall pay Respondent 
$22,500 from his share of the net sales proceeds in consideration of Petitioner being 
awarded the airplane. 
16. Respondent shall be awarded the aluminum boat and motor. The interest of 
the parties in the sailboat shall be awarded to Matthew Larson. 
17. Petitioner shall be awarded his retirement accounts in the Cardiomed Profit 
Sharing Plan. Petitioner represents that no contributions have been made to his account 
in the Cardiomed Profit Sharing Plan during the term of the marriage. Petitioner shall be 
awarded his IRA accounts. 
18. Respondent shall be awarded her 401 (k) retirement accounts. Respondent 
shall be awarded her IRA accounts. 
19. Each party shall be awarded one half of any Utah Education Savings Plan 
accounts in either parties' name. 
20. Any bank account maintained jointly by the parties for their personal use or 
used in conjunction with a real property shall be equally divided between the parties at the 
time the account is closed, the property is sold, or Respondent is paid out her equity in the 
property. Petitioner shall be awarded the Rawkin Horse bank account and the cash in 
Petitioner's possession. 
21. The Each party shall be awarded his or her individual checking and savings 
accounts. 
22. The parties have no life insurance policy that has a cash surrender value. 
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23. Each party shall be awarded his or her clothing, jewelry, sporting equipment, 
musical instruments, and personal effects. 
24. Each party shall be awarded as his or her separate property, property 
acquired prior to the marriage, property acquired by gift, devise or inheritance, or as a gift 
from the other party during the marriage 
25. Petitioner shall be awarded the furniture, furnishings and other personal 
property located in the real properties awarded to him except as described in Exhibit A 
attached, which items shall be awarded to Respondent. Respondent shall be awarded the 
furniture, furnishings and other personal property located in the real properties awarded to 
her except as described in Exhibit B attached, which items shall be awarded to Petitioner. 
Respondent may store her personal property at the Seven Springs residence until thirty 
days after the date the Agreement was signed by the parties. The parties shall clearly 
identify in a list the property that is being stored. Respondent may store her grand piano 
at the Seven Springs residence for an indefinite period of time provided that Respondent 
shall remove the grand piano within 60 days of demand for such from Petitioner. 
26. Each party shall be awarded one half of any marital property not specifically 
provided for in the Agreement. 
27. Each party shall assume and pay one half of any marital debt or obligation 
not specifically provided for in the Agreement. 
28. Each party shall assume and pay his or her debts and obligations incurred 
since the time of the separation of the parties, and indemnify and hold the other party 
harmless therefrom. 
TAX PROVISIONS 
29. In the event any income tax return of the parties filed on a married filing joint 
basis is audited, the parties shall be equally liable for any tax, penalty or interest assessed 
or shall be equally entitled to any refund. The parties shall equally pay one half of the 
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excise sales and lodging taxes due to the State of Utah relative to the rental of the Deer 
Valley condominium. 
30. The parties shall file federal and state income tax returns on a married filing 
joint basis for the year 2007. Each party shall be _awarded one half of any refund or each 
party shall pay one half of any taxes, penalties or interest due on the 2007 returns with the 
exception that the incremental taxes owed relative to retirement distributions taken by 
Petitioner during 2007 shall be paid solely by Petitioner from his separate funds. Each 
party shall be awarded one half of any alternative minimum tax credit carryforward from the 
2007 federal income tax return. 
31. Petitioner shall be entitled to any tax deduction relative to the Seven Springs 
residence accruing from January 1, 2008. Respondent shall be entitled to any tax 
deduction relative to the Scenic, Arizona property or the Mayan Palace timeshare accruing 
from January 1, 2008. 
32. Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the 
St. George condominium from January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid her equity in the 
Phoenix Plaza property. 
33. Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the 
Deer Valley condominium from January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid her equity in the 
Phoenix Plaza property. 
34. Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the 
Sandy retail center from January 1, 2008 until the time of sale. Respondent shall elect to 
either realize the gain on the sale of the property or enter into a § 1031 exchange 
transaction since Respondent has assumed the tax basis in the property by granting 
Petitioner a credit for his interest. 
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35. Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the 
.. 
Phoenix Plaza property from January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid her equity in the 
property. ~. 
36. Each party shall be awarded and entitled to claim one half of any quarterly 
installment payment made for federal or state income taxes prior to Petitioner re-financing 
the mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property and paying Respondent her equity in the 
property as described above. 
37. Petitioner shall be liable for any income tax or penalty relative to distributions 
he has taken from his retirement during 2007 at the parties' highest marginal tax rate. 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
38. The parties shall execute such documents as may be necessary to transfer 
the property as awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto. 
39. Each party shall pay his or her attorney fees and costs individually incurred 
in this action. 
40. Respondent may have her previous surname of Johnson restored to her if 
she so desires. 
41. Each party is restrained from harassing, annoying or bothering the other party 
or any family member of the other party. 
42. In the event of a dispute between the parties as to the interpretation of a term 
of the Agreement, the parties shall mediate the issue before either party may initiate court 
action. Each party shall pay one half of the mediator's fee. 
43. The file in this action shall be classified as private. 
44. The prevailing party to an action for breach of a term of the Agreement shall 
be entitled to his or her attorneys fees and costs. 
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45. Each party shall use his or her best efforts to effectuate the refinancing of the 
existing mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property and shall cooperate and provide 
necessary documentation and signatures on a timely basis. 
46. Until the refinancing of the mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property occurs, 
the parties shall maintain the status quo on the payment of their expenses and the receipt 
of funds. )[ f)k 
DATED this __ day of ~ry, 2008. 
APPROVED this __ day of 
______ ,2007 
GLENN K. IWASAKI 
District Court Judge 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
MELISSA M. BEAN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
11 
686 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this l %ay of November, 2007, I hereby caused to be served on the 
Petitioner a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE by having 
the same delivered by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Kenneth A. Okazaki, Esq. 
Melissa Bean, Esq. 
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main Street, #1500 
P. 0. Box 45444 















ITEMS DEBRA WANTS FROM SANDY RESIDENCE 
1. Tempurpedic Bed 
-r 1}...r ~_(\l) ~-2:- Marble Buddha I() l-1:() f>~r -" t ~ 
3. Washer & Dryer 
4. Stainless Steel Barbeque 
5. New Chase Lounges and Umbrella around pool c.:_., 
Flat screen ifl bed1oom t Hhk .... ,.. aJ!tl'{ Uc/.---6. 
7. ~tber furn~ and Rig in downstairs family room 
8. Treadmill +o Ptt-1,~~, ~ UL.ti---
'--9. Purchases during travel equally divided 
10. Photographs divided or copied - cost divided equally. 
11. Equally divide sheet music 
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DAVIS, Presiding Judge: 
11 Petitioner Michael S. Robinson (Husband) appeals the Decree 
of Divorce finalizing his divorce from Respondent Debra J. 
Robinson (Wife). Husband argues that the district court erred, 
in several respects, by -enforcing a stipulation between the 
parties. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
~2 During Husband and Wife's marriage, they acquired many 
pieces of income-producing real property, including condominiums, 
vacant land, and strip malls. The most va·luable of these pieces 
of property was a strip mall in southern Utah (the plaza). After 
Husband filed for divorce in February 2007, the parties, over the 
course of several months, discussed their differing views as to 
how they should divide the various properties in which they had 
an interest. 
13 On November 2, 2007, Husband and Wife attended formal 
mediation, at which they were each represented by counsel. At 




issues and signed a Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement 
(the stipulation}. The stipulation calculated Wife's share of 
various assets to be approximately $1.78 million, awarded the 
plaza to Husband, and provided that Husband would refinance the 
mortgage on the plaza so as to pay Wife the $1.78 million. The 
parties stipulated that the fair market value of the plaza was 
$7.25 million. The stipulation also provided that Husband would 
file a loan application within fifteen days and that Wife would 
provide information necessary to assist Husband in preparing the 
application. 
14 Husband not only failed to apply for a loan within the 
fifteen days provided for in the stipulation, but he at no time 
thereafter made such an application. In February 2008, Wife 
moved for entry of a divorce decree based on the stipulation. 
Husband thereafter filed motions to set aside the·stipulation, 
arguing that his performance under the stipulation was excused 
because due to the parties• mistaken assumptions regarding the 
status of the plaza's leases, it was impossible for him to secure 
the contemplated loan on the plaza. 
~5 Based upon affidavits and proffered testimony, the 
commis.sioner recommended that the stipulation be enforced. The 
commissioner reasoned, "[I]t's clear to me that the deal was 
reached in a fair fashion, and it represented the parties' 
agreement at the time." The district court then, without 
complying with Husband 1 s request for an evidentiary hearing, 
accepted the commissioner's recommendations and entered the 
decree of divorce incorporating the provisions of the 
stipulation. · 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
16 Husband argues that his performance under the stipulation _ 
should have been excused under the contractual· defenses of mutual• 
mistake and impossibility. Whether such defenses should have 
afforded Husband relief under the facts as he argues them is a 
question of law that we review for correctness. See American 
Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah 
1996). 
17 Husband next argues that in order to enforce the 
stipulation, the district court was obliged to make a specific 
determination that the stipulation represented a fair and 
equitable division of the parties' property. Whether the 
district court made the necessary factual findings to support its 
determination .is a question of law that we review for 
correctness. Cf. State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 942-43 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) . 
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~8 Husband also argues that the district court violated his due 
process rights when it f ai.led to hold an evidentiary hearing 
before enforcing the stipulation and entering the decree of 
divorce. "Constitutional issues, including questions regarding 
due process, are questions of law that we review for 
correctness." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 1 25, 100 P.3d 1177. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Contractual Defenses 
~9 Husband argues that the district court erred in failing to 
grant relief under two contractual defenses. Because neither of 
these defenses was applicable to the facts of this case, we 
conclude that the district court did not err in this regard. 
A. Mutual Mistake 
110 Husband alleges that he should have been relieved from 
performance under the stipulation because of the contractual 
defense of mutual mistake. 1 
"A party may rescind a contract when, at the 
time the contract is made, the parties make a 
mutual mistake ·about a material fact, the 
existence of which is a basic assumption of 
the contract. If the parties harbor only 
mistaken expectations as to the course of 
future events and their assumptions as to 
facts existing at the time of the contract 
are correct, rescission is not proper." 
Deep Creek Ranch, LLC V. Utah State Armory Bd., 2008 UT 3, ~ 17, 
178 P.3d 886 (quoting Mooney v. GR & Assocs., 746 P.2d 117-4, 1178 
1. In making his argument for mutual mistake, Husband.places 
some reliance on the case of Kendall Insurance, Inc. v. R & R 
Group, Inc., 2008 UT App 235, 189 P.3d 114. But the lead opinion 
in that case is that of only one judge because the second judge 
concurred only in the result--without elaboration--and the third 
judge dissented. Thus, the opinion relied on is not binding as 
precedent, as it would be had at least two judges joined the 
opinion. See generally State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 
(Utah 1993) (quoting authority stating that "'a decision of a 
panel constitutes a decision of the court and carries the weight 
of stare decisis in a subsequent case before the same or 
dif·ferent panel 1 ") • 
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{Utah Ct. App. 1987)). The mistaken assumptions to which Husband 
points are regarding the money that the plaza "would generate"; 
the vacancy rate that "would" exist; the value the plaza "would 
have"; that the leases "would be" sufficient to secure a new loan 
or else the existing tenants 11 would re-sign extensions"; and that 
Husband "would be able to" refinance the plaza. These 
assumptions are simply expectations as to future everits--that 
those events would not vary significantly from the current state 
of evertts--and therefore do not support the contractual defense 
of mutual mistake. As to the current status of the leases and 
the income of the plaza--the amounts from which the plaza's value 
was calculated2--Husband was well aware of those figures .. 
Indeed, the evidence Husband offers to show that the parties were 
mistaken as to the value of the plaza speaks only to the value of 
the plaza after events unfolded regarding the expiring .leases. 
Husband sets forth no evidence that at the time the stipulation 
was signed the plaza was not worth the value the parties 
attributed to it. 
111 Further, even had Husband, as he alleges, made a mistake in 
his valuation due to inadequate information, his argument would 
still be unavailing because" [u]nder contract law, a party may 
not rescind an agreement based on mutual mistake where that party 
bears the risk of mistake." State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 
387-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts 
§ 215 (1991)). "A party bears the risk of a mistake when ... 
he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only 
limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake 
relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient . " 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 154 (1981); see also Klas v. 
Van Wagoner, 829 P.2d 135, 141 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (applying 
the above rule from the restatement). Thus, if Husband did not 
feel that the information upon which he relied was sufficient, he 
should have either insisted on any information he felt he needed 
before he entered into the stipulation or modified the terms of 
the stipulation accordingly. But as the commissioner recognized, 
Husband took no such steps to avoid the risk associated with 
inadequate information: 
To the extent [Husband] relied upon [Wife] 's 
handwritten analysis or any other verbal 
2. Interestingly, although the parties agreed on a fair market 
value for the plaza, th~y did not agree as to the underlying 
amounts on which such·a calculation is typically based. For 
example, although the parties knew that the property was fully 
occupied at the time of the stipulation, they could not agree on 
whether to use a vacancy rate of three percent or five percent. 
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representations that she made, [Husband] 
chose to rely upon those representations and 
he chose not to include any of those 
representations·in the [stipulation], to make 
any reference to them whatsoever, or to 
include them as pre-conditions. 
The commissioner determined that, instead, Husband was simply 
asking for the deal to be fair "in hindsight," which is not a 
ground for rescission, see Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 
699 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah 1985) (stating that an appellate court 
11 will not nullify a settlement contract because one of the 
parties would have acted differently if all the future outcomes 
had been known at the time of agreement"). Thus, the defense of 
mutual mistake does not provide relief under the facts of this 
case. 
B. Impossibility 
~12 Husband also argues that his performance under the 
stipulation should have been excused due to the impossibility of 
such performance. "Under the contractual defense of 
impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an 
unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and 
without fault of the obligated party, which event makes 
performance of the obligation impossible or highly 
impracticable. " Western Props. v. Southern Utah Aviation, Inc. , · 
776 P.2d 656, 658 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (emphases added) (footnote 
omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 266(1) 
(1981) ("Where, at the time a contract is made, a·party's 
performance under it is impracticable without his fault·because 
of a fact of which he has no reason to know and the non-existence 
of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no 
duty to render that performance arises, unless the language or 
circumstances indicate the contrary. " .( emphasis added) ) . This 
defense is wholly inapplicable here because Husband alleges no 
unforeseen event occurring after the stipulation was signed in 
November 2007 that altered the possibility of performance. See 
generally Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 n.3 ("The requirement 
that the event occur after formation of the contract 
distinguishes a case of supervening impossibility ... from a 
case in which the contract cannot be performed because of a 
mistake, an unknown legal requirement, or other fact in existence 
at the time the contract is made."). Instead, Husband argues in 
his brief that at no point could he have obtained a loan "given 
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anytime thereafter. 113 Thus, without any later-occurring event 
rendering performance impossible or highly impracticable, 
Husband's argument of impossibility is unavailing and the 
district court did not err in failing to address the issue. 4 
II. Fair and Equitable Division of Property 
113 Husband next argues that the district court erred in failing 
to make a determination that the division of assets contained in 
the stipulation was fair.and reasonable. But the district court 
did discuss whether the division of the properties was equitable: 
The Court finds that the parties represent 
that prior to the execution of the 
[stipulation] they have each reviewed and 
discussed its terms with their respective 
counsel, if deemed necessary, and that the 
same represents a fair and equitable 
distribution of the assets acquired and 
liabilities incurred by the parties. 
We do, however, recognize that this finding is somewhat ambiguous 
in that it could have been relating that the parties determined 
3. Husband argues that his ineligibility for a loan based on the 
status of the leases was an unforeseen future event. However, 
when Husband entered the stipulation, he was well aware of the 
current status of the leases and could have checked to see if 
such would be adequate _to .support the contemplated loan. This 
ineligibility therefore fails as an unforseen future event. 
Likewise, the future expectations advanced under Husband's mutual 
mistake argument do not support his impossibility claim because 
they are not future· events that made performance impossible. 
Husband admits that the alleged impossibility of performance 
existed even when the stipulation was signed. Furthermore, as a 
general rule, stability in market events and financial ability 
are not basic assumptions of contracts. See Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts§ 261 cmt. b (1981) ("The continuation of existing 
market conditions and of the financial situation of the parties 
are ordinarily not such [basic] assumptions, so that mere market 
shifts or financial inability do not usually effect discharge 
under the rule [regarding impracticability]."). 
4. We further note that Husband's ability to provide evidence 
that performance was impossible or highly impracticable is 
severely limited where he never actually applied for a loan as 
contemplated, let alone having done so in the time frame set 




the division to be equitable, as opposed to the district court 
having made such a determination. 5 Nonetheless, we are 
unconvinced that further findings are necessary in this case. 
Husband correctly asserts that a stipulation dividing property 
between divorcing parties should be adopted only "if the court 
believes it to be fair and reasonable," Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 
472, 476 (Utah 1975) ·. But Husband provides no authority for his 
resulting assertion that a district court may not enforce a 
stipulation unless the district court makes a formal finding that 
it is fair and reasonable. And the presumption seems to be the 
exact oppos_i te, that is, that a stipulation will ordinarily be 
enforced "unless the court finds it to be unfair or 
unreasonable," Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (emphases added). Thus, from the district court's decision 
to enforce the stipulation, we assume--and have no findings that 
would indicate otherwise--that the court determined that the 
property division was equitable. And based on the facts of this 
case, in particular the sophistication of the parties and the 
fact that they each had the opportunity to consult with counsel 
and other advisors before entering the stipulation, we cannot say 
that the court's admittedly cursory finding exceeds the limits of 
reasonableness. 
III. Failure to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing 
~14 Despite Husband's request for an evidentiary hearing, the 
district court accepted the commissioner's recommendation and 
entered the decree of divorce without holding an evidentiary 
hearing. Husband argues that this denied him due process. We 
disagree. Importantly, Husband argues that we may reach his 
first issue on appeal because there are no disputed facts 
determinative of whether the contractual defenses apply. We 
agree and determine that for this same reason, no evidentiary 
hearing was required. Although factual disputes ordinarily 
require a complete evidentiary hearing, there is simply no need 
for such a hearing when,· as here, all factual disputes are 
5. However, according to comments made at oral argument, both 
parties apparently considered this finding to express the 
determination, albeit a conclusory one, by the district court 
that the stipulation was fair and equitable. Yet Husband neither 
marshals the evidence to adequately challenge this finding nor 
cites to any authority providing that more detailed findings are 
required to explain why the stipulation was fair and reasonable. 
See generally Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, -~~ 76-80, 100 P. 3d 
1177 {explaining the marshaling requirement); Smith v. Smith, 







immaterial to the district court's decision. See Beltran v. 
Allan, 926 P. 2d 892, 898 {Utah Ct. App. 1996) ( "There is no 
dispute to these facts, and an evidentiary hearing would be of no 
benefit. 11 ) ; Liska v. Liska, 902 P. 2d 644, 650 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) {"We have already determined the commissioner's 
recommendation was appropriate ... because the undisputed facts 
overwhelmingly demonstrate [such]. Accordingly, any error made 
by the district court in failing to conduct an evidentiary 
hearing to determine the appropriateness of the commissioner's 
recommendation is likewise harmless."}. Regardless of the 
disputed issues--who had the financial records of the plaza, who 
was responsible for signing leases, whether Husband had 
sufficient information from Wife to file a loan application, and 
what representations Wife made as to the financial situation of 
the plaza--Husband was not, as we have explained above, entitled 
to relief under the contractual defenses asserted. Therefore, 
the district court did not err in declining to hold an 
evidentiary hearing before enforcing the stipulation and entering 
the decree of divorce. 
CONCLUSION 
115 We determine that the contractual defenses of mutual mistake 
and impossibility are inapplicable under the facts of this case. 
We also determine that the district court did not err in 
accepting the stipulation without making further findings that 
the stipulation was fair and equitable. Finally, we are 
convinced that H~sband's due process rights were not violated due 
to the absence of an evidentiary hearing because there were no 
disputed factual issues mater.ial to the question before the 
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JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
. Civil No. 074900501 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Comm. Michael S. Evans 
,, 
.••• I 
On January 13, 2011, the Order to Show Cause· of Respondent Debra J. 
Robinson came on regularly for hearing before Commissioner Michael S. Evans. 
Petitioner was present and represented by Steven Kuhnhausen. Respondent was 
present and represented by Dean C. Andreasen and Sar~~ L. Campbell. Counsel 
informed the Court that the parties had entered into a partial stipulation to resolve 
certain issues of the action. The stipulation was read into the record, acknowledged by 
the parties, and accepted by the Court. With respect to the disputed issues, the Court 
considered the papers and affidavits filed by the parties, and. also the arguments and 
proffers of counsel. Based thereon, the Court made findings and recommendations as 
{00197227-1} 1213 
t 
' " . ' ' 
described in the unofficial transcript of the ruling of the Court, attached hereto as Exhibit 
A. Based on those findings and recommendations, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and 
decreed as follows: 
1. Respondent's Motion to Strike the affidavits of John Gottschall and Eric 
Wadley is hereby granted. 
2. ·, Respondent shall manage the Phoenix Plaza and Sandy Retail Center, 
and she shall continue to manage the Deer Valley condo. She shall be the one to 
interact directly with the tenants, secure the deposits and rents, and deposit all funds 
from those rental properties into the parties' joint account. From the joint account, 
Respondent shall pay the expenses for the Phoenix Plaza, the Sandy Retail Center, the 
St. George home, and the Deer Valley condo. No other expenses shall be paid from the 
parties' joint account, and Respondent shall provide a monthly accounting to Petitioner. 
3. The parties shall immediately list the Phoenix Plaza property for sale with 
a mutually acceptable agent at a price of $3,000,000. If and when the Phoenix Plaza is 
sold, the sales proceeds shall be placed in an escrow account. 
4. The Sandy Retail Center shall be listed for sale. Michael Carroll is 
appointed as listing agent for the Sandy Retail Center and has authority to determine 
the initial listing price. Any reductions in the listing price shall be agreed to by the 
parties. In making a decision to reduce the listing price, each party may submit to Mr. 
Car~oll up to two expert opinions as to the property's value. 
5. Judgment is entered against Petitioner in favor of Respondent in the 
amount of $438,924.43 representing interest at a rate of eight percent (8%) per annum 
{00197227~1} 
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on the amounts owed under the Decree of Divorce (1J 11(B): $1,784,419.00; 1J 12(B): 
$105,777; 1J 15: $22,500) from March 21 2008 (120 days after the parties signed the 
Agreement) to January 13, 2011. 
6. The Court finds there has been a prima facie showing of Petitioner's 
failure to comply with and breach of the terms of the Decree of Divorce. 
7. The Court finds Petitioner never filed an application to refinance. 
8. The issue of Petitioner's contempt is certified for evidentiary hearing 
regarding his failure to comply with the terms of the parties' Decree of Divorce. 
9. The issue of attorney fees and costs being awarded to Respondent in 
connection with this Order to Show Cause hearing is certified for evidentiary hearing 
and shall be considered at the hearing on the issue of Petitioner's contempt. 
10. The Court finds the language of the Decree of Divorce does not trigger the 
award of a judgment for the principal amounts involved, which principal amounts are 
due and owing upon the refinance of the property or perhaps as a sanction following a 
finding of contempt. 




DATED this ~4 day of 4 .1 j y\WTAA,viv 2011. 
BY ;iE COURT: 
DATED this 2 r'" day of ------"8_tM_. ____ 2011. 
{00197227-1} 
D this .:lL._day of 
11 
HNHAUSEN 
BY THE COURT: 
GLENN K. IWASAKI 






~ CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On thi~ day of January 2011, I hereby caused to be served on the 
Petitioner a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER by having 
the same hand delivered to: 
{00197227-1} 
Steven Kuhnhausen, Esq. 
10 West 300 South, #603 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 




DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent. 
CE: Commissioner Michael S. Evans 
(UNOFFICIAL) PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT 
OF RULING PORTION OF HEARING -
JANUARY 13, 2010 
Civil No. 074900501 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Comm. Michael S. Evans 
SK: · Steven Kuhnhausen, Attorney for Petitioner 
DCA: Dean C. Andreasen, Attorney for Respondent 
DR: Debra Robinson 
MR: Michael Robinson 
CE: I'll receive and approve the agreement of the parties as has been stated on the 
record. In regard to the issue of contempt, I will recommend the same be 
certified for further hearing. It appears to me as though, there's been, in fact, 
there's no dispute that a prima facia showing of failure to comply with the Decree 
{00198125-1} 121. 9 
of Divorce has occurred. The Decree provides specificallyt and you've read it a 
lot, counsel, but one very specific direction to Mr. Robinson was the "shall file the 
loan refinance application within 15 days of the date of this Agreement." Mr. 
Robinson doesn't say he couldn't file the loan refinance application, that it was 
impossible for him to do that. He says he was dissuaded and that's insufficient. 
And because he didntt take the first stept of course, the other steps resulting in 
the refinance have never occurred. So again, I will recommend the issue of 
contempt be certified. Howevert given the language of the Decree, I can't find 
that that would trigger the award of a judgment for the principal amount involved. 
I will recommend that a judgment for the 8% interest be awarded as that is 
separate and apart and there's no dispute that that portion of the Decree has 
been triggered. I'll· recommend that the request for fees in connection with this 
hearing be certified and considered by the Court at the hearing on the issue of 
contempt. I have reviewed again, in cursory fashion today, the Court of Appeals 
decision, no mention is made of attorneys' fees there, and it's my understanding 
that it's appropria~e to request an award of fees of the Court before whom you 
are appearing, so I'll recommend, well, I'll not rule one way or the other, but I'll 
not award attorneys fees that were incurred on appeal. I'm certainly not certain 
where that standst but I'll not recommend any be awarded at this time. I believe 
I've addressed all the issues. Hav~ I missed anything counsel? 
SK: No, I think you're done. Oh, my countermotion to go to mediation on those 
unclear paragraphs. 
CE: I can't find there's, the language is, if a term needs to be interpreted they go to · 
mediation, I can't find there are any unclear terms that would require mediation, 
not that mediation would be a bad idea to talk about what you do now that 
everything that was contemplated three years ago is no longer in placet as if 




DCA: What about payments of amounts coming out as distributions from the rental 
proceeds, the net rental proceeds after payment of expenses. 
CE: That was left within the discretion of the parties, was it not? 
SK: Yes. 
CE: In the Decree? Welt I've awarded a Judgment for the interest amount and I trust 
that you'll provide the formula you arrive at to Mr. Kuhnhausen that you apply in 
arriving at the grand total of the interest accrued from the date of the triggering 
event to today is my recommendation of, it would appear those proceeds would 
be available for execution if you can't reach some other agreement. 
DCA: May I ask a clarification, then, of the distinction, I'm assuming the Court's going 
to have me draft the Order, the distinction between no judgment being entered 
against Mr. Robinson for the principal amounts owing, as compared to the 
interest. What is the distinction? 
CE: The principal amount is due and owing upon the refinance of the property. The 
interest is due and owing upon the lack of refinance of the property. So, the 8% 
is a fixed amount. The other amounts aren't due until the refinance occurs or 
perhaps as a sanction following a finding of contempt. 
DCA: And the Court's findings that he has never filed an application to refinance? 




DCA: Thank you. 
SK: Thanks again for accommodating my schedule. 
CE: Thank you. I appreciate counsel, your cooperating together to allow this hearing 
to proceed. And I will ask Mr. Andreasen, you prepare the Order. Thank you 






DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981) 
SARAH L. CAMPBELL (#12052) 
CL YOE SNOW & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 




Attorneys for Respondent 
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Third Judlclal District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 




DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 074900501 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Comm. Michael S. Evans 
On June 21, 2011, the (i) Motion for Stay of Proceedings to Enforce the 
Judgment, (ii) Motion for Order, and (iii) Motion to Strike Respondent's Verified Motion 
for Sale of Phoenix Plaza filed by Petitioner Michael S. Robinson ("Petitioner") and the 
(a) Verified Motion to Enforce Sale of Sandy Retail Center and (b) Verified Motion to 
Enforce Sale of Phoenix Plaza filed by Respondent Debra J. Robinson ("Respondent") 
came on regularly for hearing before Commissioner Michael S. Evans. Petitioner was 
present and represented by Steven Kuhnhausen. Respondent was present and 
represented by Dean C. Andreasen and Sarah L. Campbell. The Court considered the 
{00219922-2} 
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papers filed by the parties and the arguments and proffers of counsel..Based thereon, it 
is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows: 
1. Petitioner's Motion for Stay of Proceedings to Enforce the Judgment is 
denied. 
2. Petitioner's Motion to Strike Respondent's Verified Motion for Sale of 




Respondent's Verified Motion to Enforce Sale of Sandy Retail Center is 
Respondent's Verified Motion to Enforce Sale of Phoenix Plaza is granted. 
Sandy Retail Center 
5. Pursuant to Rule 70 of the URCP, Petitioner is divested of all title in the 
Sandy Retail Center (sometimes also referred to as the "Sandy Plaza" or "Demi Plaza") 
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah at 7760 South 700 East, Sandy, Utah 84047 
and more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Section 30, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North 183 feet, thence West 
183 feet; thence South 183 feet, thence East 183 feet to the place of 
beginning. 
Less and excepting the following described parcel conveyed to Sandy City 
by that certain Special Warranty Deed recorded November 16, 1989 as 
Entry No. 4848748 in Book 6176 at Page 1435 of Official Records: 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Section 30, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence North 
0°02'05'' East 183.0 feet, along the section line thence North 89°53'1 O" 
West 53.0 feet; thence South 0°02'05" West 117.0 feet; thence South 
45°04'31" West 36.74 feet; thence North 89°53'10" West 104.0 feet; 
thence South 0°02'05" West 40 feet; thence South 89°53'10" East 183.0 






Tax Parcel ID NO: 22-30-478-008-0000 
6. Respondent is vested with complete title in the Sandy Retail Center 
(described above), clear and free of any title of Petitioner. Respondent may sign all 
documents necessary to list the Sandy Retail Center for sale and to close the sale of it. · 
This Order divesting Petitioner of title is solely for the purpose of facilitating the listing 
and sale of the Sandy Retail Center and does not affect the term of any previous order 
of the Court. 
7. If Respondent receives an offer to purchase the Sandy Retail Center, 
Respondent shall provide Petitioner a copy of all documents relative to the sale and an 
accounting of the sales proceeds. 
Phoenix Plaza 
8. Petitioner is ordered to execute addendum No. 3, attached hereto as 
Exhibit A, of the Real Estate Purchase Contract for the Phoenix Plaza by June 21, 
2011. 
9. The Court finds there are no substantial changes between addendum no. 
3 and addendum no. 2, which is Petitioner's counteroffer related to sale of the Phoenix 
Plaza. 
Other Provisions 
10. Should Petitioner fail to execute addendum No. 3, the court clerk is 
authorized and ordered to do so before noon on June 22, 2011, and such signature 
shall have the same effect as if Petitioner had personally signed the document. 
11. Respondent's request for attorney's fees in connection with the motions 






the issue of Petitioner's contempt, currently scheduled for July 21, 2011. 
12. Petitioner's request for attorney's fees related to his Motion to Strike 
Respondent's Verified Motion for Sale of Phoenix Plaza is denied because he was not 
damaged by the motion failing to be verified. 
13. Relative to Petitioner's Motion for Order, Respondent's contempt in not 
providing a full accounting to Petitioner is certified for evidentiary hearing because there 
is a prima facie case that she has not provided a full accounting. 
DATED this °1,"d..._ day of ~ ,,, 2011. 
BY THE COURT: 
~N~~~I 
MICHAELS. EVA S ~
District Court Commissioner 
DATED this~ 2_ day of _J_. _u_J.-,-(JJI' _____ 2011. 







CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this .JJnt/day of June 2011, I hereby caused to be served on the Petitioner a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by having the same hand delivered to: 
{00219922-2 } 
Steven Kuhnhausen, Esq. 
10 West 300 South, #603 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 




MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, FINDINGS, ORDER, AND JUDGMENT 
Petitioner, 
V. 
DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent. 
Civil No. 074900501 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Comm. Michael S. Evans 
On July 26; 2011, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on (i) the 
certification of Petitioner's contempt under the Order entered March 1, 2011; (ii) t1:1e 
certification of Respondent's contempt under the Order entered June 22, 2011; and (iii) 
the certification of ~espondent's attorney fees incurred as a result of her motions to 
enforce the Decree of Divorce and subsequent orders. Petitioner was present and· 
represented by Steven Kuhnhausen. Respondent was present and represented by 
Dean C. Andreasen and Sarah L. Campbell. The Court considered the papers filed by 
the parties, the arguments and proffers of counsel, and the stipulation of the parties as 
{00225576-1 } 




\ ... \ 
to certain issues. Based thereon, the Court made the following findings as more 
completely described in the transcript of the Court's ruling, attached hereto as Exhibit A: 
Motion in Limine 
1. . Petitioner has not established Mr. Wadley as an expert such that he can 
offer an opinion about facts to which he does not have personal knowledge. 
2. Mr. Wadley has no personal knowledge of the matters before this Court. In 
fact, any information upon which he could base his testimony he received. from 
Petitioner, who is Mr. Wadley's father-in-law. 
3. While Petitioner's counsel has indicated that Mr. Wadley will not be 
testifying as an expert, it seems that the proffer centers on expert opinion and expert 
testimony. 
4. If Petitioner is not calling Mr. Wadley as an expert and he is a lay witness, 
then Mr. Wadley's proffered testimony lacks foundation and is irrelevant because he 
was not involved with or present during any of the communications between the parties 
during the relevant timeframes. 
5. Accordingly, it is proper that Respondent's motion in limine be granted. 
Motion to Dismiss Contempt Proceedings 
6. The crux of Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss is what more can be done to 
Petitioner and why doesn't Petitioner have an opportunity to purge his contempt. 
7. There is a dual component as to contempt proceedings. Petitioner has an 
opportunity to purge his contempt if he complies with the Court's direction and order, 






\._ .. \_ 
8. The claims in Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss are not well taken because he 
has no applicable defenses to his contempt and he persists in disobeying Court orders. 
9. The defenses of impossibility and mutual mistake were both completely 
addressed in the Court of Appeals opinion, and the Petitioner is precluded from arguing 
defenses. 
10. There is claim preclusion as to Petitioner's allegations of fraud a~nst 
Respondent. This issue was raised iR eye~ 11 ,otiefl &REI memerandum filel; ~oner 
after November 2, 2007. That issue was not taken up on appeal although Petitioner had 
an opportunity to raise the issue on appeal. \T -\Ul¼- fl>ve, 1/2 YWt Cl (1{, ~)e__ hi 
11. Accordingly, Petitioner is precluded from arguing impossibility, mutual ~ 
mistake,orfraut ().S Cl. &~~ Th ~ C,ov\,~rt, ~e,,. ~e 
Petitioner's Contempt · \V • ~ 
12. Petitioner is held to be in contempt for the following reasons. 
13. The Decree awards the Phoenix Plaza to Petitioner and also requires that 
he refinance the mortgage encumbering the Phoenix Plaza and pay Respondent 
$1,784,419. Specifically, Petitioner was required to file an application to refinance the 
Phoenix Plaza mortgage within fifteen ( 15) days from the parties, signing of the 
Stipulation. Decree 1I 11 (B). 
14. The Decree also requires Petitioner to pay Respondent the following 
amounts to accomplish an equitable division of the marital estate: 
{00225576-1 } 
a. Paragraph 12(8) of the Decree requires Petitioner to pay Respondent 








b. Paragraph 15 of the Decree requires Petitioner to pay Respondent the 
sum of $22,500. 
c. Accordingly, a total of $1,912,696 was.to be paid to Respondent. 
.15. Petitioner knew and clearly ·understood he had an obligation to refinance 
the Phoenix Plaza mortgage. 
16. Petitioner failed to apply for a loan to refinance the Phoenix Plaza 
mortgage within the time agreed and has made no application at any time thereafter. 
17. Petitioner has still not submitted a mortgage refinance application relative 
to the Phoenix Plaza, which has now become the subject of a sale pursuant to a 
stipulation of the parties incorporated into the Order entered March 1, 2011. 
18. Petitioner has not made a single payment to Respondent to satisfy his 
obligations to her under the Decree. 
19. Petitioner has had some ability to pay Respondent property settlement 
from the sale of other property and insurance proceeds. 
Respondent's Contempt 
20. Respondent is no~ in contempt for failing to provide the accounting based 
upon the totality of the circumstances as well as providing the accounting in June of 
2011 and July of 2011, with no objections by Petitioner at this time. 
21. Under the terms of the Decree, Respondent is responsible to "provide the 
bookkeeping and accounting services" and "provide Petitioner the regular monthly 
reports" for the Sandy Retail Center and the Phoenix Plaza. Decree fflI 10(8), 11(C). 
22. Pursuant to ,i 2 of the Judgment and Order, which transferred 
management of the parties' commercial properties to Respondent, Respondent is also· 








to provide a monthly accounting for the Phoenix Plaza and the Sandy Retail Center to 
Petitioner. 
23. On June 13, 2011, Respondent provided Petitioner with an accountjng for 
the Sandy Retail Center and the Phoenix Plaza that is complete e-xsept-fer--the---year--------------• 
201 O and the months of January and February 2011, during which time Petitioner was 
still managing the properties. 
24. Respondent was unable to complete the accounting for the year 2010 and ~ ~ 
January and February of 2011,beea1:1&e Petit101 ,er .-efl:lsed eRd coRtiAues to 1-&fuse to Lt,ow 
pFO¥ide Reeessary info, malion inelueling rental deposits for the relevant period~: s '{V\JJ,..v 
Respondent's Attorney Fees O\,"t 1'\,u__ ~½ 
25. Tuer~ is both a statutory basis and a contractual basis for ~~u-lrui\VI 
Respondent her attorney fees and costs incurred in enforcing certain provisions of the ~::i ' 
Decree. \~~~~ 
26. The parties' Decree provides that "[t]he prevailing party to an action forfo.r 
breach of a term of the.Agreement shall be entitled to his or her attorneys fees and~~ 
costs." Decree 1I 44. 
27. Respondent has had to seek enforcement of the Decree. 
~(W 
w. 
28. Respondent is entitled to her attorney fees, the specific amount which will 
be subject to proof by affidavit and a response and reply. 
Based on these findings and the stipulation of the parties, it is hereby ordered, 
adjudged and decreed as follows: 







2. Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Contempt Proceeding is denied. 
3. Judgment is entered against Petitioner and in favor of Respondent in the 
amount of 1,912,696.00, representing the amounts owed under the Decree of Divorce 
m 11<B>: $1,184,419.00; ,r 12cs): $1os,111; 111s: $22,soo}. 
4. Judgment is entered against Petitioner in favor of Respondent in the 
amount of $81,748.10 representing interest at a rate of eight percent (8%) per annum 
on the amounts owed under the Decree of Divorce from January 13, 2011 to July 26, 
2011. 
5. Petitioner is in contempt. 
Respondent is not in contempt. 6. 
7. Petitioner is sentenced to thirty days in the Salt Lake County jail, which 
sentence is suspended at the present time. 
8. Respondent is awarded her attorney fees, the specific amount which will 
be subject to proof by affidavit and a response and reply. 
9. Based upon the positions taken by counsel and the Court's suggestion, 
Respondent is not precluded from exercising collection means to satisfy her judgments. 
However, collection actions will be stayed (limited forbearance) relative to the Phoenix 
Plaza for a period of 60 days from the Court's ruling at the evidentiary hearing on July 
26, 2011. 
1-0. The parties shall meet and confer to determine the least expensive 







11. Petitioner is restrained from contacting people associated with the closing 
of the sale of the· Phoenix Plaza-including brokers, - agents, buyers, and closing 
agents-other than as he is requested to provide documents or information. 
12. For at least sixty days, Petitioner is restrained from selling, transferring, 
conveying, gifting, secreting, or otherwise disposing of any personal or real property. 
13. Each party is restrained from making disparaging comments about the 
other party. 
14. Petitioner shall sign deeds to the Scenic Arizona property and the Park 
City condo conveying complete title to Respondent within ten days of the deeds being 
presented to him. 
DATED this ~ "o' day of Ml'si-C\\ 2011. 
APPROVED this ___ day of 
August 2011 
STEVEN KUHNHAUSEN · 
Attorney for Petitioner 
{00225576-1} 







CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On thi~ay of August 2011, I hereby caused to be served on the Petitioner 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS, ORDER, AND JUDGMENT by 
having the same mailed via first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to: 
{00225576-1 } 
Steven Kuhnhausen, Esq. 
1 0 West 300 South, #603 







DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981) 
SARAH L. CAMPBELL (#12052) 
CL YOE SNOW & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone (801) 322-2516 
Fax (801) 521-6280 . 
dca@clydesnow.com 
slc@clydesnow.com 
Attorneys for Respondent 
f U.~b fJISrtUtl' COURT 
Third Judicial .District 
JAN 2 4 20i2 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 07 4900501 
Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy 
Comm. Michael S. Evans 
On December 20, 2011, seven of the fourteen pending motions came on 
regularly for hearing before Commissioner Michael S. Evans. The motions considered 
were the (A) Motion to Terminate 8% Interest as Per Paragraph 11 in the Divorce 
Decree filed by Petitioner Michael S. Robinson ("Petitioner") and the (B) Motion for 
Order to Compel Compliance of Bank of the West; (C) Motion for an Order to Compel 
Petitioner to Sign Seller Disclosures Related to the Phoenix Plaza and for a Permanent 
Restraining Order; (D) Motion for Approval of Reduced Listing Price for Sandy Retail 
Center; (E) Objection and Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum; (F) Motion for 
Issuance of Bench Warrant Against Carol Busche; and (G) Motion to Approve and 




Enforce Substitute Offer to Purchase Phoenix Plaza filed by Respondent Debra J. 
Robinson ("Respondent"). Petitioner was present and represented by Steven 
Kuhnhausen. Respondent was present and represented by Dean C. Andreasen and 
Sarah L. Campbell. Carol Busche was present and represented by Budge W. Call. 
Cardiomed Incorporated Profit Sharing Plan was represented by Scott A. Hagen. 
Counsel informed the Court that the parties had entered into a stipulation to 
resolve two of the pending motions. The stipulations were read into the record, 
acknowledged by the parties, and approved by the Court. With respect to the disputed 
issues, the Court considered the motions, the papers and affidavits filed in support and 
opposition, and the arguments and proffers of counsel. Based thereon, the Court hereby 
finds, orders, adjudges, and decrees as follows: 
(A). Petitioner's Motion to Terminate 8% Interest 
1. Petitioner's Motion to Terminate 8% Interest as Per Paragraph 11 in the 
Divorce Decree is denied. 
2. There is no statutory or contractual basis for awarding Petitioner his 
attorney's fees and this request is denied. 
(8). Respondent's Motion to Compel Bank of the West 
3. The Objection of the Cardiomed Incorporated Profit Sharing Plan to 
Subpoena Duces Tecum is overruled. 
4. Respondent's Motion for Order to Compel Compliance of Bank of the 
West is granted. 
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5. Bank of the West is ordered to respond to the Subpoena Duces Tecum 
dated May 16, 2011, served on it relating to the accounts of Michael S. Robinson and 
the Cardiomed Incorporated Profit Sharing Plan. 
(CID). Petitioner's Motions as to Seller Disclosures and Substitute Offer on Phoenix 
Plaza 
6. Respondent's Motion to Approve and Enforce Substitute Offer to 
Purchase Phoenix Plaza is granted. 
7. The new offer has been made at the same price and under the same 
terms as the prior offer. 
8. Petitioner is the owner of the Phoenix Plaza and the only person subject to 
IRS form 1099 reporting pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Decree. 
9. The Phoenix Plaza shall be sold free and clear of any interest of the 
parties. 
10. Petitioner is ordered to sign all documents necessary to close sale of the 
Phoenix Plaza including, but not limited to, the Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
counteroffers (addendums), deeds, seller disclosures, affidavits and/or indemnities, and 
other closing documents. 
11. In the event Petitioner fails to sign a document necessary to close the sale 
of the Phoenix Plaza within twenty-four hours of the document being presented to him, 
the court clerk is authorized and ordered to sign the relevant document on Petitioner's 
behalf, and such signature shall have the same effect as if Petitioner had personally 




12. In the event Petitioner fails to sign a document necessary to close the sale 
of the Phoenix Plaza, Respondent is authorized and may sign the relevant document on 
Petitioners behalf, so long as the document does not place Respondent in the chain of 
title. 
13. The closing agent shall deem and treat all seller proceeds from the sale of 
the Phoenix Plaza including, but not limited to, seller proceeds, rents, and rent deposits, 
as if they were payable to Petitioner but such funds shall not be disbursed to Petitioner 
but shall be disbursed to Respondent in partial satisfaction of the judgments which 
Respondent has against Petitioner. 
14. Respondent shall provide Petitioner a copy of all documents relative to the 
sale of the Phoenix Plaza and an accounting of the sales proceeds. 
15. Respondent's request for attorney's fees and costs is certified for 
evidentiary hearing. 
16. Petitioner's contempt for non-compliance with the terms of the Decree of 
Divorce is certified for evidentiary hearing. 
17. The sixty-day restraining order imposed on Petitioner by the Court at the 
hearing on July 26, 2011, is hereby made permanent for the duration of this action. 
· (E). Reduced Listing Price of Sandy Retail Center 
18. Respondent's Motion for Approval of Reduced Listing Price for Sandy 
Retail Center is granted. 






(F). Respondent's Obiection and Motion to Quash 
20. If Petitioner decides to re-issue any subpoenas, he will give Respondent 
the proper notice required by the Rules of Civil Procedure and serve them on her. 
21. Additionally, Petitioner will immediately give Respondent copies of all 
documents received -in response to the subpoenas duces tecum previously issued and 
served in connection with this case. 
(G). Motion for Issuance of Bench Warrant Against Carol Busche 
22. Budge Call has entered an appearance on behalf of Carol Busche and will 
accept service of a Subpoena to Appear.at Deposition. 
23. The deposition of Carol Busche will be scheduled for a mutually 
convenient date in January 2012. 
Additional Motions 
24. The other motions that remain pending before the Court will be heard on 




DATEDthisndayof ~MAAOM.!'..,.- 2012. 
. BY T~E COURT: 
District co·~_rt-q-9mmrsaj~&e·~y 
''._ v ,·,".-:1.f 1\.~\ v / 
. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this ~ day of . 2012. 
APPROVED as to form this . 
___ day of January 2012 
STEVEN KUHNHAUSEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
APPROVED as to form this 
f i~ay of January 2012 
BY THE COURT: 
TODD M. SHAUG 
District Court Judge 
scJr:6:tJ ~  
Attorney for Cardiomed Incorporated Profit Sharing Plan 
APPROVED as to form this 
___ . day of January'2012 
BUDGE W. CALL 
Attorney for Carol Busche 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
541:-On this __ day of January 2012, I hereby caused to be served on the 
Petitioner a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by having the same hand 
delivered to: 
{00252194-2} 
Steven Kuhnhausen, Esq. 
1 0 West 300 South, #603 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Budge W. Call, Esq. 
Bond & Call 
8 East Broadway, #720 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ScottA. Hagen, Esq. 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 






DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981) 
SARAH L. CAMPBELL (#12052) 
CL YOE SNOW & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone (801) 322-2516 
Fax (801) 521-6280 
dca@clydesnow.com 
slc@clydesnow.com 
Attorneys for Respondent 
RLED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
FEBO 3° 2012 
ay SALT LAKE cou~ 'h 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS AND ORDER 
Civil No. 074900501 
Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy 
Comm. Michael S. Evans 
On February 3, 2012, Respondent Debra J. Robinson's Motion for Temporary 
~ 
Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, Lien Nullification, Damages, and Other Relief 
came on regularly for hearing before the Court, Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy presiding. 
Respondent was present and represented by Dean C. Andreasen. Petitioner Michael 
S. Robinson was present and represented by Michael A Jensen via telephone. 
The Court considered the Motion, the papers filed in support and opposition 
thereto, and the arguments and proffers of counsel. Based thereon, and for good cause 
shown, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows: 
{00258723-1 } 
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1. The Court finds that on January 27, 2012, Petitioner recorded a document 
entitled Lis Pendens with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office of the State of Utah 1 
as entry no. 11322084, in book 9986, at pages 2486-2489 (the "Lis Pendens") affecting 
that certain parcel of property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and more particularly 
described as follows: 
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Section 30, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North 183 feet, thence West 
183 feet; thence South 183 feet, thence East 183 feet to the place of 
beginning. 
Less and excepting the following described parcel conveyed to Sandy City 
by that certain Special Warranty Deed recorded November 16, 1989 as 
Entry No. 4848748 in Book 6176 at Page 1435 of Official Records: 
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Section 30, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence North 
0°02'05" East 183.0 feet, along the section line thence North 89°53'1 0" 
West 53.0 feet; thence South 0°02'05" West 117 .0 feet; thence South 
45°04'31" West 36.74 feet; thence North 89°53'10" West 104.0 feet; 
thence South 0°02'05" West 40 feet; thence South 89°53'10" East 183.0 
feet to the point of beginning. 
Street Address: 7760 South 700 East, Sandy, Utah 84047 
Parcel No. 22-30-4 78-008-0000 
(the "Property"). 
2. The Lis Pendens is determined to be a "wrongful lien" under the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-1 et seq. Q.\'\~ 1 "-~ \I\..(;~~ , t,t.t~ C,p a~ /JM'() · ~ 1-6~-~-
3. Accordingly, the Lis Pendens is declared to be void ab initio and of no 1?01,, 





4. The Property is released from any lien, cloud, or encumbrance to title 
based on the Lis Pendens. The Lis Pendens provides no notice of claim or interest to 
the Property. 
5. A certified copy of this document shall be recorded with the Office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder. 
6. Respondent is awarded her costs and reasonable attorney's fees as may 
be established by way of affidavit of counsel to be submitted pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-9-1 et seq. o. v, ~ vl ~ 'vi lo (!.t.. Pw..VI ~ ·1 i I; - <.. - I~ ""'f l.l,,) . -,-,.M-~ 
7. The issue of damages for this wrongful lien is reserved for further hearing. 
DATED this 9<}dayofFebruary, 2012. 
BY THE COURT: 
{00258723-1 } 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this __ day of February 2012, I hereby caused to be served on the 
Petitioner a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS AND ORDER by having 
the same emailed and mailed via first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to: 
{00258723-1 } 
Michael A. Jensen, Esq. 
Jensen Law Firm 
136 South Main Street, #430 
P. 0. Box 571708 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 




DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent. 
SECOND FINDINGS AND ORDER 
And 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. 074900501 
Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy 
Comm. Michael S. Evans 
On February !: 2012, Respondent Debra J. Robinson's Second Motion for 
Nullification of Second Lis Pendens Filed by Petitioner, Damages, Contempt and Other 
Relief and Motion for Order to Show Cause (Expedited Decision Requested} came on 
regulartyfor consideration before the Court, Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy presiding. 
The Court considered the Motion, papers filed in support and opposition thereto, 
and the arguments and proffers of counsel. Based thereon, and for good cause shown, 





• t. • I 
1. The Court finds that on February 6, 2012. Petitioner recorded a document 
entitled Lis Pendens with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office of the State of Utah. 
as entry no. 11327536, in book 9988. at pages 8694-8696 (the "Lis Pendensj affecting 
that certain parcel of property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and more particularly 
described as follows: 
Commencing at the Southeast comer of Section 30, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North 183 feet, thence West 
183 feet; thence South 183 feet, thence East 183 feet to the place of 
beginning. 
Less and excepting the following described parcel conveyed to Sandy City 
by that certain Special Warranty Deed recorded November 16, 1989 as 
Entry No. 4848748 in Book 6176 at Page 1435 of Official Records: 
Beginning at the Southeast comer of Section 30, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence North 
0°02•05n East 183.0 feet, along the section line thence North 89°53'10" 
West 53.0 feet; thence South 0°02'05" West 117.0 feet; thence South 
45°04'31" West 36.74 feet; thence North 89°53'10" West 104.0 feet; 
thence South 0°02•05n West 40 feet; thence South 89°53'1 O" East 183.0 
feet to the point of beginning. 
Street Address: TT60 South 700 East, Sandy, Utah 84047 
Parcel No. 22-30-478-008-0000 
(the "Property'). 
2. The Lis Pendens is detennined to be a 'wrongful lien" under the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-1 et seq. and, as necessary, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-1304. 
3. Accordingly, the Lis Pendens is declared to be void ab initio and of no 




4. The Property is released from any lien, cloud, or encumbrance to title 
based on the Lis Pendens. The Lis Pendens provides no notice of claim or interest to 
the Property. 
5. A certified copy of this document shall be recorded with the Office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder. 
6. Respondent is awarded her costs and reasonable attorney's fees as may 
be established by way of affidavit of counsel to be submitted pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann.§ 38-9-1 et seq. and Utah Code Ann.§ 788-6-1304(6). 
7. The issue of damages for this wrongful lien is reserved for further hearing. 
8. Petitioner is ordered to appear before this Court, 450 South State Street, 
Fourth Floor-W47, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1860, on ~ 
-i--6 2012, at \r'· (J(J "'~"ia:Y.-and show cause why he should not be held in 
civil contempt for the violation of this Court's orders and why appropriate sanctions 
should not be imposed including a fine, incarceration, an award of Respondent's 
attorney's fees and costs, and other equitable relief. 
DATED this t?\ day of February, 2012. 
{00259895--1} 
BY THE COURT: 
TOD M. SHAUGHNESSY 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this _J:M_ day of February 2012, I hereby caused to be served on the 
Petitioner a true and correct copy of the foregoing SECOND FINDINGS AND ORDER 
and ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by having the same emailed and mailed via first-class 
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Michael A. Jensen, Esq. 
Jensen Law Firm 
136 South Main Street, #430 
P. 0. Box 571708 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 







IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FORSALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 07 4900501 
Judge Todd Shaughnessy 
Pending before the court is Petitioner's objection to the form of order proposed 
by Respondent for the hearing held on July 26, 2011. The matter was briefed and 
then argued on February 28, 2012_. Petitioner was represented by Kevin Bond. 
Respondent was represented by Dean Andreasen. Following the hearing, the court 
received and reviewed a supplemental brief and exhibits from Petitioner. The court 
also reviewed, among other things, orders and transcripts related to proceedings in 
the case prior to July 26, 2011, the court of appeals' opinion in Robinson v. Robinson, 
2010 UT App 96, the transcript of the July 26, 2011, -hearing, and related materials. 
On the basis of the foregoing, and for good cause appearing, the court now enters this 
minute entry and rules on Petitioner's objection as follows. 
The only issue now before the court is documenting the rulings that were made 
at the hearing held on July 26, 2011 . Judge Iwasaki presided over that hearing, and 
4 3 71 
over this case, prior to his retirement. However, ~e did not have an opportunity to sign 
the order or rule on the objection before he retired, and consequently that 
responsibility now falls on a new judge. The change in judges, howev~r, does not 
change t_he scope of the task at hand. The court appreciates efforts by counsel for 
both parties to help get the court up to speed on the long and complicated history of 
the case, but whether the objection is being made to the judge who heard the motion 
or to a new judge, it is not the proper method to re-argue matters upon which the court 
made a clear ruling or to revisit prior related rulings in the case. As stated, the court's 
current task is simply to document accurately Judge lwasaki's rulings at the July 26 
hearing. 1 
The July 26, 2011, hearing was set as an evidentiary hearing on an order to 
show cause arising from Petitioner's purported failure to refinance, or attempt to 
refinance, the property and various issues related thereto~ The parties first argued a 
motion in limine to exclude testimony from Eric Wadley, which was granted.· (Tr. 5). 
Next,_ the parties argued a Motion to Dismiss Contempt Proceedings that has just 
been filed by Petitioner. (Tr. 5). Petitioner's principal argument was that because the 
court had ordered the sale of the property, Petitioner could not purge any contempt 
that may be found and/or that by seeking a sale of the property, Respondent had 
effectively purged any contempt. In that context, the parties argued whether 
Much of the supplemental memorandum filed by Petitioner is devoted to arguing that the fraud claims 
asserted by Petitioner in the separate action he recently filed against Respondent and others in West Jordan are not 
barred by the doctrines of claim preclusion or issue preclusion. The court does not fully understand why those 
arguments are being made here, and why they are being made in the context of an objection to the form of the order 
for the July 26 hearing. The West Jordan lawsuit was not discussed at the July 26 hearing; indeed, it could not have 
been discussed since it had not yet been filed. Though there was a discussion of res judicata ~t the July 26 hearing, 
that discussion involved whether fraud claims had been raised, or could have been raised, earlier in this case. 
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impossibility, mistake, or fraud, could serve as a defense to contempt. (Tr. 7, 9). And, 
in that context, Judge Iwasaki referenced a motion that Petitioner had filed seeking 
relief based on fraud, and suggested that it at least appeared the motion was pending 
before the commissioner. (Tr. 13). 
In arguing against the motion to dismiss, Respondent's counsel noted that 
impossibility and mutual mistake were not available as defenses to contempt because 
these defenses had been considered and rejected by the Utah Court of Appeals. (Tr. 
18-19). Respondent's counsel then addressed fraud as a defense to contempt, 
arguing claim preclusion. Specifically, Respondent's counsel argued that fraud could 
not be a defense because Petitioner "raised it at the commissioner level, at the trial 
court level and didn't take it up on appeal·." {Tr. 20)._ Respondent's counsel also 
pointed out that, in fact, there was no motion pending before the commissioner related . 
to fraud becau~e Petitioner's counsel ''withdrew that motion on June the 22nd." (Tr. 
20).2 In reply, Petitioner's counsei again mentioned fraud, but disagreed that it had 
been raised, saying "he didn't get it raised properly, it's still available to him. He has 
until - he has three years to file an independent action." (Tr. 21-22). 3 
2 Petitioner's supplemental memorandum acknowledges that Petitioner did in fact withdraw this 
motion. {Supp. Mem. Para. 68). On June 16, 2011, Petitioner's counsel signed a Notice of Withdrawal of · 
Motion for Relief from Judgment Pending Assertion of Additional Claims. That notice. apparently was 
served on June 17, 2011, and it was docketed on June 21, 2011, the same day on which a hearing was 
held before Commissioner Evans. 
3 The court's independent review of the docket and record confirms Respondent's statement that 
Petitioner has asserted from very early on, in a variety of contexts, that Respondent provided false and 
misleading information, that she mislead him into entering the stipulation, and engaged in a wide variety 
of misconduct. Ultimately, Petitioner's position seems to be that unless and until he discovers a// of 
Respondent's purported misdeeds, he is under no obligation to assert any of them. Aside from the 
passing reference quoted above, that issue was not raised before Judge Iwasaki at the July 26 hearing, 
and consequently it is not addressed herein. 
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Against this background, Judge Iwasaki (i) denied the motion to dismiss the 
.. 
contempt proceeding (Tr. 24 ), (ii) "as to the issues of impossibility and mutual mistake~ 
the Court finds that they were both addressed completely in the Court of Appeals 
opinion", and therefore could not be relied upon by Petitioner- as a defense to 
contempt (Id.), and (iii) relying on the doctrine of claim preclusion, ruled that fraud 
likewise could not be relied upon by Petitioner as a defense to contempt (Id.). He 
summarized that ruling by stating, "But as to impossibility, mutual mistake, and fraud 
as to claims preclusion, the Court denies - the Court finds that the petitioner is 
precluded from arguing those matters." (Tr. 24). 
Petitioner relies on the following statement made by Judge Iwasaki at the July 
26 hearing: "As to claim preclusion, while there's a pending fraud motion and 
allegations to support a fraud before the commissioner, the Court again finds that 
there is claim preclusion as to that issue." (Tr. 24 ). From this, Petitioner seems to 
argue that the court did not rule on the claim preclusion issue. That statement, . 
however, must be read on context: Petitioner's counsel had just argued there was a 
fraud motion before the commissioner; Respondent's counsel had pointed out that the 
fraud motion had been voluntarily withdrawn by Petitioner. In fact, the fraud motion 
had been voluntarily withdrawn by Petitioner several weeks earlier. Judge Iwasaki 
Was not in a position to verify either party's position,. and therefore stated that "what 
recommendation comes out of the fraud recommendations, the court will address it at 
that time." (Tr. 24 ). 4 After addressing each of Petitioner's claimed defenses to 





contempt, the court proceeded to find Petitioner in contempt and impose sanctions. If 
Judge Iwasaki had concluded that fraud was a valid defense, available to P~titioner, 
and then-pending before the commissioner, he would not have taken these steps . 
. Thus, the hearing transcript alone demonstrates that Judge Iwasaki squarely ruled 
fraud was not a defense to the contempt charge. Whether Judge Iwasaki was correct 
is not before the court. As stated, the task at hand is to correctly document the ruling 
and nothing more. 
The court has reviewed the Findings, Order, and Judgment submitted by 
counsel for Respondent. The court has made interlineations as shown and signed the 
proposed order. 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner's objection to the form of the order is · 
overruled. The order proposed by Respondent is being signed by the court, with the 
changes as noted therein. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




Case No. 07 4900501 
DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent. 
Judge Todd Shaughnessy 
Pending before the court is Respondent's motion for a preliminary injunction, 
lien nullification, damages, and other relief. The court previously ruled, on an 
emergency basis, on that portion of the motion dealing with the Sandy Retail Center. 
The court deferred ruling on the balance of the motion because Petitioners counsel 
was out of the country and was in the process of attempting to withdraw from the 
case. To ensure that Petitioner could be heard on the matter, and be represented by 
counsel of his choice, the court heard only that portion of the motion necessary to 
address the then-immediate sale of the Sandy Retail Center, and deferred the balance 
of the motion. The balance of the motion was argued on February 28, 2012. 
Petitioner was represented by Kevin Bond. Respondent wa~ represented by Dean 
Andreasen. The court has reviewed the moving and opposition papers, the pleadings 
and papers on fil~ in the case, along with the -evidence presented by both sides, and 
I 
now grants Respondent's motion. 
1 
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Some of Petitioner's arguments in opposition to the rnotion are addressed by 
other orders entered by the court today, which the court incorporates by reference. 
The remaining issues are (i) whether a lis pendens is properly characterized as a 
wrongful lien for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1, (ii) whether this court, as ' 
opposed to the court in West Jordan, has the authority to order removal of the lis 
pendens pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 788-6-1304(1 ), and (iii) whether Petitioner is 
permitted to record serial lis pendens pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in 
Doug Jessop Constr., Inc. v. Anderton, 2008 UT App. 348. 
Whether a lis pendens is a wrongful lien for purposes of Utah's wrongful Hen 
statute, and whether this court has the authority to order removal of a lis pendens 
under the lis pendens statute, are not dispositive.1 Where, as here, the property in 
question is a marital asset subject to the jurisdiction of this court, and where this court 
has in the past entered orders associated with that property, this court respectfully 
submits that it has the authority to issue orders in aid of its jurisdiction or orders that 
are necessary or appropriate to carry out or enforce· its prior orders. The court is not 
persuaded that the Anderton case permits serial recording of lis pendens. The holding 
in Anderton is very narrow - in that case, the first Ii~ pendens was invalidated because 
there was no legal proceeding pending to support the lis pendens thereby rendering it 
invalid; the court acknowledged that such an action could be filed and when it was, the 
The court notes that section 78B-6-1304(1) states that an affected party "may make a motion to 
the court in which the action is pending.n The statement is permissive, and the "court in which the action 
is pending" is the Third Judicial District Court. However, the court does not rule on the question of 
whether the "court in which the action is pendingn means the particular judge before whom the case is 
pending, or that district, because it is unnecessary to do so. · 
2 
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second lis pendens was recorded. The second lis pendens did not violate the court's 
injunction because the court permitted the lawsuit to be filed, and the lis pendens 
merely provided record notice of that lawsuit. The case does not support the 
proposition thata party may file a lawsuit, record a lis pendens, and then; in-response 
to an order invalidating that lis pendens, record another one. 
Based on the foregoing, counsel for Respondent is directed to submit to the 
court an order granting the remaining relief sought in her motion for a preliminary 
-injunction. Because this matter is time-sensitive, the court suspends the time periods 
in Rule 7 for lodging objections. Respondent must serve her proposed order, by 
electronic mail or hand delivery, before close of business today. Petitioner will have 
until the close of business tornorrow, fy1arch 2, 2012, to file any objections and, with · 
them, a proposed form of order that Petitioner believes correctly reflects the court's 
rulings herein. 
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Third Judicial District 
MAR O 5 2012 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner, 
V. 
DEBRA J. RO~INSON, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS AND ORDER GRANTING 
PRELIMINARY.INJUNCTION, LIEN 
NULLIFICATION, AND OTHER REl,.IEF 
Civil No. 074900501 
Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy 
Comm. Michael S. Evans 
_On February 28, 2012, the (i) Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, 
Preliminary Injunction, Lien Nulliffcat,on, Damages, and Other Relief dated February 1, 
2012, and the (ii) Second Motion for Nuilification of Second Lis Pendens Filed by 
Petitioner, Damages, Contempt, and Other Relief and Motion for Order to Show Cause 
dated February 7, 2012 ( collectively the "Motion") filed by Respondent Debra J. 
Robinson ("Respondent") came on for hearing before the Court, Judge Todd M. 
. . 
Shaughnessy presiding. Petitioner Michael S. Robinson ("Petitioner") was present and 
{00263979-1 } 
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represented by F. Kevin Bond and Budge W. Call. Respondent was present and 
repre-sented by Dean C. Andreasen and Sarah -L. Campbell. T-he -Coart ·considered the 
papers filed by the parties and the arg·urrients and proffers of counsel. Based thereon, 
. . 
the Court made the findings reflected in the Minute Entry dated March 1, 2012, attached 
hereto as Exhibit A, and as follows: 
FINDINGS 
1. Petitioner recorded Lis Pendens against four properties in four different 
counties in Utah and Arizona, in which R~spondent has an interest (the "Lis Pendens"). 
The Lis Pendens were recorded on the properties commonly known as the Sandy Retail 
Center, the Phoenix Plaza, the Deer Valley Condominium, and the Arizona Parcel-
described more fully below. 
2. On January 27, 2012, Petitione·r recorded a document ·entitled Lis 
Pendens with the Salt Lake County Recorder'~ Office of the State of Utah, as entry no. 
11_ 322084, in bpok 9986, at pages 2486-89 affecting that certain parcel of property 
located in .Salt Lake County, Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Section 30, Township 2 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Meridian, th.ence North 183 feet, thence West 183 feet; thence 
South 183 feet, thence East 183 feet to the place of beginning. . 
Less and excepting the fo,llowing des:cf,bed parcel conveyed to Sandy City by 
that certain Special Warranty Deed recorded November 16, 1989 as Entry No. 
4848748 in Book 6176 at Page.1435.of Official Records: 
Beginning at the Southeast corner· ot'Section 30, Township 2 South, Range 1 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence North .0°02'05" East 183.0 
feet, along the section line the_nce Nort~ 89~53'10" We~t 53.0 feet; the;mce South 







89°53'10" West 104.0 feet; thence South 0°02'05" West 40 feet; thence South 
89°53'10" East 183.0 feet ~o the_point of beginning. 
Street Address: 7760 South 700 East, Sandy, Utah 84047 
Parcel No. 22-30-478-008-0000 
(the "Sandy Retail Center"). 
3. On January 27, 2012, Petitioner recorded a document entitled Lis 
Pendens with the Washington· County Recorder's Office of the State of Utah, as 
document no. 20120002718 affecting that certain parcel of property located in 
Washington County, Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at a Point Which Lies South 0°35'4011 East, 430.15 Feet Along 
the Section Line and North 81°41'20" East, 212.49 Feet from the 
Northwest Corner of Se~tion. 24, Township 42 South, Range 16 West, Salt 
Lake Base and Meridian and Running °Thence South 0°21 '40" East, 9.51 
Feet; Thence North· 83°00'00" East, -88.52 Feet; Thence North 78°30'00" 
East, 36.71 Feet; Thence South 47°54'40" East, 288.32 Feet to a Point on 
the Westerly Right of Way Line of· Valley View Drive; Thence North 
42°05'20" Ea~t_, 179.00 F_eet Along ~aid Westerly Right of Way; Thence 
North 47°54'40" West, 50.46 Feet; Thence North 02°54'40" West, 136.69 
Feet; Thence South. 74°24'40" East, 134.30 Feet to a Point on Said 
Westerly Right of Way, Said Point Being. Also on a Curve to the Left, the 
Radius Point of WhichHe~rs North.69°03'15" West, 400.00 Feet Distant; 
Thence Northeasterly Alori-g Said ·westerly Right of Way and Arc of Said 
Curve Through a Central Angle. of 05°21 '25", a Distance of 37.40 Feet to 
the Poirit of Tangency; Thenc.e North 15°35'20" East, 18.34 Feet Along 
Said Right of Way; Th~nce North 74°24'40" West, -148.51 Feet; Thence 
North 3°01'13" West, 146.25 Feetto a-_point·(?n the Southerly Right of Way 
. of Suns~t Boulevard, Said Point Seing. Also on a Curve to the Left, the 
Radius Point of Which Bears South 5°33'49" West, 1298.14 Feet Distant; 
Thence Westerly Along Said Southerly Right of Way and the Arc of Said 
Curve Through a Central° Angle of 1 °40'50", a Distance of 38.08 Feet; 
Thence South 97.87 feet; Thence West 149.91 Feet; Thence North 99.37 
Feet to a Point on Said Southerly Right of Way, Said Point Being Also on 
a· Curve lo the Left, the R~dius Point of Which Bears South 2°44'15" East, 
1298.14 Feet Distant; Thence Westerly Along Said Southerly Right of Way 
and the Arc of Said Curve Tt:,rough a Central Angle of 9°55'52", a 
{00263979-1 } 
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Distance of 225.01 Feet;· Thence Sputh 0°21'40" East, 296.07. Feet to the 
Point of Beginning. 
Street Address: 929 W, ·S~nset Blvd., Was_hington,_ Utah 84770 
Parcel No. SG-6-2-24-44451 
(the "Phoenix Plaza") 
4. On January 27, 2012, P~titioner _recorded a document entitled Lis 
Pendens with the Summit County Recorder'.s Office of the State of Utah, as entry no. 
00938337, in book 2113, at pages 0782-85 affecting that certain parcel of property 
located in Summit, Utah, and more particularly described as follows: 
Unit 59, • Fawngrove · Condominiums, a Utah Condominium. Project, 
Together With Its Undivided Appurtenant Ownership Interest in and to the 
Common Areas and F acilitie~ of tnei Project as the Same are Identified in 
the Record of Survey Map ·Recorded: December 17, 1980, as Entry No. 
174104,:and the Condominium :Declaratiqn Recorded December 17, 1980 
as Entry. No. 174105 in Book M174 At Page 773, the First Supplemental 
Record of ·Survey Map Recorded March 1'2, 1982 as Entry No. 189403 
and th~ Supplemental• Declaration of and Amendment to the 
Condominium Declaration Recorded-March·-12, 1982 as Entry No. 189404 
in Book _M214 at Page·531', the Record of Survey Map .for Fawngrove 
Condominiums Phase ·II -R~co~ded. November 15, 1985 as Entry _No. 
241835 and the Second Supple·mental Declaration of and Amendm~nt to 
Condominium Deciaratioli ::Recorded ·:November 15, · 1985 as E_ntry No. 
24.1836 in Book 361 · _at Page 623, the Record of Survey M,ap of 
. Fawngrove Condominiums .Phase ll Re·corded Ju·ne 16, 1986 as Entry No. 
252810, .. and the 1-hird Supplem~IJt,al Declarc;ition of and Amendment to 
Condominium Declaration Recorded June 16, 1986 as Entry No. 252811 
in Book .388 at Page 608. ar)o the· Record of Survey Map Recorded April 
19, 1990. as Entry No. 32332°5 and the.-Fourth Supplemental Declaration of 
and Amendment to Condominium.Declaration Recorded April 19, 1990 as 
Entry No.· 323326 in Book .561 ·at Pag~ 495 of the Official Records, in the 
Office of, the Summit Co'unfy R~corder. · . 
Street Address: 16~4 ·oeer. Valley priye North, Park City, Utah 84060 
• I• .' ; • I • 
Parcel ~9- FGR-11-59 
{00263979-1 } 
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(the "Deer Valley Condominium') 
5. On-February 3, ,2012, Petitioner recorded a document entitled Lis 
. . 
Pendens with the Mohave Co~nty Recorder's Office of the State of Arizona, as fee no. 
2012005595 affecting that certain parcel of prop~rty located in Mohave County, Arizona, 
. . 
and more particularly described as follows: 
The Southwest Quarter (SW ¼) of P~rcel 5, of Franhi Chaparral Estates, 
According to the Plat Thereof, Recorded December 10, 1985, in Book 2 of 
Parcel Plats, Page 85, Records of Mohave County, Arizona. 
Except One-Half of All Minerals, as Reserved in Instrument Recorded in 
Book 118 of Deeds, Page 462. 
Parcel No. 402-77-005 
(the "Arizona Parcel") 
6. On January 30, 2012; aft~r Re_sp~ndent received notice of the Lis 
Pendens recorded against the pr~perties, Respondent's counsel gav~ notice to 
Petitioner's counsel ~hat the liens were wron~fully reco.rded and requested that the Lis 
Pendens be immedi~tely removed.· ?~-h-t\Ohl:-V" rekv.se ~ -\v ,e-Mt;Ne., 1'1,(:... h!.V\SJ 
. . . ~~J 
7. Protitioner's then counsel, Miol=la~i Jensen, Fespondcd to the reqtiest.for COV\TJVJllt.~ 
. . . to f l.{v{Se_ 
rcfflmml of t~e Lis Pendens by disavo>Nin~ any Fesponsibility tor those liens being.,,. re.ci ve~ t1;. 
~ y . . . , . TO \'~ \'VlD\IL. 
.-recoided. · .. · . . -tvt.c. \\{M ~, 
8. On February 1, 201·2, Respondent filed a Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, Lien Nullification, Damages, and Other Relief. 
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9.- The TRO provided for a preliminary injunction hearing on February 3, 
2(:)'1-2, at 9:-00 am. A copy of-the issued TRO was .mailed and ·emaHed to Michael Jensen 
and Petitioner. The issued TRO was'sent directly.to Petitioner because Mr. Jensen was 
out of the country for three weeks _on vacation. During the weekend of February 3, 2012, 
a constable attempted to serve Petition:er ~our times with the TR0
0
but Petitioner cvaaea ~ ~ 
.. ·.. "flAA 
-service of proses~ · · 
10. Mr. Jensen must have received the TRO and the papers filed in 
conjunction therewith because on February 2, 2012, he filed a memorandum in 
opposition which was received by the Court on February 2, 2012. 
11. The Court attempted to contact Mr. Jensen for the hearing on the morning 
• .i • 
on February 3_, 2012, but without su~cess. The Court proceeded with the hearing. At the 
hearing, the Court concluded that the /is pendens_filed on the Sandy Retail Center was 
a wrongful lien· and declared it to he .void .at> initio and entered Findings and Order. (The 
Findings and· Order incorrectly sta~e that Petitioner ·was present in person and Mr. 
Jensen was present via teleptio~e bec~use ,_the. document was prepared in advance of 
the hear_ing and attendance was· anticipated 'iilth~ugh the correction was not. made 
. . 
before _the document was signed.by the. Court.) 
12. The Findings arid Order were sent to Mr. Jensen via email on February 3, 
2012, and ultimately recorded with :the_ Salt Lake County Recorder's Office. 
13. Notwithstanding the terms of the Court's Findings and Order, Petitioner 






February 61 2012. The TRO was.still in effect when Petitioner recorded the second /is 
pendens on the·Sandy··Retail Gentef. 
14. On February 7, 2012, · Petitio,ier had another /is pendens recorded on the 
~hoenix Plaza as document no. 201209:04136 with the Washington County Recorder's 
Office of the State of Utah. 
15. On February 7, 2012, after finding out about the second /is pendens being 
recorded on the Sandy Retail Center by Petitioner! Respondent filed a Second Motion 
for Nullification of Second Lis Pendens; 
16. On February 9, 2012, the Court conducted a hearing on the Second 
Motion for Nullification~ Mr. Jensen was present via telephone for the hearing. The Court 
g,ranted the Second Motion and issued its Second Findings and Order and Order to 
Show Cause. 
17. PctiUei=mr has speeifieelly oidlatetf and aisobeyed the above-desc,ibed 
01de1s ofthc Cgurt by cecotding the fii'sl and second ,'is pende,,s 011 tlie Sandy Retail 
~t . . 
Center. 
18. For the same reasons as set forth in the two motions filed to have the /is · 
pendens nullified on the sa·ndy Reta_il Center, the /is pendens on the Phoenix Plaza, 
Deer Valley Condominium; and the Arizona Parcel should also be deemed wrongful 
liens and nullified. 
19. At the hearing on February 9, 2012, the Court ordered that the hearing on 
the nullification of the /is pendens clouding title to the Phoenix Plaza, Deer Valley 
{00263979-1 } 
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Condominium, and the Arizona Pare·~, ·as well as the Order to Show Cause would be 
conducted on February ~-a antj·29, 2012. 
20. The Court has already found .and concluded that the two /is pendens 
recorded on the Sandy RetairCenter were wrongful liens and they were, accordingly, 
nullified by previous order of the Court. 
21. The Court finds and ·concludes that the /is pendens recorded on the 
Phoenix Plaza, the Deer Valley -Condominium and the Arizona Parcel are also "wrongful 
liens" as that term is defined under the provisions of Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-1 et seq., 
and as necessary, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-:-6--1304, and that an order shall be entered 
nullifying the s~n:ie. 
22. The Court finds·and.:concl.udes that Petitio.ner's actions in recording the 
two /is pendens on the Sandy 'Retail Center and the two /is pendens on the Phoenix 
I 
. . . I 
Plaza, and individual /is pendens ·on' the· Peer Valley Condominium and the· Arizona 
. . \.\A . . . ; . . _: ~ 
Parcel are wrollgful and were/..,8. IEAoWiil!j::'iolation i:>f the order✓c;f this Court. ,f(V"-
23. .P'etiUorier has. o iolated Ceurt efders ifl the this actio11 by filii ig ,'is penclens 
-ageiAst tile Sandy Retail Center a1 id. Phoenix Plaza and by diverting rent received fronr 
. . ~ 
tl=te Sandy Retail Ce11te1 and. Pfio~hbc--Pia•;z;a ·11l=leA. Respo1 ,dent I ,as been granted full-- ~ 
autl=lority to list and Close the ~ale of the Sand~ Retail Center and the Phoenix Plaza 
• and is the Cour:t ordei ed 1, ia, ,ager ef beth pr=epertie·s witl I sele authority te sollect and. 
-deposit r:eAts. 
24. Unless the Court· g'rarit~ Res.p-ondent's Motion and· enters a preliminary· 
injunction, Respondent will suffer actual or thteatened imme.diate and irreparable injury 
{00263979~ 1 } 




as a result of Petitioner's efforts to interfere with and jeopardize the sale of the Phoenix 
Plaza. 
25. Respondent will suffer irreparable harm unless a preliminary injunction is 
immediately issued because of (1) the pending sale of the Phoenix Plaza to a third-party 
buyer which is under a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") with a scheduled 
closing date of no later than April 9, 2012, which transaction is likely or in actual threat 
of being lost as a result of Petitioner's recording of a /is pendens against the Phoenix 
Plaza; and (2) because of the continuing denial and deprivation of Respondent's right to 
her interest and control over the Phoenix Plaza, as real property rights constitute a 
unique interest, the loss of which constitutes irreparable harm to Respondent. 
26. The threatened injury to Respondent outweighs the damage, if any, that 
the preliminary injunction may cause Petitioner given the finding of irreparable harm to 
Respondent by the deprivation of her real property rights to the Phoenix Plaza, including 
the right to realize the net sales proceeds of the Phoenix Plaza, and Petitioner will not 
sustain damage where he stipulated to the sale of the Phoenix Plaza and its sales price. 
27. The preliminary injunction will not be adverse to, and will serve the public 
interest because the Court has ah interest in enforcing court orders. 
':D 28. Based upon the evidence b~f~re the Court demonstrating Petitioner's 
.£/J ¢ kABWiAg violatien et Get1rt efders s11d ~filing of a /is pendens agaiilst the Sandy Retail 
Center, Phoenix Plaza~ DeerValley Condominium, and Arizona Parcel without a 
sufficient legal basis, there is substantial likelihood that Respondent Will prevail on the 
merits of her underlying claims against Petitioner. 
{00263979-1 } 
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29. Given that Petitioner has stipulated to the sale of the Phoenix· Plaza, the 
Court has ordered the sale of the· Phoenix Plaza, and· R·esponcfent is the only one as 
between her and Petitioner who will receive the net proceeds from the sale of the Sandy 
Phoenix Plaza, the Court finds there is ;no reasonable· basis to require Respondent to 
provide security under Rule 65A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Respondent's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Lien Nullification, 
Damages, and Other Relief is granted in all respects. 
2. Petitioner is enjoined from acting or failing to act, or causing any third · 
party to act or fail to act, contrary to the terms of the Decree of Divorce ente_red by the 
_Court in this matter on De~ember 31', 2QOB_and a_l~ subsequent orders. 
3. Petitioner is ~nJoined· from int~rferihg wi~h the sale of the Phoenix Plaza by 
making, uttering, recording, or filing-'~my do_cument which will cloud title to the Phoenix 
Plaza or contacting any person associated with. the sale of the Phoenix Plaza without 
permission of the Court. 
4. The above-described Lis Pendens are declared to be void ab initio and of 
no force or effect. · 
. . . . 
5. The Phoenix Plaza; Deer Valley Condominium, and Arizona Parcel are . 
released from a·ny lien, cloud, or encumbra_nce to title based on the Lis Pendens. The 
{00263979-1 } 
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Lis Pendens provides no notice of claim or interest to the Phoenix Plaza, Deer Valley 
Condominium, and j:\-rizona Parcel. 
6. A certified copy of this document shall be recorded with the Offices of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder, Washington County ~ecorder, Summit County Recorder, 
and Mohave County Recorder. . ~ l,,\.lLA.-Wt..d ~ 
L cavv'\cciWYi 7. Respondent is awarded her costs and reasonable attorney's fees~s may IN), ty\ 
be established by way of affidavit of counsel to be,submitted pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-9-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. § 788-6-1301 et seq., and paragraph 44 of the 




8. Judgment is cntcr=ea against Petitioner in faoor of Respo11derIt ii, tl1e --(M,~ 
.· -&v 
amo•mi at $60,00Q for Petitio11e,'s k11owing{lling of six wrongful liens in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-9-4
1 
-\-b \u.. IU,--\,e,-vwl1 ~ M" A \w \-eY d.&vlt:-- , --rt-A Y 
9. An s1,<idsntiary· hearing on· Petitioner's contempt aAa a hearing on ttm 
pendiAg motieri fer order to sh<,vv e~use shall be 1·1eld on March_, 
~2~on1~2~, aeitt-_-:_-_-_-_-_-_-...=:-,m, Additional attorney's fees and costs are reserved for the 
evidentiary hearing and may beaw~·rded. ·. · 
10. Respondent-is nci required to.'provide security under Rule 65A(c} of the 




DATED this G day of March 2012. 





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this M_ day of March 201-2~' I hereby caused to be served on the Petitioner 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing.FINDINGS AND ORDER GRANTING 
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, UEN NULLIFICATION, AND OTHER RELIEF by having 
the same emailed to: 
{00263979-1 } 
F. Kevin Bond, Esq. 
BOND & CALL, L.C. 
8 East Broadway, Suite 720 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111_ 
kbond@bondcall-law.com 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 074900501 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: DEAN C ANDREASEN ONE UTAH CENTER 13TH FLR 201 S MAIN ST SALT 
LAKE CITY, UT 84111-2216 
MAIL: F, KEVIN·BOND 8 E BROADWAY STE 720 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
03/05/2012 /s/ AMANDA OLSEN 
Date: 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Page 1 (last) 
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Tab M 
DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981) 
DIANA L. TELFER (#10654) 
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216 
Telephone (801) 322-2516 
Fax (801) 521-6280 
dca@clydesnow.com 
dlt@clydesnow.com 
Attorneys for Respondent 
f81~8 IISTQ·JCJ' COURT 
Thrrd Judicial District 
MAY 2 9 2013 
SALi l.Al(E COUNy\ 
By__,.._ ________ _ 
Deputy Clark 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 




DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent. 
fRESPONDEN=r·s PROfl6SED] ,Q.__ 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 074900501 
Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy 
Comm. Joanna Sagers 
On April 17-19, 2013, an evidentiary hearing was held in the above-captioned 
matter before the Court, Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy presiding. Petitioner Michael S. 
Robinson was present and represented by counsel, F. Kevin Bond and Budge W. Call 
of Bond & Call, LC. The Respondent, Debra J. Robinson, was present and 
represented by counsel, Dean C. Andreasen and Diana Telfer of Clyde Snow & 
Sessions. 
The Court having heard the evidence presented by the parties and the witnesses 
called, and after considering the additional briefing and oral arguments of counsel: 
{00382641-1 } 
hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in the above 
matter. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Prior Rulings, Orders and Judgments 
1. All rulings, orders and judgments that been made in the case to date are 
affirmed. With the exception of a modification to the Court's prior ruling with respect to 
the tax liability arising from sale of the Phoenix Plaza, as specifically set forth below, 
nothing herein is intended to alter or modify, in any way, any of the rulings that have 
already been made in this case. 
Wrongful Lien Damages 
2. The Court finds that Petitioner filed lis pendens on the parties' properties 
to prevent the sales of those properties that were ordered to be sold by this Court. This 
Court has the authority to nullify, and require the removal of, the lis pendens that were 
recorded relative to the West Jordan action. However, because there is a legal 
question, and some doubt as to whether Utah's Wrongful Lien Act should apply to a lis 
pendens, the Court declines to impose any statutory damages. 
Contempt Issues 
3. Lis Pendens. The Court will not make a finding of contempt, with respect 





4. Interfering with the Sale of Properties. 
(A) Sandy Retail Center. The Court finds that Respondent sold the Sandy 
Retail Center for an amount less than the amount authorized by the Court's 
Order. Therefore, Respondent has unclean hands and is not in a position to 
enforce a contempt order against Petitioner. 
(B) Phoenix Plaza. The Court exercises its discretion and declines to 
make a finding of contempt with respect to interference with the sale of the 
Phoenix Plaza. However, the Court does not condone the activities that were 
undertaken by Petitioner and finds they constituted improper conduct by 
Petitioner in certain instances. 
5. Diversion of Assets. The Court finds that Respondent has failed to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence all of the elements of contempt relative to her claim 
that Petitioner diverted certain assets. The amounts that were presented to the Court, 
other than the diversion of rent, occurred prior to the time that the order was entered in 
this case, and the Court finds that contempt has not been established. 
6. Diversion of Rents. The Court finds that Petitioner did divert the Ernesto's 
rent. Petitioner acknowledged the same. The Court finds Respondent essentially did 
the same thing, although the Court finds that Respondent is in a better position because 
she accounted for it and didn't attempt to conceal it. Nevertheless, the Court finds that 
because Respondent has unclean hands, she is not in a position to enforce a contempt 




7. Failure to Provide Bankruptcy Accounting. The Court declines to impose 
contempt for Petitioner's failure to comply with orders of the Bankruptcy Court. This 
issue should be addressed by Judge Marker if Respondent wishes to pursue contempt 
of.his order. ~ 
8. Failure to Sign Documents. The Court finds that with respect to the Sandy 
Retail Center, the Respondent had unclean hands regarding the amount for which the 
property was sold, and therefore can't pursue a contempt finding against the Petitioner. 
The Court declines, in the interest of justice, to make a con~empt finding with respect to 
the Phoenix Plaza. 
9. Disparaging Comments. The Court has, by prior. order entered November 
19, 2012, resolved the issue with respect to disparaging comments and that order 
stands, including the finding of contempt, the imposition of contempt sanctions and the 
award of Respondent's· attorneys' fees and costs. 
10. Contempt for Failing to Refinance the Phoenix Plaza. The Court has 
already made a contempt finding with respect to Petitioner's failure to refinance the 
mortgage encumbering the Phoenix Plaza, and is not disturbing that finding. Additional 
sanctions have been mooted at this point by virtue of the sale of the Phoenix Plaza, and 
therefore the Court declines to impose any additional sanctions for that contempt. 
11. St. George Condo Issues. The Court finds that discovery issues, with 
respect to the St. George Condo, should be governed by Rule 37,.and not through 




denied. The Court finds that Respondent was not prompt about producing her tax 
returns so she is not in a position to complain about Petitioner not having produced his 
tax returns. Additionally, the Court finds that Respondent has not proven by clear and 
convincing evidence that Petitioner did not provide everything that he had in his 
possession with respect to the rental income that he has been receiving from the St. 
George Condo. Furthermore, Respondent has not established that Petitioner had the 
ability to make the payments that he was required to make. 
12. Additional Contempt Issues. The Court declines in the interest of justice 
to impose any further contempt finding or any further sanction with respect to any 
additional contempt issues that were presented and have not been covered above. 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
13. The Court finds that Respondent should b~ awarded her attorneys' fees 
and costs incurred from January 1, 2008 through May 31, 2012 in the total amount of 
$309,074.72. However, this amount should be reduced by $83,373.18 which was 
awarded in a previous Judgment entered on January 25, 2012 for attorneys' fees and 
costs incurred during that same time period. Accordingly, an additional judgment for 
attorneys' fees and cost should be entered against Petitioner in favor of Respondent in 
the amount of $225,701.54 ($309,074.72 • $83,373.18). 
14. Respondent was also previously awarded attorneys' fees and costs in the 
amount of $6,251.26 in the Court's Order entered April 12, 2013 with respect to the 




15. Judgment interest and costs of collection are awarded as permitted under 
Utah law on the two judgments for attorneys' fees and costs awarded to Respondent 
above. These two judgments are not included in the Updated Judgment section below 
because they accrue interest at a different rate than the Updated Judgment. 
16. Respondent shall be responsible for her attorneys• fees and costs incurred 
prior to January 1, 2008 and after May 31, 2012, with the exception of the $6,251.26 
no~ed in item 14 above. Any additional request for attorneys' fees and costs during 
those time periods is denied. 
Respondent's Accounting and Reconciliation Issues 
17. General Observations. The Court finds with respect to the accounting 
issue that the parties had a history of combining all of their income, including income 
from investment properties, and all of their expenses into a single or series of accounts. 
The Respondent provided an accounting that was consistent with the way the 
accounting had been done historically. The accounting the Respondent has provided is 
numerically accurate. It is also complete, with the exception of the categorization of 
expenses. This was not in any way intentional. She did the best job she could and she 
did it the way she historically had done it. There are some uncertainties and ambiguities 
about whether some expenses have been properly accounted for. These uncertainties 
and ambiguities have to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner given that the Respondent 





The Court declines to retain an accountant because the cost would exceed the 
benefit and would invite more disputes. Both parties should have utilized the last year to 
complete their accounting through discovery, including revealing documents. records, 
witnesses, and retaining experts. The Court is not going to prolong this any further and 
is simply going to rule on all these issues. 
The Court has serious concerns about the fact that some of the items it had ruled 
on, and that Mr. Jayne's relied upon, were not disclosed in a report. However, the Court 
is not going to prolong this action any further and is simply going to rule on all these 
issues. 
Animating this, to a certain degree, is the equity principle concerning how this 
case has ultimately come down. Without commenting on why it has ultimately come 
down the way it has, the reality is that the Respondent has received a tremendous 
financial advantage compared to the Petitioner. That animates in part what the Court 
thinks is appropriate with respect to the accounting issue. 
· 18. Mr. Jayne's List of Disputed Items. The Court makes the following 
findings with respect to the list of items Mr. Jayne's disagrees with, or disputes, in the 
Respondent's accounting reconciliation. 
a. Clark Roofing. The Phoenix Plaza was sold shortly after these 
expenses were incurred so these expenses should be split 50/ 50, rather than 




b. Steve Hard. These expenses are attributed to Petitioner, as his 
personal expenses. 
c. Steve Shields. These expenses are attributed to Petitioner, as his 
personal expenses. 
d. Software. These expenses are attributed to Respondent, as her 
personal expenses. 
e. Appraisals. The costs of the appraisals are attributed to Petitioner, 
as his personal expenses. 
f. POS/ATM Withdrawals. These expenses are attributed to 
Respondent, as her personal expenses. The proof on all these issues is thin at 
best, but in the interest of overall equity the Court includes these withdrawals as 
an item on which the Petitioner prevails. 
g. Respondent's Tax Deduction for Withdrawing 401 k Monies. 
Petitioner is given a credit for the amount of the tax deduction listed by 
Respondent on her reconciliation statement with respect to taxes incurred for 
withdrawing 401 k funds. The Court makes this ruling based on equity. 
h. Credit Card Issue. The Court finds that with respect to the credit 
card issue, it was an issue that should have been addressed by Respondent's 
expert but it was not. Therefore, the Petitioner should be given a credit for the 
recalculated charges. However, Petitioner is not entitled to any credit for the 




19. Equalization of Distributions. The Court finds with respect to the 
equalization of distributions that under Respondent's updated accounting, Petitioner 
owes Respondent $19,319.96. This amount should be adjusted in the Petitioner's favor 
by $81,617.63, which represents one-half of the total adjustments (a) thru (h) listed 
above. Accordingly, Respondent owes Petitioner the amount of $62,297.67 
($81,617.63 - $19,319.96) and such amount shall be used as an adjustment in the final 
judgment accounting. 
20. Tax Liability on the Phoenix Plaza. The Court is modifying its prior order 
with respect to the tax liability on the Phoenix Plaza. In paragraph 8 of the Order 
entered January 24, 2012, the Court ordered "Petitioner is the owner of the Phoenix 
Plaza and the only person subject to IRS Form 1099 reporting pursuant to paragraph 11 
of the Decree." Although the Court affirms that ruling, it further orders that Petitioner is 
entitled to a credit for one half of the income tax assessed directly attributable to the 
sale of the Phoenix Plaza, as reported on Petitioner's 2012 federal income tax return. 
Petitioner is ordered to provide Respondent a complete copy of his 2012 federal income 
tax return, any amendment thereto, and any supplemental information from Petitioner's 
accountant necessary to verify the amount of the tax. In the event the sale of the 
Phoenix Plaza results in a capital loss (i.e. a tax savings), the amount of the judgment 
shall be increased by one half of the income tax savings directly attributable to the sale 




21. Sale of Sandy Property. The Court finds with respect to the sale of the 
Sandy Retail Center that the Respondent sold the property for an amount not 
authorized by the Court's Order, and that Respondent has unclean hands. Therefore, 
the Petitioner is entitled to a $9,000 credit representing 100% of the amount by which 
the sales price was unilaterally reduced by Respondent. 
22. Equalization of the distributions from the UESP Accounts. The Court 
finds with respect to the equalization of distributions from the UESP accounts that the 
parties are to provide each other with documentation verifying the account balance for 
any account they had with the Utah Educational Savings Plan as of November 2, 2007, 
the date of the parties' settlement. This information shall be provided within fourteen 
days of the hearing date of April 19, 2013. The balances in all the accounts for the 
parties are to be added together and divided by two, with each party receiving one-half 
of the total amounts as of November 2, 2007. If one party fails to disclose this 
information to the other within the 14 day period, they will receive nothing from these 
accounts. 
Update of Judgment Initially Entered March 1. 2012 
23. The Court hereby finds that the Judgment entered March 1, 2012, should 
be updated with offsets and adjustments as set forth above and calculated as follows: 
Judgment dated 03/01/12 $1,912,696.00 
A. Interest only - Judgment 02/25/11 $438,924.43 










C. Interest only - Accrual of interest 
(Interest calculated at 8% interest 
from July 27, 2011 to May 23, 
2012 or 301 days at per diem of 
$419.22 on principal amount of 
$1,912,696.00) 
D. Attorneys' Fees/Costs - Judgment 01/25/12 
Principal amount 
Interest amount 
E. Sandy Retail Center payment relative to 
Benchmark and sales price of 
$590,000 and net sales proceeds of 
$523,507.33; and $9,000 credit 
F . Amount Petitioner ordered to pay 
Respondent under ,I 3.b. of Order 
(Hearing 01/22) entered 02/13/13 
G. Charge for $130.00 and payment by 
Petitioner of $130.00 for 
Respondent's service fees 
H. Adjustment as described above 
relative to Respondent's accounting 
I. Accounting adjustment as described above 
for UESP accounts 
J. Net sales proceeds from sale of 
Phoenix Plaza 
Unpaid principal as of May 23, 2012, relative to 












Accordingly, the Court finds that a judgment updating the initial Judgment 
entered on March 1, 2012, should be entered against Petitioner in favor of Respondent 
{00382841-1 } 
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in the amount of $1,128,948.62 as of May 23, 2012, with interest at the rate of eight 
percent (8%) accruing on the unpaid principal balance until paid in full. Costs of 
collection are awarded as permitted under Utah law on this judgment. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the above Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following Conclusions 
of Law: 
1. That a Final Order and Judgment should be entered with terms consistent 
with the terms of the Findings of Fact above. 
DATED this _m_ ~ay of yV\. A:tq , 2013. 
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IFILil B13I~C1' COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 2 9 2013 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 




DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent. 
.,-(RESPONBENT'S PROPOSED~ t)_ 
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 074900501 
Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy 
Comm. Joanna Sagers 
On April 17-19, 2013, the hearing on the remaining issues in this action was 
conducted before the Court, Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy presiding. Petitioner Michael 
S. Robinson was present and represented by F. Kevin Bond and Budge W. Call. 
Respondent Debra J. Robinson was present and represented by Dean C. Andreasen 
and Diana L. Telfer. The Court considered the admitted evidence and the proffers and 
arguments of counsel. Based thereon, the Court ORDERS, ADJUDGES and 
DECREES as follows: 
(00382642-1 } 
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1. The Court affirms all previous rulings, orders and judgments entered in 
this action except as provided for herein. 
Lis Pendens 
2. The Court declines to impose statutory damages relative to the six lis 
pendens recorded by Petitioner. 
Contempt 
3. The Court declines to hold Petitioner in contempt for: 
a. having recorded the six lis pendens; 
b. having interfered with the sale of the Sandy Retail Center and the 
Phoenix Plaza; 
c. having diverted assets; 
d. having diverted rents from the Phoenix Plaza; 
e. having failed to comply with the orders of the Bankruptcy Court 
although Respondent may pursue such with the Bankruptcy Court; and 
f. having failed to sign documents relative to the sale and closing of 
the sale of the Sandy Retail Center and the Phoenix Plaza; 
4. The previous Findings and Order entered November 19, 2012, relative to 
Petitioner's contempt for having made disparaging comments about Respondent, 
remains in effect including the ordered sanctions. 
5. The previous Findings, Order, and Judgment entered March 1, 2012, 






encumbering the Phoenix Plaza, remains in effect but the Court declines to impose 
sanctions because the issue is moot in that the Phoenix Plaza property has been sold. 
6. With respect to the St. George condominium issues, as far as those 
concern discovery issues governed by Rule 37, and to the extent relief is requested 
under Rule 37, the same is denied. 
7. Insofar as any other contempt issue presented, the Court declines in the 
interest of justice to impose any further contempt finding or any further sanction. 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs 
8. Respondent is awarded her attorneys' fees and costs incurred from 
January.1, 2008 through May 31, 2012, in the total amount of $309,074.72. However, 
the $309,074.72 amount is reduced by the amount of $83,373.18 because the 
$83,373.18 amount constitutes a Judgment entered on January 25, 2012 for attorneys' 
fees and costs, which were incurred during the January 1, 2008 through May 31, 2012 
time period. The Judgment entered on January 25, 2012 is being satisfied in total as 
described below. Accordingly, judgment is hereby entered against Petitioner in favor of 
Respondent in the amount of $225,701.54 ($309,074.72 - $83,373.18) for attorneys' 
fees and costs. 
9. Respondent was also previously awarded attorneys' fees and costs in the 
amount of $6,251.26 relative to the Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs entered 
April 12, 2013, as awarded in the Findings and Order entered November 19, 2012. 
Accordingly, a judgment is hereby entered against Petitioner in favor of Respondent in 
the amount of $6,251.26. 





10. Judgment interest and costs of collection are awarded as permitted under 
Utah law on the two judgments for attorneys' fees and costs awarded to Respondent 
above. These two judgments are not included in the Update of Judgment section below 
because of the different interest rates involved. 
11. Respondent shall be responsible for her attorneys' fees and costs incurred 
prior to January 1, 2008 and after May 31, 2012, and any request for attorneys' fees 
and costs during those time periods is denied. 
12. Petitioner shall be responsible for his attorneys' fees and costs for all time 
periods, and any request for such is denied. 
Respondent's Accounting 
13. Petitioner stipulated that under Respondent's updated accounting, 
Petitioner owe·s Respondent $19,319.96 to equalize the division of the funds between 
the parties. 
14. As detailed in the Court's Findings of Fact, the Court orders certain 
adjustments to Respondent's accounting. The amount found by the Court is that 
Respondent owes Petitioner a total of $81,617.63 to equalize the division of the funds 
between the parties. 
15. Accordingly, Respondent owes Petitioner the amount of $62,297.67 
($81,617.63- $19,319.96) and such amount shall be used as an adjustment in the final 





Utah Education Savings Plan Accounts 
16. Under the terms of the Decree of Divorce, the parties were to equalize the 
division of certain Utah Educational Savings Plan accounts held as of November 2, 
2007. On November 2, 2007, Petitioner held accounts totaling $6,441.39 and 
Respondent held accounts totaling $15,014.72 resulting in Respondent owing Petitioner 
the amount of $4,286.67 which amount shall be used as an adjustment in the final 
judgment amount as described below. 
Update of Judgment Initially Entered March 1. 2012 
17. The updated amount of the Judgment entered on March 1, 2012, with 







Judgment dated 03/01 /12 
Interest only - Judgment 02/25/11 
Interest only - Judgment 03/01 /12 
Interest only- Accrual of interest 
(Interest calculated at 8% interest 
from July 27, 2011 to May 23, 
2012 or 301 days at per diem of 
$419.22 on principal amount of 
$1,912,696.00} 
Attorneys' Fees/Costs - Judgment 01/25/12 
Principal amount 
Interest amount 
Sandy Retail Center payment relative to 
Benchmark and sales price of 
$590,000 and net sales proceeds of 











F. Amount Petitioner ordered to pay 
Respondent under ,J 3.b. of Order 
{Hearing 01/22) entered 02/13/13 
G. Charge for $130.00 and payment by 
Petitioner of $130.00 for 
Respondent's service fees 
H. Adjustment as described above 
relative to Respondent's accounting 
I. Accounting adjustment as described above 
for UESP accounts 
J. Net sales proceeds from sale of 
Phoenix Plaza 
Unpaid principal as of May 23, 2012, relative to 







18. Accordingly, judgment is entered against Petitioner in favor of Respondent 
in the amount of $1,128,948.62 as of May 23, 2012, with interest at the rate of eight 
percent (8%) accruing on the unpaid principal balance until paid in full. Costs of 
collection are awarded as permitted under Utah law on this judgment. 
Tax Liability on Sale of Phoenix Plaza 
19. In paragraph 8 of the Order entered January 24, 2012, the Court ordered 
that "Petitioner is the owner of the Phoenix Plaza and the only person subject to IRS 
Form 1099 reporting pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Decree." Although the Court 
affirms that ruling, it further orders that Petitioner is entitled to a credit against the 
judgment referred to in the prior section for one half of the income tax assessed directly 
attributable to the sale of the Phoenix Plaza, as reported on Petitioner's 2012 federal 









2012 federal income tax return, any amendment thereto, and any supplemental 
information from Petitioner's accountant necessary to verify the amount of the tax. In 
the event the sale of the Phoenix Plaza results in a capital loss (i.e. a tax savings), the 
amount of the judgment shall be increased by one half of the income tax savings 
directly attributable to the sale of the Phoenix Plaza, as reported on Petitioner's 2012 
federal income tax return. 
DATED this __.2tl t'a'y of May, 2013. 
BY THE COURT: 
TO D M. SHAUGHNESSY 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED this 
day of May, 2013: ~~~ ~J-e~ 
~~G-Oll\..~~~ 
C(,V\ ~ c:it-M- 6}~ "'1A-L(_.d_., 
F. KEVIN BOND 
BUDGE W. CALL 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DEBRA J. ROBINSON, 
Respondent. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 07 4900501 
Judge Todd Shaughnessy 
Pending before the court are (i) petitioner's Rule 59 Motion for New Trial to Amend 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Judgment, and (ii) petitioner's Rule 
62(b) Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment. The court has reviewed the moving1 
opposition, and reply papers filed In connection with both motions. Oral argument has not 
been requested and would not materially assist the court in resolving the motions. 
Motion to Amend. 
Petitioner's Rule 59 motion challenges the $1.9 million judgment originally entered 
on or about March 1, 2012, and the court's award of attorneys' fees following the final 
hearings in April 2013. The March 1, 2012 1 judgment was incorporated into and 
consolidated with the final judgment of the court, entered on or about May 29, 2013. With 
respect to petitioner's challenges to the $1.9 million judgment, the arguments raised by 
petitioner are all arguments that were or could have been raised in his Motion to Amend 
Judgment, Vacate Judgment. or Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rules 521 59 1 and/or 
60{b)(6), filed by petitioner on or about March 14, 2012. That motion was fully briefed, 
7131 
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argued, and the court stands by its ruling and declines to revisit again the March 1, 2012, 
judgment. That portion of the motion is therefore denied for all of the reasons previously 
given in connection with the prior challenge to that judgment, and the additional reasons 
set forth in respondent's opposition papers. With respect to the petitioner's challenge to 
the court'~ award of attorneys' fees, the court notes that it did not award respondent all of 
the fees she sought and did not award her fees she incurred in connection with matters on 
which she was not successful at the hearing held in April 2013. The court stands by its 
attorney fee ruling for the reasons stated on the record and as set forth in petitioner's 
opposition papers. In sum, petitioner's Rule 59 motion is DENIED. 
Motion to Stay. 
Petitioner requests a stay pursuant to Rule 62(b ). The basis for the stay is his 
pending Rule 59 motion, and he requests a stay "until after a decision has been rendered 
on Petitioner's Rule 59 Motion .... " The court has now ruled on the Rule 59 motion, and 
the Rule 62(b) motion is therefore DENIED as moot. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, and for good cause appearing, petitioner's Rule 59 Motion 
for New Trial to Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions <;>f Law, and Final Judgment, and 
petitioner's Rule 62(b) Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment are both DENIED. This is 
the order of the court, and no additional order is required to be prepared in this matter. 
DATED this 11th day of July, 2013. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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May 23, 2012 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Good morning, Counsel. 
{Good mornings from counsel.) 
THE COURT: Okay. We are on the record--
we're on the record, right, Ma~dy? 
{No audible response.) 
THE COURT: Okay. We're on the record in 
the Robinson v. Robinson matter, 074900501. And for 
purposes of the record, can we have folks who are on 
the line identify themselves? 
MR. CALL: Yeah. Budge Call, Your Honor, on 
behalf of the Petitioner, Michael Robinson. 
MR. ANDREASEN: Dean Andrea.sen and Sarah 
Campbell on behalf of the Respondent, Debra Robinson. 
THE COURT: Okay. I appreciate your doing 
this. I know it's a little--a little bit of an 
unusual way dealing with ruling on the--on the pending 
motions, but I--I wanted to--first of all, wanted--as 
I said yesterday, the purpose of my--of the call today 
is really just to announce to you what my ruling is on 
the three pending motions that we've got before us. 
And I decided during the hearing yesterday 
that--that I wanted to--although I had a good idea of 
what I wanted to do, I decided that I wanted to go 
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back and take another look at the file. I wanted to 
go back and sort of go through everything once again 
and make sure that I had satisfied myself that I was 
familiar with the issues. 
You know, I'm not--I'm sympathetic to the 
issue that's been raised about this case potentially 
going up on appeal and it resulting in a lot more 
delay and a lot more expense in a case that has been 
subject t~, as you all know better than I, a lot of 
delay and a lot of expense already. And so I really 
felt like I needed to go back once again, look through 
everything very carefully. 
So I did that for the bett~r part of the 
night last night, went back sort of once again through 
the file, reviewed everything carefully, reviewed 
again the briefs that were filed on the pending 
motions, and am going to just sort of announce to you 
what I'm--what I'm going to do with respect to the 
pending motions, and then we'll talk sort of briefly 
about where we go from there. 
Let me take up, first, the--the motion to 
amend the preliminary injunction that the Court 
entered with respect to the Lis Pendens and the 
nullification of the Lis Pendens. The Court's going 
to deny that motion. I believe that the Court had the 
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authority, under 78B-6-1304, or the Court's inherent 
authority to issue orders effectively in aid of its 
jurisdiction and to nullify the Lis Pendens in this 
case. 
Basically what I said in my March 1, 2012 
Minute Entry, and I'm going to stand by that ruling. 
You know, there are some practical considerations that 
were at issue here that I don't know were ever really 
spelled out very clearly. The reality is that we were 
on the eve of a court-ordered sale of one parcel of 
property and ultimately a second parcel of property; 
that these Lis Pendens had been recorded not simply 
once, but twice; that this was obviously done--and I 
think the Petitioner has been fairly candid that this 
was done in an effort to prevent that sale from 
closing. 
The reality is that going to Judge Stone and 
--out in West Jordan in that case, you would have been 
presenting to him, you know, all of these issues with 
none of the background regarding the--the issues in 
the divorce case. And I think it would have been 
unfair to him and he would have been, frankly, very 
ill-equipped to deal with the issues that had been 
ordered either by me--the orders that had been entered 
either by me or by predecessor judges in this case. 
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And I think just as a practical matter, there 
was no way to deal with that other than by having--by 
having me handle it. So for these reasons and the 
other reasons that were advanced, I'm going to deny 
the--the motion to amend the preliminary injunction 
and the nullification order. Mr. Andreasen, I'm going 
to ask you to please prepare a short order on that, 
okay? 
MR. ANDREASEN: Certainly. Are you issuing 
any type of additional minute entry on that or not? 
THE COURT: I'm not. 
MR. ANDREASEN: Okay. 
THE COURT: Well, what--what I will do, when 
we get done, is I'm going to give--and Mandy's not 
even in here, but I'm going to have Mandy just do a 
docket entry of this phone call with, you know, 
basically a three-sentence summary of what the rulings 
were and who's been directed to prepare what. 
MR. ANDREASEN: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay? 
(No audible response.) 
THE COURT: So next is the--what I call, 
perhaps inaptly, the omnibus motion, if you will. 
This is the Rule 52, 59 and 60(b) motion to amend the 
judgment, to vacate the judgment or for other relief. 
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And this, as I said, is what I spent the bulk of my 
time, you know, last night and again this morning 
going back again through the file and making sure that 
I was comfortable with what had happened up to this 
point in the case. 
And I'm going--and I don't know that it's 
necessary to do this, but I'm going to sort of walk 
back through a little bit the--the notes that I have 
from going back through the file so at least it's 
clear as to how I get to the conclusions that I get 
to. 
There was, on November 2nd of 2007, a 
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, 
pursuant to which Debra was to receive $1.7 million, 
Michael was to receive--at least in connection with 
the property that we're talking about here, that 
Michael was to receive the property and this refinance 
was basically a mechanism that had been agreed to by 
the parties in order to fund a property distribution, 
of which the Phoenix Plaza was--was one part, among 
many. 
Not long thereafter, there was a sort of a 
protracted period of litigation in the case, and that 
ultimately resulted in a motion being filed by Michael 
to set aside the stipulation. That was heard on 
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October 6, 2008 by the Commissioner. The Commissioner 
denied that motion. The order was signed, it looks 
like, on November 14, 2008 by the Commissioner, and 
then on November 17, 2008 by Judge Iwasaki. 
That's the order--that, along with the 
Divorce Decree that is entered on December 31st of 
2008, are the issues that go up on appeal to the Utah 
Court of Appeals. And the Court of Appeals' decision 
is issued on April 20th of 2010. 
I've taken another look at the Court of 
Appeals opinion and the Court of Appeals pretty--and I 
agreed with the--with the point that was made at 
yesterday's hearing that the Court of Appeals 
obviously did not have the contempt issue in front of 
it. The Court of Appeals had in front of it the issue 
of setting aside the agreement that had been entered 
into by the parties and the decree that was premised 
on that agreement. But in that context, the Court of Appeals pretty squarely 
held that 
the doctrines of mutual mistake and impossibility were 
not grounds upon which Michael could set aside the 
stipulation and decree. 
The issue of fraud is an issue that, while 
not directly raised as a defense, is an issue that 
could have been raised and was not raised and is 
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therefore barred by res judicata, as I found in 
confirming the ruling from the July 26th hearing. 
It's important to me, at least from sort of my 
analysis of--of how we look at this case, is that as 
of April 22nd of 2010, when the Court of Appeals 
issued its opinion, the lay of the land was basically 
this: We had a stipulation and a decree that the 
Court of Appeals had determined were valid and 
enforceable. 
That stipulation and decree and the Court of 
Appeals opinion represent law of the case. Under the 
terms of that stipulation and decree, Debra was 
entitled to the $1.784 million in property distri-
bution. I don't believe, in light of the ruling from 
the Court of Appeals and the doctrine of law of the 
case, that I have the authority to change any of that, 
even if I were inclined to do so. 
!--there's simply no way that I can properly 
undo decisions that have been made by the Court of 
Appeals, and I can't do that either directly or 
indirectly. It's simply outside the scope of 
authority that I have. And everything that happened 
in the case from and after that time has to be viewed 
in light of the reality of the Court of Appeals 
decision. 
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You know, there's some significant attention 
paid in the briefs to what the Commissioner did or did 
not consider, what Judge Iwasaki did or did not 
consider, and what the Court of Appeals did or did not 
consider in the course of making that opinion--in the 
course of the events prior to April 22nd of 2010. 
And my response to that is that--that this 
Court is not the proper forum in which to raise any of 
those issues. I simply don't have the authority to go 
back and unwind it. And I don't believe that I can do 
it indirectly. I don't believe that--that I have the 
authority to do indirectly what I am prohibited by law 
of the case and by the binding precedent from the 
Court of Appeals indirectly. 
So the events following the issuance of the 
opinion are really the ones that are most important 
for purposes of this motion. And so we have, on 
January 13th of 2011, a hearing before the 
Commissioner, at which the Commissioner did a few 
things, one is which--one of which was struck 
affidavits or declarations that the Commissioner 
determined had been untimely filed. 
The Commissioner declined to continue the 
hearing and at that January 13, 2011, Michael 
stipulated to the sale of the property for $3 million. 
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There is a suggestion that that stipulation was 
somehow not voluntary and I just can't find any 
evidence to suggest that--that his agreement as of 
January 13th to sell the property for $3 million was 
anything other than a voluntary agreement that he'd 
entered into at that time. 
Now, the Commissioner also concluded that--
that he could not award the principal amount of the 
$1.7 million, and that the--that those amounts would 
have to be--because they were not yet due--and I--
whatever the language of the Commissioner from the--
from the hearing is what it is, but essentially that 
those were not yet due and they would have to be dealt 
with as a sanction following a finding of contempt. 
And that's what, it appears to me, kind of led us down 
the road of the contempt proceedings that followed. 
There was an objection to the Commissioner's 
recommendation that was filed in late January. That 
was addressed and ruled upon by Judge Iwasaki in 
February. And he also entered his order from the 
January 13 hearing. 
We then sort of move--we then move to the 
April 2011 time frame. And at that point in time 
Michael filed a relief--again, a--basically a 59 or 
60(b) motion for relief, in which he raised, again, 
ANN M. LOVE, RPR, CCR 
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the fraud issues. That motion was subsequently 
withdrawn, as we all know from the Minute Entry that I 
entered and from the docket in the case. And in early 
June, Debra moved to enforce the stipulation and to 
sell the property for $3 million. 
There is, on June 21st of 2011, a hearing 
before Judge Iwasaki, at which Judge Iwasaki orders a 
couple of things. One is a sale of the Sandy Center. 
The other is the sale of the Phoenix Plaza for $3 
million. 
We then--that then gets us to the point of 
the July 26, 2011 hearing. I have gone back again 
last night and reread the transcript of the hearing. 
And I've gone back again and looked at the Minute 
Entry that I entered and the Findings of Fact that I 
entered on March 1st with respect to that issue. 
And I am, I will tell you candidly, not 100 
percent comfortable, as I indicated to you at the 
hearing yesterday, that contempt and a contempt 
proceeding was the correct vehicle to use to enforce 
the sale of the property. However, under Rules 59, 60 
and Rule 52, as well, it's not my role and my job to 
go back and re-review and second-guess each decision. 
Now, if there is an obvious or egregious 
error that's been made, then I think that I need to go 
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back and look at it and try and fix it. And as I say, 
I'm not entirely comfortable with the idea that a 
contempt proceeding was the proper way to enforce the 
terms of the decree. 
However, in that regard, I can say a few 
things. One is in going back and looking at the 
transcript again, there is a certain sense in which 
that error, if it was an error, was invited by 
Michael's counsel at the time. Because what happened 
was there were certain proffers that were made at the 
hearing with respect to testimony that would be 
offered. 
There was a discussion between Judge Iwasaki 
and--and Michael's counsel about the Court of Appeals 
opinion and the issues that had been addressed by the 
Court of Appeals. And essentially, no one said at the 
time what's being said now, which is, Wait a minute. 
There was not a contempt issue that was before the 
Court of Appeals at the time. You still need to 
consider this issue. 
Basically, what happened is--is counsel said, 
Well, if you're not going to consider impossibility 
and you're not going to consider mistake, and you're 
not going to consider res judicata because it's 
something that could have been raised but was not and 
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therefore barred by res judicata, then there's really 
nothing on which--there's really nothing to present in 
terms of evidence. And it would--there's a certain 
sense in which the finding of--the finding of contempt 
that resulted from that was a foregone conclusion. 
The other thing I will say is that even if 
the contempt vehicle was not the proper vehicle to 
raise the issue, and if it were addressed in some 
other way, I'm not sure that the result at the end of 
the day would be any different. And that was the 
issue I was trying to get at, inartfully I'm sure, in 
my questions of Mr. Bond yesterday about whether we 
wouldn't be in the same place we are now if it had 
been enforced by, for example, a motion for summary 
judgment or, frankly, even a--a trial on the issue of 
the contract--the contract being enforceable and no 
defense to the contract being enforceable on the 
grounds of impossibility, mutual mistake or fraud. 
And so I guess the bottom line for me is that 
unless there was some mechanism by which the Court 
could go back and undo the Utah Court of Appeals 
opinion, which this Court can't do and isn't inclined 
to do, in any event, the deal that was reached by the 
parties would still have to be enforced. And the 
mechanism of contempt was a mechanism that was chosen 
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to do that. As I said, I'm not a hundred percent sure 
that that was the right choice, but what I am sure of 
is that at the end of the day, if it was not the right 
choice, I think the result and where we would be if a 
different path had been followed is exactly where we 
are today. 
The other thing I want to make clear is that 
to the extent there was any confusion about the 
interlineations that I made to the propo~ed form of 
order from the July 26 hearing, my purpose in making 
those interlineations was--was not to do anything 
other than make sure that the findings and the order 
conformed with the issues that were before Judge 
Iwasaki on July 26th so that the order would correctly 
reflect what he ruled at the hearing. I didn't intend 
anything more or anything less than that. 
That's sort of a long explanation, I think, 
of getting to the point that I've looked at these 
issues carefully, I've thought about them carefully, 
and I just don't see that there is grounds or, 
frankly, the ability, given the Court of Appeals 
opinion, to go back and unwind what's happened in the 
case since July of 2011, or since April, frankly, of 
2011, when the Court of Appeals opinion came down. 
So on that basis, I'm going to deny the--what 
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I've called the omnibus motion. And again, we'll do a 
very short Minute Entry following our telephone 
conference today documenting that. Mr. Andreasen, 
I'll ask you to prepare the order. Okay?· 
MR. ANDREASEN: Did you want-all-of this 
background in the order or not? 
THE COURT: No, I don't think--I think the 
record speaks for itself. I just wanted my rationale 
to be recorded somewhere in how I got to the point 
that I got to. 
MR. ANDREASEN: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Now, that brings up the last 
motion, which is the motion dealing with the temporary 
restraining order that I issued. And with respect to 
that issue, I will enter an order, when we finish the 
phone call today, dissolving my TRO effective 
immediately. I'm not going to do anything in that 
order other than dissolve the TRO, because I don't 
have any other issue, frankly, before me in that 
regard. 
The TRO, as I explained yesterday, was 
entered for purpose--purposes of--and I went back and 
looked at it again today and I think it was pretty 
clear--for purposes of preserving the status quo 
pending a ruling on the motion that I have now just 
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ruled on. And in light of the fact that I denied the 
motion, I'm going to dissolve the TRO. And so I don't 
need anybody to prepare anything for me on that. I'll 
just enter a short order when we get done here. Okay? 
MR. ANDREASEN: Would that result in the 
funds being disbursable, if there is such a word, 
immediately after that is entered? 
THE COURT: That, I don't know. I mean, I'm 
assuming that your prior orders that you had in the 
case dealing with the sale of the property address in 
some fashion how that's to occur. But I didn't go 
back and look at those again. And the only issue that 
I, frankly, view that I have in front of me is 
dissolving the TRO. 
MR. ANDREASEN: Okay. Certainly {inaudible) 
--I think you've answered my question. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ANDREASEN: May I ask one question for 
clarification? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. ANDREASEN: You have the request for 
attorney fees in responding to their two motions, to 
(inaudible) motions. Is the Court ruling on that, 
also? 
THE COURT: Why don't we do this? On the 
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motion for attorney's fees, indicate in the order that 
the Court will take up that request for attorney's 
fees in connection with these motions in resolving--in 
sort of fully and finally resolving all of the 
outstanding issues in the case. 
MR. ANDREASEN: Certainly. 
THE COURT: So that--I'd prefer not to do it 
piecemeal. 
MR. ANDREASEN: (Inaudible.) 
THE COURT: Okay. The other thing that I 
suggested yesterday we be prepared to talk about is 
scheduling. And I wonder if, given that we don't have 
your all's clients on the line and we don't have 
Mr. Bond here, what we ought perhaps to do instead is 
to simply set a date for a scheduling conference at 
which you all could come in with your proposals as to 
how I proceed from--from there. 
And I guess, perhaps --and I say this, hoping 
against odds, that the two of you have an opportunity 
to speak with one another and present me some agreed-
upon proposal for how we proceed from here to fully 
and finally resolving the case. 
MR. ANDREASEN: And certainly I think that 
makes sense, and we'd be happy to make a proposal and 
get something over to Mr. Call and Mr. Bond here in 
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the near future. And I see kind of two practices 
we're following now, one being the contempt issue that 
we've started. 
And then number two, a motion dealing with 
all of the, I'll call, wrap-up issues. For example, 
attorney fees; for example, accrual of interest; 
things--additional items that were in the Decree of 
Divorce that just need to be finalized and either 
brought to judgment or ruled upon in some fashion. 
THE COURT: Right. And I think there may be 
--based on the comments that were made yesterday, I 
think there may be issues that--that the Petitioner 
will want to bring up with respect to that sort of 
final accounting and wrapping up. 
MR. ANDREASEN: Certainly. 
THE COURT: And it would--and I guess it 
would be my hope that we figure out a way to tee up 
all of those issues and get them--and get them 
resolved as efficiently as we can. 
MR. ANDREASEN: We still have, I guess from 
my perspective, a major issue of are Mr. Call and 
Mr. Bond going to be involved in the case, given this 
advice of counsel defense that has been raised. 
THE COURT: Well, that's put that on the list 
of things to talk about--
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MR. ANDREASEN: Okay. 
THE COURT: --I guess. So--
MR. CALL: (Inaudible) that in our proposal 
to get this thing resolved. But do we want to get a 
date to come over for a scheduling conference? 
THE COURT: Yeah, that's what I'm look--
that's what--I'm just looking at my calendar here. 
Let me--let me get Mandy. I hesitate to schedule 
anything without her knowing what I'm doing, so ... 
Do you guys want to come over here and do it 
or do we want to do it--do we want to do it on-the 
phone? 
MR. ANDREASEN: I might suggest, Your Honor, 
that maybe we just--give us a ten-day period or 
something at least to see if we can put something down 
on paper as to all the remaining issues, get it to you 
and then maybe come--I'm happy either way, a phone 
call or in person, whichever is most convenient. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's--
MR. CALL: Yeah, that's fine. If we can get 
a written proposal to you, then may be easier to_ do it 
by phone. 
THE COURT: Yeah. If you all have an 
agreement as to how you want to do it, then there's--
what I don't want to do is have all of you take the 
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time and effort and traipsing down here when we really 
don't need to. So why don't we do--why don't we--
let's figure out what a date is. We'll plan on this 
being a--sort of a telephone scheduling conference. 
And if either of you feels like we need--that we need 
to have everybody down here and we need more time to 
do it, then just include that in whatever you file 
with me. 
We're looking at--I mean, ~hey want at least 
ten days to sort of sort through the issues, so we're 
looking at probably two weeks. The first week in June 
I'm in Summit. We've got a trial (inaudible). If we 
did it that week, we'd have to--it would have to be on 
the phone. 
(One of the attorneys talking, inaudible.} 
THE COURT: How about Wednesday, June 13th at 
4:00? 
MR. ANDREASEN: We're fine. 
THE COURT: Does that work for you guys? Do 
you have--do you have Kevin's calendar or not? 
MR. CALL: I do. He's not available on the 
13th, but he is available on the 12th. 
THE COURT: Yeah, I can't do it on the 12th. 
If we--I'm out of town on the 14th. We could do the--
Wednesday, the 20th, at 8:30. 
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MR. ANDREASEN: We're fine. 
MR. CALL: (Inaudible.) 
(Judge talking to clerk, inaudible.) 
MR. CALL: I'm sorry, I had to run into 
Kevin's office real quick. He doesn't seem to have 
any conflict on the 20th, so that should work. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's plan on the 
20th at 8:30. Can you all make an effort to get to me 
some kind of a consolidated statement, if you will, of 
the issues that we need to kind of resolve and talk 
about? 
the 13th. 
MR. ANDREASEN: Sure. 
THE COURT: And do that by the--Wednesday, 
MR. ANDREASEN: Certainly. 
MR. CALL: Okay. 
THE COURT: And if you--and if--I guess what 
I envision is if--if--you know, one section of that 
that says, Here are the issues we all agree need to be 
resolved and our proposal for how to resolve them. 
And hopefully that's the end of it. But if not, 
another section saying, you know, These are the other 
issues that we think we need to address and how we 
want to address them. Just so I've got something that 
kind of has each party's position on that. Okay? 
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THE COURT: Thanks very much, Counsel. I 
appreciate it. 
MR. ANDREASEN: Thank you. 
MR. CALL: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Bye. 
(The ruling was concluded.} 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
* * * 
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County TUCOrder may reject wrongful 
lion within sa>po otemployment.-
Oocd faith roqui.remenL 
Civil liability for recording WNngful 
lien - Damages. 
Repealed. 
Suction 
38-9--6, Petition. to file lioa - Notice to 
rooord intc-rest holders - Sum-
mary relief - Contested petition. 
38-8-7. Petition to nulliJy lien - Notice to 
lien claimant - Summary reUof -
Finding of wroosf ul lien - Wrong-
ful lien is void. 
38 .. 9-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter. 
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present, 
lawful property interest in certain real property. including an owner, title 
holder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner. 
(2) "Lien claimant'' means a person claiming an interest in real property 
who offers a document for recording ·or filing with any county recorder in 
the state asserting a lien, or notice of interest. or other claim of interest in 
certain real property. 
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in 
certain real property. 
( 4) {a) "Record interest ·holder11 means a person who holds or possesses 
a present_· lawful property interest in certain real property, including 
an owner, titleholdert mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial QWller, and 
whose name ·antt ittterest in that real property appears in the county 
recorder's records for the county in which the property is located. 
(b) "Record interest bolder" includes any grantor in the chain of the 
title in certain real property. 
(5) ~cord owner"' means an owner whose name and ownership inter-
est in cei·tain real property is i:ecorded or filed in tbe:_ county recorder's 
records for the county in which the prope1-ty is locat.ed. 
(6) "Wrongful lien,•~-any doeu~ent that purports to create a lien, 
notice.of-interest, or encmnhrance on an owner's interest in certain real 
property and at the time it is recorded is not: · 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapt.er or another state or federal 
statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of 
competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the 
owner of the real property. 
History: C. 1963. 38-9-t, enacted by L. 
189'1, eh. 126, t Si 2008, ch. 123, § 1; 2009, 
ell. 69, f 1; iOlO, cb. 381, § 2G. 
Repeals and ~ta. - Laws 
1997, ch. 125, § 2. repeals former§ 38-9-1, as 
enacted by Laws 19.85, ch. 182. § 1. \"elating t.o 
the liability of a petsan llllng-a wrongtul lion. 
and eoacw t.he present section. See f 38-9-4 for 
pre,ent. liability provision&. 
Aanendmon& Notes. - The 2008 amend-
ment, effective May 6, 2008, added •OT notice of 
1nwest• in CZ) and added -Ootice of interest'" in 
(6). 
Tho 2009 amendment, offed;ive May 12. 
2009, added the (4}{a) desigo4tion and added 
{41(b). 
The ·2010 amendment, etrective May 11, 
2010, delot.ed •or filed• fallowing -recorded" in 
the introdumry language of (8). 
3~9-2. Scope. 
(1) (a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1. 38-9-3, 38-9-4, and 38 .. 9-6 apply to 
any recording or filing or any rejected recording or filing of a lien_ pursuant 
to this chapter on or after May 6, 1997. 
(b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38·9-7 apply to all liens of 
record regardless of the date the lien was recorded or- filed. 
(c) Notwithstanding Subsections (l)(a) and (b), the provisions of this 
chapter applicable to the filing of a notice of interest do not apply to a 
notice of interest filed before May 5; 2008. 
(2) The provisions of this cbap~r shall not pnW8Jlt a person from filing a lis 
pendens in accordance with Section 788-6-1308 or seeking any other relief 
permitted by law. 
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section 
38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens. 
History: C. 1968, 88-9-2. enacted by L. 
19971 ch. 125, t S; 1999, ch. I.!9, I 1; 2005, 
ch. 93, § l; 2008, ch. S, § 88; 2008, ob. 223, 
§ z. 
Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws 
1997, ch. 125, t S ropcnla funner I SS-9-2. as 
onacted by Laws 1985. ch. 1B2. § 2, relating to 
en urmuthorized_licn as invulid, and enacts the 
µres.cnt s~ction. For prt."5ent comparable provi-
sion,~§ 38·9-7. 
38-9-3. County recorder may reject wrongful lien within 
scope of employment - Good faith requirement. 
( 1) {a) A county recorder may reject recording of a lien if the county recorder 
determines the lien is a wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-9-1. 
(h} If the county recorder rejects a document to record a lien in 
accordance with Subsection (lXa). the county recorder shall immediat:ely 
return the original document together with a notice that the document 
was rejected pursuant to this section to the person attempting to record 
the document or to the address provided on the document. 
(2) A county recorder who, within the scope of the eounty retarder's 
employment. rejects or accepts a document for recording in good faith under 
this section is not liable for damages. 
(3) If a rejected document is later found to be recordable pursuant to a court 
order, it shall have no retroactive recording priority. 
(4) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude any person from pursuing any 
remedy pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65A, htjunctions. 
Hlatory: C~ 1963, 38-9-3, enacted by L enacted by Lawa 1985. ch. 182, f 3, relating to 
199'7, ch. 1~ f 4J 9010, ch. 381, § 11. liability for refusing to corred P document 
Repeals and Roenaotments. - Laws containing a wrongful lien. and enDcts the 
1997, ch.. 126, f 4 repeals former§ 38-9-8, as present section.. 
·\JJi) 
38-9-4. Civil liability for recording-wroµ.g.ful lien - Dam-
ages. 
{11 A lien claimant who ~ or. causes. a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 to be recorded in the office of the county recOI'der against real 
property i.s liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages proxi-
mately caused by the wron.gful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of Subsection (1) refuses to. release qr correct 
the wrongful lien within 10 days from the date of written reqQest from a .record 
in~& holder of t~ · real p~perty delive~d personally or mail~d tio the 
last-known address of the lien claimant~ ·the ·person is -liab1e to that r~ 
Jnterest h~lder for $.;3;000 or for treble actual damages;·whichever.is greater. 
and for reasonable attorney fees nnd OQSts. · 
(3). A person is Jiabl~ to the .re.cord awner of real property for $10,000 or for 
treble actt$1 damages. whichever· is greater., and for reasonable attm,ley: fees· 
and costs, who records or cuuaes to bo recorded a wrongful.lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 fn the office of the county recorder against: the real property. 
knowing or having reesQn to know that the document: · 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
{c) contains a material mi~tatcrnent or false claim. 
History: C. 1953, 38-9-4, enacted by L 
1997, clL 125, § .. o; 2008, e,h. 297, § ill 208' 
ch. 223, i 3; 2010~-ch. 381, i 22. 
Repeals· and -~nc:tments. - Lawa 
1997; ch. 125, § 5 repeal&- former f. 38-9-4, aa 
Qnaeted. by Laws 1985; ch. UI~, §. 4, rel:3tmg to. 
· V'Qnue; ~.bJ. and attorn~y fct-s, ~uid 9~acts the 
present. section. For p~ont provision~. s~ § 
SS.9-6. . 
38-9--5. Repealed. ~ 
Repeals. - Laws 2006. ch. 93. t 12 repeals For present com.parable provisiona, see § 76-6-
f 38-9-6, ae enacted by L. 1997. ch.. 125, § 6, 503.5; 80u also TiUe 38, Chapte?' 9a, regarding 
portnining to criminal liability and penalties iajunctions against wrongful liens. 
for filing a wrongful lien. oftective May 2. 20015. 
88-9-6. Petition to file lien - Notice to record interest 
holders - Summary relief - Contested petition. 
(l) A lien claimant whose document is rejected pursuant to Section 88-9-3 
may petition the district court in the county in which the document was 
rejected for an expedited determination that the lien may be recorded or filed. 
(2) (a) The petition ahall be filed with the district coort within 10 days of the 
date notice is received of the rejection and shall state with specificity the 
grounds why the document should lawfully be recorded or filed. 
(b) The petition shall be supported by a sworn affidavit. of the lien 
claimant. 
(c) If the court finds the petition is insufficient, it may dismiss the 
petition without a hearing. 
(d} If the court grants a hearing, the petitioner shall serve a copy of the 
petition, notice of hearing, and a copy of the court's order granting an 
expedited hearing on all record interest holders of the property sufficiently 
in advance of the hearing to enable any record interest holder to attend the 
hearing and service shall be accomplished by certified or registered mail 
(e) Any record interest holder of the property has the right to attend 
and contest the petition. 
(3) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court finds that the document 
may lawfully be recorded, it shall issue an order directing the county recorder 
to accept the document for recording. Jf the petition is contested, the court may 
award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 
(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether 
or not a. contested document, on its face, shall be recorded by the county 
recorder. The proceeding may not determine the truth of the content of the 
document nor the property or legal rights of the parties beyond th~ necessary 
determination of whether or not the doaiment shall be recorded. The court's 
grant or denial of the petition under this section may not restrict any other 
legal remedies of any party, including any right to injunctive relief pursuant to 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 66A, Injunctions. 
(5) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings 
may not be expedited under this section.. 
Bl~tocy: C. 1933. 38-9--6, enacted by L. 
199'1. ch. 12&, I 7. 
38-9-7. Petition to nullify lien - Notice to lien claim.ant -
Summary relief - Finding of wrongful lien -
Wrongful lien is void. 
(1) Any record interest holder ofreal property against which a wrongful lien 




in the county in which the document was recorded for summary relief to nullify 
the lien. 
(2) The petition shall state with specificity the claim that the lien is a 
wrongful lien and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit of the record interest 
holder. 
(3) (a) If the court finds the petition .insufficient, .it may dismiss the petition 
withuut a hearing. 
(b) If the court finds the petition is sufficientt the court shall schedule a 
hearing within 10 days to determine whether the document is a wrongful 
lien. 
(c) The record interest holder shall serve a copy of the petition on the 
lien claimant and a notice of the hearing pursuant to Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 4; Process. 
(d) The lien claimant is entitled to attend and contest the petition. 
(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether 
or not a document is a wrongful lien. The proceeding shall not dete.rrnine any 
other property or legal rights of the parties nor restrict other legal remedies of 
any party. 
(5) (a) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court determines that the 
document is a wrongful lien, the court shall issue an order declaring the 
wrongful lien void ab initio, releasing the property from the lien. and 
awarding costs and reasonable attorney's fees to tbe petitioner. 
(b) (i) The record interest bolder may record a certified copy of the 
order with the county recorder. 
(ii) The order shall contain a legal description of the real property. 
(c) If the oourt determines that the claim of lien is valid, the court shall 
dismiss th& petition and may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to 
the lien claimant. The dismissal order shall contain a legal description of 
the real property. The ptevailing lien claimant may record a certified copy 
of the dismissal order. 
( 6) If the district court determines that the lien is a wrongful lien as defined 
in Section 3S.9- l, the wrongful lien is ·void ab initio and provides no notice of 
claim or interest. 
(7) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings 
may not be expedited under this section. 
History: C. 19ff3, 88-9-'1, enacted by L 
1997, ch. 125, § 8. 
Tab R 
788-6-1304. Motions related to a notice of the pendency of an action. 
(1) Any time after a notice has been recorded pursuant to Section 788,.;6-1303, 
any of the following may make a motion to the court in which the action is pending to 
release the notice: 
(a} a party to the action; or 
(b) a person with an interest in the real property affected by the notice. 
(2) A court shall order a notice released if: 
(a) the court receives a motion to release under Subsection (1); and 
(b) the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of 
the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim that is the subject of the 
notice. 
(3) If a court releases a notice pursuant to this section, the claimant may not 
record another notice with respect to the same property without approval of the court in 
which the action is pending. 
(4) Upon a motion by any person with an interest in the real property that is the 
subject of a notice, a court may require the claimant to give the moving party a 
guarantee as· a condition of maintaining the notice: 
(a) any time after a notice has been recorded; and 
(b) regardless of whether the court has received an application to release under 
Subsection (1 ). 
(5) A person who receives a guarantee under Subsection (4) may recover an 
amount not to exceed the amount of the guarantee upon a showing that: 
(a) the claimant did not prevail on the real property claim; and 
(b) the person seeking the guarantee suffered damages as a result of the 
maintenance of the notice. 
(6) A court shall award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party on any 
motion under this section unless the court finds that: 
(a) the nonprevailing party acted with substantial justification; or 
(b) other circumstances make the imposition of attorney fees and costs unjust. 
Enacted by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 


